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ABSTRACT 
ENSURING APPLICATION SPECIFIC SECURITY, PRIVACY AND 
PERFORMANCE GOALS IN RFID SYSTEMS 
 
Farzana Rahman 
Marquette University, 2013 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is an automatic identification technology that 
uses radio frequency to identify objects. Securing RFID systems and providing privacy in RFID 
applications has been the focus of much academic work lately. To ensure universal acceptance of 
RFID technology, security and privacy issued must be addressed into the design of any RFID 
application. Due to the constraints on memory, power, storage capacity, and amount of logic on 
RFID devices, traditional public key based strong security mechanisms are unsuitable for them. 
Usually, low cost general authentication protocols are used to secure RFID systems. However, the 
generic authentication protocols provide relatively low performance for different types of RFID 
applications. We identified that each RFID application has unique research challenges and 
different performance bottlenecks based on the characteristics of the system. One strategy is to 
devise security protocols such that application specific goals are met and system specific 
performance requirements are maximized.  
This dissertation aims to address the problem of devising application specific security 
protocols for current and next generation RFID systems so that in each application area maximum 
performance can be achieved and system specific goals are met. In this dissertation, we propose 
four different authentication techniques for RFID technologies, providing solutions to the 
following research issues: 1) detecting counterfeit as well as ensuring low response time in large 
scale RFID systems, 2) preserving privacy and maintaining scalability in RFID based healthcare 
systems, 3) ensuring security and survivability of Computational RFID (CRFID) networks, and 4) 
detecting missing WISP tags efficiently to ensure reliability of CRFID based V\VWHP¶VGHFLVLRQ. 
The techniques presented in this dissertation achieve good levels of privacy, provide security, 
scale to large systems, and can be implemented on resource-constrained RFID devices.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is an automatic identification technology that 
uses radio waves to identify objects such as products, animals or persons. Each RFID system has 
three main components: tag, reader, and database. An RFID reader and an RFID tag communicate 
via a wireless radio communication channel. The basic idea of RFID technology is an automatic 
identification technique, which relies on storing and remotely retrieving data about objects we 
want to manage using RFID tags. Some popular applications of RFID technology are product 
tracking in a supply chain [Li07], toll payments [Mayes09], military applications and access 
control [Juels05a], patient recognition in hospitals [Juels05a], automatic vehicle identification 
[Juels05a], point of sale applications [Juels05a], library book administration [Juels05a], and e-
passports [Juels05b].  
Near field communication (NFC) [NFC] is a similar technology like RFID with much 
less capability. NFC is a subset of RFID that limits the range of communication to within 10 
centimeters or 4 inches. However, one advantage of NFC is that some mobile phones are being 
equipped with NFC now-a-days. But this advantage of NFC is overshadowed by its limitations, 
like: NFC has a very limited range and it cannot be programmed like active RFID tags. Therefore, 
it cannot be used in applications where the reading range has to be in meters. It cannot be used in 
many sophisticated applications where the active tag has to be programmed for special purpose. 
Specially, in most of the healthcare applications (like: pharmaceutical drug tracking, patient 
specific meal dispatch and such sophisticated application) longer range and tag programming 
capability is required. Since RFID tags can be read in longer range and it can be programmed for 
special purpose, it has become popular over the last decade in many real life application areas. 
We envision that low-cost RFID tags will be attached to every object in our daily lives, 
from clothes, books, and pens, to very small objects, such as pins and buttons. Annotating objects 
around us with tags gives us an enormous advantage in connecting the physical world with the 
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cyber-world so that people can easily obtain information about the environment and physical 
objects. We believe that more powerful tags and readers in the future promise many more 
applications based on how we may use those tags. 
Unit cost per tag is a major consideration for RFID tags because some applications need 
low cost tags. Cost may be a secondary consideration in passports or credit cards because security 
is paramount and these devices may pass that cost on to the consumer without much concern. In 
an application like product tagging, cost is paramount, and the cost per tag needs to be low; 
otherwise, the benefits of RFID are outweighed by the cost.  
However, simply integrating RFID technology into the above mentioned applications will 
not ensure that the needed services are provided adequately, because RFID systems operate 
untrusted environments, for which adversaries motivated by different purposes may attack the 
system. Some will block readers from hearing tags. Further, attackers may attempt to hide within 
a group of authorized users in an attempt to eavesdrop private information. Moreover, privacy is 
an issue that could hinder the wider use of RFID. Furthermore, privacy will become an even more 
important issue as RFID technology is pervasively applied.  To ensure a wider use of RFID 
technology, security must be included into any design of applications. In some systems one must 
make sure the communication between tags and readers is confidential and authenticated, in other 
systems the information provided by the tags needs to be authenticated and in other systems the 
access to the RFID systems, including tags, readers and other related equipment should be 
classified against unauthorized parties. 
Securing RFID systems and providing privacy in RFID consumer applications has been 
the focus of much academic work lately. Due to the constraints on memory, power, computation 
capacity, and limitations of logic on RFID devices, standard cryptographic primitives are often 
unsuitable for them. Therefore, researchers focused on developing general authentication 
protocols based on lightweight cryptographic tools to ensure the security and privacy of RFID 
systems. However, these generic authentication protocols provide relatively low performance for 
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different types of RFID applications. There was no validated explanation as to why achieving a 
generalized security solution with maximum system performance is not possible for all RFID 
systems. With deeper investigation of existing RFID applications and analysis of authentication 
protocols, we identified that each RFID application has different underlying research challenges 
and a different set of performance bottlenecks based on the unique characteristics of the system. 
One strategy is to devise security protocols such that application specific goals are met and 
system specific performance requirements are maximized. For example:  
1) The main challenge in an RFID based supply chain is to detect counterfeit products at 
the same time ensure low system response time.  
2) Systems like, RFID-based healthcare, e-passports, and office personnel monitoring are 
more focused on ensuring privacy and maintaining scalability.  
3) More sophisticated applications like RFID-installed military networks are more 
focused on maintaining system survivability without sacrificing system’s performance. 
All these applications of RFID technology have a different set of research challenges in 
meeting their system specific goals. 
The aim of this dissertation is to make several contributions to address the problem of 
devising application specific security protocols for the current and next generation of RFID 
systems so that in each application area maximum performance can be achieved and other system 
specific goals are met. Since ensuring security is the common goal in almost any RFID system, 
our major focus has been to develop and implement authentication protocols to solve the 
identified research issues using lightweight operations like hash functions, XOR operations or 
pseudorandom number generation.  
1.1. Dissertation Focus 
In this dissertation, we focus on understanding different research challenges 
corresponding to four different applications of current and next generation RFID systems, so that 
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in each application area maximum performance can be achieved and other system specific goals 
are met. Though there can be numbers of different RFID applications, most of them fall under the 
umbrella of the four RFID application areas that are mentioned in this dissertation. Therefore, the 
contribution of this dissertation makes an effort to address the security, privacy and performance 
goals of many common RFID applications, as well as providing solution to the following research 
issues of four major specific RFID application areas:  
1) Detecting counterfeits in large-scale RFID systems 
2) Preserving privacy in RFID based healthcare systems 
3) Ensuring survivability of Computational RFID (CRFID) systems 
4) Ensuring reliability of system’s decision in CRFID based critical systems 
1.2. Major Contributions 
In this section, we briefly summarize the contributions of this dissertation. In this 
dissertation, first, we describe the properties of a typical RFID and Computational RFID system 
in Chapter 2. Next, in Chapter 3, we summarize all the possible attacks that can be launched 
against RFID systems and how our proposed approaches can defend against those problems. 
Then, in Chapter 4, we point out the security, privacy and performance goals that should be 
guaranteed by RFID protocols to defend against various attacks. Throughout the dissertation, we 
use four different RFID applications as a motivating example of RFID systems with a strong 
demand for various goals mentioned in Chapter 4. In this same chapter, we also present how these 
goals are achieved by our proposed four RFID protocols. Then, in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9, we 
present our approaches that propose defense mechanisms against various attacks as well as ensure 
application specific goals mentioned in chapter 4. Our proposed approaches to ensure security, 
privacy and system specific goals in four different RFID application areas are as follows: 
• Detecting counterfeits in large-scale RFID systems: In Chapter 6 we have introduced 
the concept of batch authentication for detecting counterfeits efficiently. In large-scale RFID 
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applications (such as supply chain, pharmaceutical industry, etc.), general authentication is used 
to detect counterfeit products. However, general authentication protocols are mainly per-tag 
based where the reader needs to authenticate tags sequentially and one at a time. This increases 
the protocol execution time due to a large volume of authentication data. To solve this issue, we 
proposed to detect counterfeit tags by verifying the objects in batches. We present a batch 
authentication protocol named FTest to meet the requirements of prompt and reliable counterfeit 
tag detection. The novel discovery of this work is that the batch authentication can reduce the 
system response time while performing significantly better than existing counterfeit detection 
approaches.  
• Preserving privacy in RFID based healthcare systems: In Chapter 7, we have 
identified the two major types of privacy preservation techniques that are required in RFID-based 
healthcare: 1) a privacy preserving authentication protocol is required while sensing RFID tags 
for different identification and monitoring purposes and 2) a privacy preserving access control 
mechanism is required to restrict unauthorized access of private information while providing 
healthcare services using the tag ID. We designed and developed a “two component based 
framework” that makes an effort to address the above mentioned two privacy issues. One 
component of the framework is a privacy preserving authentication protocol that provides more 
privacy than the existing approaches when RFID tags are sensed by a nearby legitimate reader. 
The other component of the framework allows authenticated user access in the information 
system. This system consists of both the ID of the RFID tag and its corresponding usage history. 
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first framework to provide increased privacy in RFID-
based healthcare systems, using RFID authentication along with access control techniques. 
• Ensuring survivability of Computational RFID (CRFID) systems: In Chapter 8, we 
propose a robust authentication protocol to defend against the DoS attack in CRFID systems. Due 
to the sensing capability of CRFID tags, recently they have been used in many sophisticated 
applications like physiological signal monitoring in home healthcare systems, enemy move 
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detection in military battlefield, activity inference, etc. In these types of CRFID applications, an 
adversary may launch DoS attack by de-synchronizing the tags with the reader. This may 
jeopardize the survivability of the system. In an effort to address the survivability issues of 
CRFID systems, we propose DRAP protocol. DRAP allows both tag and reader to communicate 
successfully with each other and provide service even if the adversary launches De-
synchronization or DoS attack. 
• Ensuring reliability of system’s decision in CRFID based critical systems: In Chapter 
9 we have studied the problem of monitoring a large set of WISP tags and identifying the missing 
tags in CRFID-based critical systems. Recently, CRFID tags have been used in many critical 
applications like monitoring indoor activity, vital signs, sleep quality, and health status remotely. 
These types of systems make critical decisions based on the data collected from each individual 
tag in the system and perform collective information analysis. Hence, the absence of any tag data 
may eventually introduce serious error into the decision making process of the system. To address 
this, we propose two tag monitoring protocols for WISP based critical systems based on 
probabilistic methods. Our approach proposes a secure protocol to monitor for missing tags and 
for collecting sensor values from existing tags only, to reduce system response time of CRFID 
based critical systems.  
• In chapter 6, 7, 8, and 9 we propose four different protocols for four example RFID 
application areas. Though we have used specific application scenario as a motivating example, 
most of the RFID systems fall within the category of one of these application types. Figure 1.1 
presents a summary of what security, privacy and performance goals are achieved by our 
proposed protocols.  
We emphasize that we do not consider in our work low-level criteria such as gate count 
or power consumption of tags because, although important, these depend on the implementation 
of the building blocks. Instead, we focus on the protocols, their efficiency, and the security and 
privacy level they achieve. The techniques presented in this dissertation achieve good levels of 
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privacy, provide security, scale to large systems, and can be implemented on resource-constrained 
RFID devices. From now on we refer to Computational RFID systems as CRFID systems. 
Table 1.1 Security, Privacy and Performance goals addressed by our proposed protocols 
 
Privacy 
Violation 
Access 
of data 
DoS/De-
Synchronization 
Spoofi
ng 
Track
ing 
Eavesdro
pping 
Scalability 
Low response 
time 
Ftest Protocol 
(Chapter 6) 
X X +A X X X X X 
PriSens 
Protocol 
(Chapter 7) 
X X +A X X X X X 
DRAP 
Protocol 
(Chapter 8) 
X X X X X X  X 
MTD 
Protocol 
(Chapter 9) 
X X +A X X X X  
Assumptions in our Proposed Approaches: For the rest of the dissertation, we consider 
typical RFID tags that are capable of generating Pseudo Random Number (PRNG), performing 
simple hash function and XOR operation. From this point on and in the rest of the dissertation, 
we use Computational RFID and CRFID interchangeably. Like majority of the literature on RFID 
security, in all of our approaches, we assume that the channel between server and reader is secure. 
We also assume the physical security of the devices involved, like an intruder not being able to 
have physical access to the contents of the truck.  
1.3. Dissertation Organization 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
• In Chapter 2, we present a brief description of RFID technology. We first discuss the 
historical perspective of RFID technology. Next in this section, we discuss different 
components of RFID systems and their constraints. Next, we introduce Computational RFID 
(CRFID) technology. 
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• In Chapter 3, we start by pointing out the attack objectives and goals of an RFID system 
attacker. Then we briefly discuss the security requirements of RFID systems and RFID 
protocols. Next we define different types of adversary. This is followed by a detailed 
discussion of different types of attacks in RFID systems and attack intentions of an adversary. 
• In Chapter 4, we briefly describe the security, privacy and performance goals that should be 
guaranteed by most RFID applications. We also point out some system specific goals that 
should be guaranteed by authentication protocols to ensure maximum system functionality. 
At the end of this section we present a summary of which goals are satisfied by our proposed 
RFID authentication protocols. 
• In Chapter 5, we discuss some classic and some recently proposed RFID protocols that use 
symmetric cryptography to ensure the identified privacy, security and performance 
requirements.  
• In Chapter 6, we present our motivation for addressing the issue of batch authentication in 
large scale supply chain. The rest of the chapter presents the details of our proposed protocols 
(GTest and FTest), analysis, and evaluation results. 
• In Chapter 7, we introduce the notion of the two-fold privacy preservation issue in RFID 
based healthcare systems. The rest of the chapter presents the details of our proposed privacy 
preserving framework (PriSens-HSAC), security analysis, and evaluation results.  
• In Chapter 8, we introduce the issue of survivability in CRFID networks. The rest of the 
chapter briefly presents the details of our proposed protocol (DRAP), security analysis, and 
evaluation results.  
• In Chapter 9, we introduce the notion of missing tag monitoring in CRFID based home 
healthcare systems. The rest of the chapter briefly presents the details of our proposed 
missing tag detection protocol (MTD), security analysis, and evaluation results. 
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• In Chapter 10, we summarize the contributions of this dissertation, and identify future 
research directions. 
1.4. Publications 
In this section, we list out the publications that forms the basis this dissertation. 
1.4.1. Publication based on the contributions of the dissertation 
• The contribution of chapter 4, i.e. the literature survey on attacks on RFID systems forms the 
base of a paper that we have submitted in Journal of ACM Computing Surveys. 
• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 6 have been published and they are as follows:  
Published [Rahman12a]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Looking for 
needles in a haystack: Detecting Counterfeits in Large Scale RFID Systems using Batch 
Authentication Protocol”, In Proc. of IEEE PerCom Workshop on Pervasive Wireless #etworking 
(PW#12). Switzerland. 2012. pp. 811 - 816. [Acceptance rate: 20%] 
In Press [Rahman12c]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Efficient Detection 
of Counterfeit Products in Large Scale RFID Systems with Batch Authentication Protocols”, 
Accepted to be published in Journal of Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, Springer-Verlag. 
2012. 
• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 7  have been published and they are as follows:  
Published [Rahman12b]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “I am not a 
goldfish in a bowl: A Privacy Preserving Framework for RFID based Healthcare Systems”, In 
Proc. of IEEE 14th International Conference on e-Health #etworking, Applications and Services 
(IEEE Healthcom 2012). China. 2012. [Best paper winner] 
Published [Hoque11]: Md. Endadul Hoque, Farzana Rahman, and Sheikh I. Ahamed, 
"AnonPri: An Efficient Anonymous Private Authentication Protocol", In Proc. of IEEE 
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International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom 2011), WA, 
USA. 2011. pp.102-110. [Acceptance rate: 11%] 
Under Review: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “A Privacy Preserving 
Framework for RFID based Healthcare Systems”, In a journal. 
• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 8  have been published and they are as follows:  
Published [Rahman12d]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “DRAP: A 
Robust Authentication Protocol to Ensure Survivability of Computational RFID Networks”, In 
Proc. of ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC 2012). Italy. 2012. pp. 498-503. 
In Preparation: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Designing Survivable 
Computational RFID Systems with Robust Authentication Protocol”. 
• The proposed methodologies of Chapter 9  have been published and they are as follows:   
Published [Rahman12e]: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “MonAC: 
Detecting Missing Tags for Improved Accuracy in Computational RFID based Assisted 
Environments”, In Proc. of the ACM Symposium on Research in Applied Computation (ACM 
RACS 2012). USA. 2012.  
Under Review: Farzana Rahman and Sheikh Iqbal Ahamed, “Towards Improving 
Security and Reliability of Computational RFID based Assisted Environments”, In a journal. 
1.4.2. Other related publications 
Notable publications related to this dissertation are as follows: [Ahamed08a, Ahamed08b, 
Ahamed08c, Ahamed08d, Ahamed08e, Hoque09a, Hoque10a, and Rahman 11].  
 
11 
 
Chapter 2: Overview of RFID and Computational RFID Technology 
The goal of this chapter is to discuss some basics of RFID technology. It starts by 
highlighting the historical perspective of RFID. Then the technical background of RFID readers 
and tags are discussed. We also give a description of Computational RFID (CRFID) technology 
at the end of this chapter.  
2.1. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) (Figure 2.1) is the classic pervasive computing 
technology. At the very beginning, RFID was plugged as the replacement for traditional barcodes 
and its’ wireless identification capabilities promise to revolutionize our industrial, commercial, 
and medical experiences. What makes RFID unique is that it facilitates information gathering 
about physical objects easy. Information about RFID tagged objects can be read through physical 
barriers and from a distance. In line with Mark Weiser's concept of ubiquitous computing 
[Weiser93, Pervasive1, and Pervasive2], RFID tags could turn our interactions with computing 
infrastructure into something more ubiquitous than ever before. 
 
Figure 2.1 Different types of RFID tags (Source: [WikiTag]) 
Unit cost per tag is a major consideration for RFID tags because some applications need 
low cost tags. Cost may be a secondary consideration in passports or credit cards because security 
is paramount and these devices may pass that cost on to the consumer without much concern. In 
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an application like product tagging, cost is paramount, and the cost per tag needs to be low; 
otherwise, the benefits of RFID are outweighed by the cost. Securing RFID tags and providing 
privacy in consumer applications, while limiting cost per tag, has been the focus of much 
academic work. Due to the constraints on memory, power consumption, and amount of logic on 
RFID devices, standard cryptographic primitives are often unsuitable.  
In recent years, numbers of papers have been published providing solutions to RFID 
security and privacy challenges. One approach to addressing such privacy and security threats is 
to use a tag authentication scheme in which a tag is both identified and verified in a manner that 
does not reveal the tag identity to an attacker. However, RFID tags have limited computation 
power and storage because of the tag cost requirements. 
2.2. History and RFID Technology 
RFID is an acronym for Radio Frequency IDentification. It designates a large family of 
technologies and devices all having in common the aim to identify objects or persons with RFID 
tags. Even if RFID is often thought of as a very new domain, actually it dates back to World War 
II. British technology IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) was developed in the late 1930s to help the 
Royal Air Force to distinguish between friendly and hostile aircrafts, and it is the ancestor of 
RFID technology. Basically, the IFF of WWII and Soviet era systems used coded radar signals  to 
automatically trigger the aircraft transponder in an aircraft identified by the radar. An aircraft 
responding to an IFF request was then considered a friend, one not responding a foe. This 
technique was intended to reduce friendly fire. Since then RFID has seen new forms and 
applications.  
Starting in the late 1980s battery powered active RFID devices have been used for 
automatic toll collecting on motorway (e.g. Telepass in Italy). Nevertheless the big revolution, 
bringing RFID to the attention of common people and media, has certainly been due to the 
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progresses in miniaturization, which led to very small and cheap tags, well suited to be applied on 
single packages of products. 
2.3. A Typical RFID System Architecture 
RFID systems are made up of three main components: RFID tag, RFID reader, and the 
back-end database. Figure 2.2 illustrates a typical RFID system. In the following subsections, we 
explain the details of different components of an RFID system. 
 
Figure 2.2 Architecture of a simple RFID system 
2.3.1. RFID tags or transponder 
In an RFID system, each object will be labeled with a tag. Each tag contains a microchip 
with some computation and storage capabilities and an antenna coil for communication. Tags can 
be classified according to three main criteria: 
A) Memory Type: The memory element serves as writable and non-writable data storage. Tags 
can be programmed to be read-only, write-once read-many, or fully rewritable. Depending on the 
kind of tag, tag programming can take place at the manufacturing level or at the application level. 
B) Power Source: A tag can obtain power from the signal received from the reader, or it can have 
its own internal source of power. The way the tag gets its power generally defines the category of 
the tag. 
• Passive RFID tags. Passive tags do not have an internal source of power. They harvest 
their power from the reader that sends out electromagnetic waves. They are restricted in 
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their read/write range as they rely on RF energy from the reader for both power and 
communication. 
• Semi-passive RFID tags. Semi-passive tags use a battery to run the microchip’s circuitry 
but communicate by harvesting power from the reader signal. 
• Active RFID tags. Active tags possess a power source that is used to run the microchip’s 
circuitry and to broadcast a signal to the reader.  
C) Computational capability: Based on the computational capacity of RFID tags, there are 
mainly two types [Song09]: dumb and smart.  
• Dumb tags: A dumb tag has very low computation capacity, and it has a unique identifier 
that is of a fixed unique length (usually 10 or 16 hexadecimal digits long) value. The 
memory capacity of a dumb tag is likely to be fairly small (i.e. hundred bytes to 2kBytes).  
• Smart tags: Smart tags have a small processor built within them that has the capability do 
some cryptographic operation [Laurie07]. They usually have a larger memory capacity 
(32kBytes or more) compared to dumb tags. Smart tags can perform authentication before 
allowing access to the stored data. Such a tag can encrypt communications to avoid some 
major attacks [Laurie07].  
2.3.2. RFID Readers or Transceiver 
RFID readers are generally composed of an RF module, a control unit, and an antenna 
element to interrogate electronic tags via RF communication. Readers may have better internal 
storage and processing capabilities than the tags they interrogate, and they frequently have a 
connection to backend databases. Complex computations, such as all kinds of cryptographic 
operations, may be carried out by RFID readers. Figure 2.3 shows an RFID reader. 
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Figure 2.3 A simple RFID reader (Source: [Reader]) 
2.3.3. Back-end server 
The information provided by tags is usually an index to a back-end server (pointers, 
randomized ids, etc.). This limits the information stored in tags to only a few bits, which is a 
sensible choice due to severe tag limitations in processing and storing. It is generally assumed 
that the connection between readers and back-end server is secure, since processing and storing 
constraints are not so tight in readers. 
2.3.4. Constraints on the RFID  System 
The constraints on the two main components of an RFID system are as follows: 
A) Constraints on the tags: 
1) Tag is passive: It has no batteries. It can operate just when interrogated by a reader and 
only for a short time after each interrogation. 
2) Tag has limited memory: Each tag has on board only a few kilobits of memory to 
store its id and its secrets. At present the majority of the tags can just save a fixed 96-bit id. 
Nevertheless, we consider more sophisticated tags where some more memory is available 
otherwise there would be no space for any cryptographic data.  
3) Tag has limited computational abilities: Each tag can perform only basic calculations, 
hash calculations, PRNG, AES 2. Public-key cryptography is quite expensive. 
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4) Tag provides no physical security: Each tag can be physically opened, thus revealing 
the complete contents of its memory. 
5) Tag communicates up to a fixed distance: The tag-to-reader communication is limited 
to a few meters, but the reader-to-tag communication could be eavesdropped at a greater distance. 
B) Constraints on the reader: 
While having constraints on the tag seems quite obvious, it might appear that there is no 
constraints on the reader side. However, the constraints of the readers are mainly associated with 
the complexity of the reader-side algorithms. Many RFID systems consist of millions of tags. The 
main concern on the reader is the number of cryptographic operations needed to identify tags. 
These identification costs increase if computation intensive cryptographic functions are used. 
Therefore, to keep the reader’s response time moderate, efficient and scalable protocols need to 
be designed and deployed that take these constraints into account. 
2.3.5. Assumptions in Typical RFID Systems 
Usually the following assumptions are made about the availability of cryptographic 
functions in RFID tags. 
• There are sufficiently secure hash functions, which are suitable for a low-cost tag. 
• There is a sufficiently secure pseudo-random number generator for a low-cost tag. 
2.3.6. RFID Standards 
As with any technology, lack of standards leads to inefficiencies because customers have 
to rely on a single equipment provider. Even the well-known EPC standard is not yet fully 
standardized. Another problem is that frequency regulations are not internationally standardized. 
EPC Global standardizes different categories of devices, in relation with the technical 
characteristics and functionalities provided by the tag. Each class includes all the properties of the 
previous and adds some new. The summary of EPC class is showed in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 EPC class types 
Class type Specification 
Class 0 Read only tags 
Class 1 Write once, read many tags 
Class 1 Gen 2 Write once, read many tags, UHF Gen 2 protocol 
Class 2 Rewritable tags 
Class 3 Semi-passive tags 
Class 4 Active tags 
Class 0: Class 0 tags are the simplest type of tags, where the data, which are usually a 
simple id number (EPC), are written into the tag only once during manufacture. No further 
updates are possible. These tags announce their presence when passing through an antenna field. 
Class 1: Class 1 tags are manufactured with no data written into the memory. Data can 
either be written by the tag manufacturer or by the user, but only once. After this no further 
update is possible and the tag can only be read.  
Class 2: Class 2 tags allow users to both read and write data into the tag’s memory. They 
are typically used as data loggers and therefore contain more memory space than tags that carry 
only simple ID numbers. 
Class 3: Class 3 tags are just like class 2 tags except that they contain on-board sensors 
for recording parameters like temperature and pressure into the tag’s memory. As sensor readings 
must be loaded into memory in the absence of the reader, the tags are either semi-passive or 
active, thus requiring an on-board power source. 
Class 4: Class 4 tags are equipped with integrated transmitters. These tags are similar to 
radio devices, which can communicate with other tags and devices in the absence of a reader. 
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Presently deployed Gen 1 RFID systems are based on a number of competing protocols, 
most notably Matric’s Class 0 and Alien Technology’s Class 1. There is a problem that these 
protocols are proprietary. Beyond that, they lack the features, reliability and power to adequately 
serve the growing number of applications, particularly when taking worldwide operability into 
account. MIT’s Auto-ID Center recognized these problems and created a single open standard 
that would firstly create an environment of interoperability and international regulatory 
compliance and secondly raise the bar on RFID system performance in a significant way. These 
two values formed the backbone of the EPC Gen 2 UHF standard. With a single worldwide 
specification in place, UHF RFID-based systems are expected to become faster, easier to use, less 
costly to deploy and more robust. 
2.4. Introduction to Computational RFID (CRFID) Technology 
Table 2.2 Comparison of different technologies [RFID_Journal] 
 CPU Sensing Size (inches) Range Power Lifetime 
WS+ (Mote) Yes Yes 3.0 x 1.3 x .82 (2.16 in3) Any Battery < 3 yrs 
RFID tag No No 6.1 x 0.7 x .02 (.08 in3) 30 ft Harvested Indefinite 
CRFID (WISP) Yes Yes 5.5 x 0.5 x .10 (.60 in3) 10 ft Harvested Indefinite 
Despite many successes of RFID technology and various applications of wireless sensor 
networks, none of them has led to an approximation of sensing embedded in the fabric of 
everyday life, where walls, clothes, products, and personal items are all equipped with networked 
sensors. For this type of deployment, truly unobtrusive sensing devices are necessary. The size 
and finite lifetime of motes make them unsuitable for these applications. One recent extension of 
RFID, Computational RFID (CRFID) [Buettner08b, Sample08], which has some exciting sensing 
capabilities, presents numerous possibilities for many future pervasive computing applications. 
CRFID combines the advantages of RFID with those of sensor networks. As discussed, two 
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technologies, wireless sensor networks and RFID, have been widely used to realize real-world 
applications. But CRFID presents the combination of both of these networks. The comparison of 
these three technologies is presented in Table 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.4 Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) tag’s size (Source: [RFID_Journal]) 
The Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP) from Intel Research Seattle 
[Buettner08, Sample08] is an example of Computational RFID tags. WISPs combine passive 
UHF RFID technology with traditional sensors. A current WISP is shown in Figure 2.4. WISPs 
are assembled from discrete components costing at most $25. However, they are intended to be 
mass manufactured like RFID tags at price points closer to $1 [Buettner09]. WISP is the only 
RFID sensor node with computational capabilities and that operates in the long range UHF band. 
In the rest of the chapter, we will use tag or WISP tag interchangeably to refer to a WISP tag. 
WISPs combine passive UHF RFID technology with traditional sensors. A current WISP 
is shown alongside a commercial UHF RFID tag and a common wireless sensor node (mote) in 
Figure 2.4. WISPs have the capabilities of RFID tags but also support sensing and computation. 
Like any passive RFID tag, WISP is powered and read by a standard off-the-shelf  EPC “Gen 2” 
RFID reader, harvesting the power it uses from the reader's emitted radio signals. 
To an RFID reader, a WISP is just a normal EPC class-1 or gen-2 tag. However, Inside 
WISP, it has a 16-bit Microcontroller that features an 8 MHz clock rate, 8 kilobytes of memory, 
and 512 bytes of RAM. The microcontroller also has an analog-to-digital converter within itself. 
It can perform a variety of computing tasks, including sampling sensors and reporting sensor data 
back to the RFID reader. WISPs are the first programmable, passive RFID devices. They have 
used in different types of studies, from energy harvesting experiments [Jiang05] to monitoring 
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animal behavior [Holleman08, Segawa09]. The main advantage of WISP tags is that they allow 
us to implement novel security solutions on a live, passive RFID device. One disadvantage of 
using WISP tags is that they need to be placed within 1-2 meters of the reader.  
WISP uses an integrated 802.15.4 radio for communication with readers. WISPs can 
sense parameters such as light, temperature, acceleration, strain, and liquid level. The WISP 
harvests energy from a reader and stores this energy in a capacitor. When enough energy is 
harvested, the WISP powers up and can begin sensing and communicating. However, sensing and 
communication drain power from the WISP. Though the feasibility of WISPs has been discussed 
in some research literature, how to harness many such devices to create a WISP sensor network is 
until now an open question. In near future, sensor networks will consist of multiple WISP tags, 
RFID tags and one or more readers. Consequently, realizing such a secure full-scale network will 
require research on both the WISP tag’s end and the reader’s end. 
2.5. Security Challenges and Goals In CRFID +etworks 
As WISP tag is a combination of RFID and sensor, the security challenges of WISP 
networks is a combination of those found in RFID networks and traditional sensor networks. To 
develop useful security mechanisms while borrowing the ideas from the current security 
techniques, it is necessary to understand these constraints and challenges first. Some of the most 
important challenges of WISP networks are discussed next. 
C1. Communication Medium: Since WISP tags are wireless in nature, a network 
consisting of WISP tags involves broadcast communication which makes eavesdropping and 
jamming easier. 
C2. Data Conflict: In WISP networks data conflicts may happen even when the channel 
is reliable. Since the communication may still be unreliable. This is due to the nature of the WISP 
networks. If many tags reply at the same time, conflicts will occur and the transfer itself will fail. 
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C3. Constraint Power: WISP tags do not have their own battery or power. This can result 
in the WISPs losing power in the middle of an operation. WISPs may also need to cooperate with 
readers for power management. 
C4. Data Sensitiveness: In order to decrease the collision rate while replying to reader 
queries, only the WISP tags with new sensor data need to reply. Therefore, estimating an 
aggregate property of the data without collecting the data is also a challenge. 
C5: Mobility: Establishing secure association in the presence of mobility is challenging. 
Moreover, if a WISP tag is associated with a human user, tracking the device reveals the user 
location and mobility pattern which is a severe privacy violation. 
C6. Close Proximity: Currently WISP tags can communicate at most up to 4.5 meters of 
distance. But much future application will demand longer distant communication. Designing 
security protocols for such applications will be more challenging as it will incur more 
communication cost. Moreover, such protocols need to ensure the reliability of the collected 
WISP data. 
C7. Asymmetric Identification and Sensing Protocol: RFID tags and WISPs are highly 
asymmetric in terms of their communication abilities. With RFID and WISPs, readers are able to 
transmit messages to all tags and tags can send messages to the reader. But, tags can do so only 
when the reader initiates communication, and tags cannot communicate directly with each other. 
This makes it difficult to develop efficient protocols for gathering sensor data that changes over 
time. 
C8. Accessibility: Though some WISP tags in the networks may be managed by the 
owner some of them can be placed in remote and/or hostile locations for the application’s 
purpose. This greatly increases their vulnerability to physical attacks. 
C9. 9on-Collaborative: Though in most of the WSNs sensors can collaborate among 
themselves, this feature is totally unavailable in WISP networks. WISP tags can only 
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communicate with the reader that makes the design of security protocols even harder. This is one 
of the key reasons for which WSN security protocol cannot be applied in WISP networks. 
C10. Various Attacks: The unreliable communication channel makes the security of 
WISP networks defenses even harder. WISP networks are particularly vulnerable to several types 
of attacks. Attacks can be performed in a variety of ways, most notably as denial of service 
attacks, but also tracking, cloning, eavesdropping, Replay attack, privacy violation, physical 
attacks, and so on. 
Usually, in CRFID networks the security goals are classified as primary and secondary 
[Buettner08a]. The primary goals are known as standard security goals such as Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Authentication and Availability. However, the secondary goals are identified as Privacy 
Preservation, Resistance against Tracking, Cloning, Replay attack, Eavesdropping and DoS 
attack. Figure 2.2 illustrates the relation among the primary and secondary goals of WISP 
networks. Here the inner nodes correspond to primary security goals and outer nodes correspond 
to secondary security goals. We establish the relationship among security goals in such a way so 
that if we want to satisfy a primary security goal (identified by an inner node), we need to satisfy 
all the secondary security goals (identified by the outer node) belonging to the primary goal.  
 
Figure 2.5 Primary and secondary security goals of WISP +etworks 
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2.6. Summary 
In this chapter, we discuss the properties and capabilities of different categories of RFID 
tags. This is followed by the discussion of constraints of tags, readers, and back-end server. We 
also discuss RFID standards and the details of different types of EPC classes. Finally at the end of 
the chapter, we discuss the properties of Computational RFID tags and their capabilities. 
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Chapter 3: Attacks in RFID Systems 
Security and privacy concerns are the two major drawback of RFID technology. Security 
problems in RFID systems can be divided in two categories. The first concerns those attacks 
which aim to wipe out the functioning of the system. The second category is related to privacy 
where the problem is information leakage and also traceability.  
Apart from the two above mentioned security problems, a great variety of attacks can be 
identified in RFID systems. Attacks in RFID systems opened the door for the development of 
both classical and modern security techniques, ranging from signal jamming to challenge-
response based authentication. And it is just as likely that RFID will continue to inspire progress 
in security and privacy research in the future, as it has done for decades. The major goal of this 
chapter is to discuss the existing weaknesses of RFID systems so that a better understanding of 
RFID attacks can be achieved. 
3.1. Attack Objectives 
The objective of each attack in an RFID system can be very different. It is important to 
identify the potential targets in order to understand all the possible attacks. The target can be the 
complete system or only a part of the entire system. Most of the literatures focus on protecting the 
transmitted data. However, while designing the RFID system, additional objectives such as 
tracking or data manipulation should be addressed. Let us imagine the following example in a 
department store: an attacker modifies the data of a tag of an item by reducing its price from 200 
to 20 ¤. This leads to a huge loss for the store. In this scenario, the data is transmitted in a secure 
form and the database is not manipulated. However, attack is carried out because part of the 
system has been modified. Therefore, in order to make a system secure, all of its components 
should be considered. Neglecting one component could compromise the security of the whole 
system. As shown in the above example, the attack may be carried out to steal or reduce the price 
of a single item, while other attacks could aim to prevent all sales at a store.  
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3.2. Adversary Types 
The adversary can be categorized into the following classes: 
• Weak adversary: This type of adversary cannot corrupt any tags. 
• Strong adversary: This type of adversary has no limitations on corrupting tags, and can 
do anything at its wish.  
• Forward adversary: This type of adversary can corrupt tags under the limitation that 
once the adversary corrupts a tag, it can do nothing subsequently except for corrupting more tags. 
• Destructive adversary: This type of adversary can do anything after corrupting a tag. 
However, this statement is true under the limitation that the adversary cannot reuse a tag after 
corrupting it. Specifically, once a tag is corrupted it will be virtually destroyed. In particular, a 
destructive adversary cannot observe or interact with a corrupted tag nor can the adversary 
impersonate a corrupted tag to the reader. 
3.3. Classification of Different Attacks 
The following section discusses the major classes of attacks that are usually launched in 
RFID systems.  
Modification of data: 
This type of attack deals with the alteration of data saved within the memory of the tags. 
By unauthorized write access, the data stored on the tag can be modified. This attack is only 
effective if the identifier and security information such as keys remain unchanged. Otherwise this 
attack leads to denial-of-service. The attack is only possible if additional data along with the 
identifier are stored at a physical device (e.g. tags or database). 
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Deactivation of tags:  
In this type of attack, the tag is made inoperative by executing a dedicated command or 
by physical intervention. Depending on the degree of deactivation the identity or the presence of 
the tag can no longer be determined. 
Active jamming: 
Although passive interference is usually unintentional, an attacker can take advantage of 
the fact that an RFID tag listens indiscriminately to all radio signals in its range. Thus, an 
adversary may cause electromagnetic jamming by creating a signal in the same range as the 
reader in order to prevent tags from communicating with readers. 
Sniffing or tracking: 
RFID tags are designed to be readable by any compliant reader. Unfortunately, this 
allows unauthorized readers to scan tagged items, oftentimes from great distances. This type is 
attack is called sniffing or tracking and this is one of the major attacks launched in most of the 
RFID systems. This type of attack can also be launched by eavesdropping on the wireless channel 
between the tag and the reader. Tracking of RFID tags allows monitoring of individuals' 
whereabouts and actions. RFID readers placed in strategic locations (like doorways) can record 
RFID tags' unique responses, which can then be persistently associated with a person’s identity. 
RFID tags without unique identifiers can also facilitate tracking by forming collections which are 
recurring groups of tags that are associated with an individual. In such cases, RFID technology 
also enables the monitoring of entire groups of people. Moreover, tracking attack will also lead to 
unrestricted access to tag data or tagged object’s information. Unrestricted access to tag data can 
have serious implications and collected tag data might reveal information like medical history 
which could cause denial of insurance coverage or employment for an individual.  
Spoofing or cloning: 
In this type of attack, the attackers can create authentic RFID tags by writing 
appropriately formatted data on blank RFID tags. For example, thieves could retag items in a 
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supermarket identifying them as similar, but cheaper, products. Tag cloning is another kind of 
spoofing attack, which produces unauthorized copies of legitimate RFID tags.  
Replay attack: 
Replay devices are capable of intercepting and retransmitting RFID queries, which could 
be used to abuse a variety of RFID applications. These types of attacks usually occur in situations 
where RFID components use a challenge response based protocol. RFID tags and readers usually 
share a secret and use a challenge response protocol to authenticate their identities. Nevertheless, 
very often this approach is subject to replay attacks. In a replay attack, an adversary broadcasts a 
tag’s response recorded from a past transaction in order to impersonate the tag to a reader. 
Typical example of this attack is the unauthorized access to restricted areas by broadcasting an 
exact replay of the radio signal sent from a legitimate tag to the reader that grants access. 
Relay attack: 
In a relay attack an adversary acts as a man-in-the-middle. An adversarial device is 
placed surreptitiously between a legitimate RFID tag and reader. This device is able to intercept 
and modify the radio signal between the legitimate tag and reader. Subsequently, a momentary 
connection is relayed from the legitimate tag/reader through the adversarial device to the 
legitimate reader/tag. The legitimate tag and reader are fooled into thinking that they are 
communicating directly with each other. To make this type of attack even more sophisticated, 
separate devices could be used, one for the communication with the reader and one for the 
communication with the RFID tag. This sort of attack dismisses the assumption that readers and 
tags should be very close for communication. Additionally, even if communications are 
encrypted, the attack is feasible because messages are only relayed through a fast communication 
channel, without requiring knowledge of their contents. 
Denial-of-Service (DoS): 
This is a type of attack in which an attacker causes RFID tags to reach to such a state 
from which they can no longer function properly. This results in the tags becoming either 
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temporarily or permanently out of operation. More precisely, in this attack a tag is attacked with 
queries from an illegitimate reader. As a result, that tag is not able to respond to a further query 
from the legitimate reader. In other words, a genuine reader cannot communicate with its 
legitimate tags. A similar attack is also possible on the reader, but since the tag is much more 
resource constrained than the reader, they are more susceptible to such attacks than the readers. 
Such attacks are often intensified by the mobile nature of the tags, allowing them to be 
manipulated at a distance by covert readers. This type of attack can be a serious threat to the 
integrity of automated inventory and shipping applications. 
Eavesdropping attack 
As RFID technology operates through radio channel, so communication can be covertly 
overheard. In eavesdropping an unauthorized individual uses an antenna in order to record 
communications between legitimate RFID tags and readers. In this type of attack, the 
communication between tag and reader over the air interface is intercepted, decoded and 
interpreted. A passive adversary can eavesdrop on messages between a reader and a tag and can 
keep records of the messages. The information recorded can be used to perform more 
sophisticated attacks later. The feasibility of this attack depends on many factors, such as the 
distance of the attacker from the legitimate RFID devices. 
There are two possible distances at which an attacker can listen to the messages 
exchanged between a tag and a reader. They are:  
Forward Channel Eavesdropping Range: In the reader-to-tag channel (forward 
channel) the reader broadcasts a strong signal, allowing its monitoring from a long distance. 
Backward Channel Eavesdropping Range: The signal transmitted in the tag-to-reader 
(backward channel) is relatively weak, and may only be monitored in close proximity to the tag. 
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3.4. Attack Intentions 
Table 3.1 summarizes various intentions that an adversary might have while attacking an 
RFID system. An attacker may want to access sensitive information or exploit an RFID system by 
spoofing an RFID tag. An attacker’s intention might be to make an RFID system unavailable. 
Table 3.1 Intentions behind attacks in RFID systems 
 Privacy Violation Access of data DoS Spoofing 
Modification of data     
Tag Spoofing     
Deactivation of tags     
Removal of tags     
Eavesdropping     
Jamming     
Reader Spoofing     
3.5. Attack Addressed by our Proposed Protocols 
Table 3.2 Attack intentions addressed by our proposed protocols 
 Privacy Violation Access of data DoS Spoofing 
Ftest Protocol (Chapter 6) X X  X 
PriSens Protocol (Chapter 7) X X  X 
DRAP Protocol (Chapter 8) X X X X 
MTD Protocol (Chapter 9) X X  X 
In this dissertation, we propose four protocols suitable for four different example 
application areas. These four protocols are also suitable for other application areas that have the 
same core functionality like our example applications. In Table 3.2 we summarize what attacks 
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intentions are addressed by our proposed protocols. By addressing the attack intentions, our 
protocols basically address various attacks mentioned in this chapter. 
3.6. Summary 
In this chapter, we present the security issues that arise with RFID technology. Firstly a 
discussion of the attack objectives of an adversary in an RFID system is given. After that, major 
attacks in RFID systems are identified and discussed. Then, attack intentions of an RFID system 
attacker are identified. Finally we present what attacks are addressed by our system. 
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Chapter 4: Security, Privacy and Performance Goals in RFID Systems 
In our previous chapter, we have described various attacks that can be launched in an 
RFID system by an adversary. In this chapter, our aim is to identify the key fact that can ensure 
the security of an RFID system. Moreover, to ensure widespread deployment of RFID systems, 
there are three main goals that need to be addressed by the RFID researchers. We have identified, 
that these three goals are related to security, privacy and performance of RFID system. Usually, 
most RFID protocols need to guarantee the security goals. For some RFID systems preserving 
privacy is the major goal and for some other systems ensuring survivability or ensuring low 
response time is the major goal. Nonetheless, no matter what the major goal is for any RFID 
systems, providing basic security is a common requirement for every RFID protocol. Next we 
describe these goals briefly.  
4.1. Security Goals in RFID Systems 
Security and privacy of data (and of consumers) is one of the major concerns that have 
hindered the adoption of RFID technology for many applications. The absence of protocols for 
privacy and security introduce concerns such as scanning and tracking, cloning, eavesdropping, 
and replay attacks. However, a major problem of designing cryptographically secure RFID 
protocols is the lack of computational resources on RFID tags. This prohibits the use of common 
cryptographic operations to enhance privacy and security in RFID infrastructures. Therefore 
RFID protocol designers need to keep in mind all the challenges to find some new lightweight 
alternatives. RFID technology may bring spontaneous risks because of the proliferation of RFID 
tags. We try to point out the security goals that should be guaranteed by a protocol: 
• Privacy protection: A tag cannot be distinguished by an adversary without tampering it 
and realizing the data stored in the tag. 
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• Anti-tracking: It is tough for an adversary to track a tag if the adversary does not have 
any information about the tag. But the attacker can track a tag, if the tag replies with a 
constant response each time it is queried. So protocols should be designed such that a tag 
neither reveals its  nor replies with constant response. 
• Anti-cloning: In order to clone a tag, an adversary needs to know the secret key shared 
between a tag and the authorized reader. So, to be secured against cloning attack, protocols 
should never reveal the shared secret key. 
• Synchronization: Attacker should not able to update the key used by the tag or the reader 
to secure the communication.  
• DoS resiliency: Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack means an authorized entity is prevented 
from accessing its authorized entities. In order to ensure successful communication between a 
reader and its authorized tags, it should be guaranteed that an adversary cannot desynchronize 
them. 
• Susceptible to replay attack: Security must be ensured against replay attacks so that an 
adversary cannot impersonate a legitimate tag by replaying an eavesdropped message. 
• Forward secrecy: An adversary compromising a tag will not be able to identify the 
previous outputs of the tag. 
• Backward secrecy: An adversary compromising a tag will be unable to track future 
transactions even if it has access to the tag’s present internal state. 
4.2. Privacy Goals in RFID Systems 
While RFID has existed for several decades, it is its recent widespread usage that made 
privacy a major concern for everyone. One of the main concerns of users of RFID systems is user 
privacy. Since the communication between a tag and reader is unprotected, it can disclose 
sensitive information about a tag or its bearer, including its location. Two major privacy problems 
in RFID systems are as follows: 
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Information Leakage: In a typical RFID system, when a reader queries a tag, the tag 
responds with its identifier. If unauthorized parties can also obtain a tag ID, then they may be able 
to request and obtain the private information related to the tag held in the database. For example, 
if the information associated with a tag attached to person’s medical record could be obtained 
from a server, then the damage would be very serious.  
Tag Tracking: If the responses of a tag are linkable to each other or distinguishable from 
those of other tags, then the location of a tag could be tracked by multiple collaborating 
unauthorized entities. For example, if the response of a tag to a reader query is a static ID code, 
then the movements of the tag can be monitored, and the social interactions of an individual 
carrying a tag may be available to third parties without him or her being aware.  
Therefore, RFID protocols should meet the following privacy requirements in order to 
mitigate the two threats described above.  
Tag Information Privacy: RFID systems should be able to resist tag information leakage. 
To protect against such a attack, RFID systems need to be controlled so that only authorized 
entities are able to access the information associated with a tag.  
Tag reply unlinkability: RFID systems should be able to resist tag tracking attacks. If 
messages from tags are anonymous, then the problem of tag tracking by unauthorized entities can 
be avoided. 
Though adding privacy protection to RFID tags leads to higher per-tag costs and 
increased computational cost in the backend system, for some RFID applications (i.e. RFID based 
healthcare), ensuring privacy is very important. In these types of systems, the cost is outweighed 
by the need for privacy. Therefore, protocols designed for these types of data sensitive RFID 
applications needs to ensure privacy and the cost of extra computational complexity. 
4.3. Performance Goals 
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RFID protocols cannot use computationally intensive cryptographic algorithms to 
provide privacy and security because the low cost of the tags put severe limits on tag side 
resources. RFID protocols should address the following performance issues [Avoine05, and 
Weis03]. 
Scalability: 
A protocol is said to be scalable if the number of nodes can be significantly increased 
without imposing an unacceptable workload on any entity in the network. The interpretation of 
scalability will vary depending on the context (and the size of the network). Any security protocol 
deployed in an RFID network should not significantly affect its scalability. In the context of 
secure RFID systems, we would typically require that the workload on the server, to complete a 
single transaction, should not be a linear function of the number of deployed RFID tags. 
Survivability: 
Survivability refers to a system’s ability to withstand malicious attacks and support the 
systems mission even when parts of the system have been damaged. With effective fault tolerance 
and damage recovery mechanisms in place, a system may still be trustworthy in fulfilling its 
functions and supporting the system mission. In case of RFID systems, most of the authentication 
protocols are request-response based where the tags and the reader maintain synchronization 
between them during the protocol execution. Therefore, if any attacker launches DoS attack by 
de-synchronizing the tags and reader, the system is not able to provide any service. However, in 
case of some critical RFID applications (i.e. enemy move detection in military battlefield using 
CRFID technology), it is very important that the system provides minimal service even under 
attack. Therefore, to ensure system survivability, we need to ensure that the protocols designed 
for critical RFID systems need to provide service even when it is under attack. 
Low System Response Time: 
Some of the most famous RFID applications are: asset tracking, supply chain, product 
identification in warehouse, etc. In all of these applications, products attached with RFID tags 
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need to be identified in a very quick manner. An identification protocol or authentication protocol 
may need very small time to identify one particular tag. However, in case of the applications 
mentioned above, there are usually millions of products in the system that needs to be 
authenticated on an everyday basis. Therefore, if the protocol is not efficient enough, it might 
take several hours or days to authenticate all tags in the system which might not be acceptable for 
the industry owner. So, to increase the popularity of RFID technology and to make RFID systems 
more efficient, we need to ensure that the designed RFID security protocol can guarantee low 
system response time 
Storage Capacity: 
The volume of data stored in a tag should be minimized because of tight tag cost 
requirements. Therefore, we need to ensure that the designed protocols use very lightweight 
operations like: hash functions or XOR operations. 
Communication: 
Since message communication between tags and reader consume much energy and makes 
an RFID system more vulnerable to various attacks, the number and size of messages exchanged 
between a tag and a reader should be minimized as much as possible. 
Reliability: 
Every RFID protocol should guarantee the reliability of the system’s decision. Yet, 
ensuring reliability or decision accuracy of an RFID system has been understudied so far. 
However, there are some recent RFID applications (i.e. behavior inference using CRFID or 
physiological status inference using CRFID), where ensuring reliability of system’s decision is 
very important and critical. In these types of applications, the final decision at any state of the 
system is taken based on the data collected from all the tags. These types of RFID systems 
depend on all tags’ data for collective information analysis and decision making. Therefore, 
protocols designed for such RFID applications need to ensure that the system will take accurate 
decision by ensuring system’s reliability. 
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4.4. Goals Achieved by our Proposed Protocols 
In this dissertation, we propose four different protocols for four example RFID 
application areas. Though we have used specific application scenario as a motivating example, 
most of the RFID systems fall within the category of one of these application types. Figure 4.1 
presents a summary of what goals are achieved by our proposed protocols: 
Table 4.1 Summary of goals achieved by our protocols 
Application Area Goals achieved by our approach 
Supply Chain, Asset Tracking and such 
applications 
1. Ensuring security requirements 
2.Counterfeit detection (tag spoof identification) 
3. Ensuring low response time 
RFID based healthcare or such applications 
where user privacy is important 
1. Ensuring security requirements 
2. Efficient privacy preservation (tag information 
privacy and tag reply unlinkability) 
3. Ensuring scalability 
Sophisticated critical CRFID applications 
where system survivability is important 
(enemy move detection) 
1. Ensuring security requirements 
2. Ensuring survivability 
3. Reducing system response time 
Critical RFID applications where decision 
accuracy is important (physiological status 
inference using CRFID) 
1. Ensuring security requirements 
2. Ensuring decision reliability 
3. Reducing system response time 
\  
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Chapter 5: Related Work 
There have been research initiatives for quite some time now to prevent various attacks in 
RFID systems and facilitate the expansion of RFID technology. One key research area that 
focuses on securing RFID systems is the design of secure authentication methodologies. These 
authentication techniques are designed to defend against various attacks launched in RFID 
systems while a reader communicates with RFID tags for identification or data retrieval purposes. 
5.1. Preliminaries 
A variety of authentication protocols have been proposed over the years to secure an 
RFID system. Many of these protocols use cryptographic functions to protect messages 
exchanged between an RFID reader and tags and also to perform authentication. Cryptographic 
techniques can be divided into two main categories based on the nature of the keys used. These 
two techniques are: symmetric and asymmetric. All the protocols proposed in this dissertation use 
the symmetric key technique. However, next we briefly describe the two techniques: 
5.1.1. Symmetric Key Cryptography 
In symmetric key cryptography (or secret key cryptography), the sender and receiver 
share a common secret key. The precise use of the key will depend on the nature of the protection 
provided by the algorithm being used. This key can be used to protect the confidentiality and/or 
the integrity of the message. One widely used symmetric encryption technique is Hash Functions. 
A hash function takes an input of any length and gives as output a short, fixed-length value that is 
a function of the entire input. The output of the hash function is called hash value. Hash functions 
must have the one-way property; that is, they must be designed so that they are not only simple 
and efficient to compute, but also, given an arbitrary output, it is computationally infeasible to 
find an input that gives the chosen output. It implies that hash functions have to be irreversible. 
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5.1.2. Public Key Cryptography 
In asymmetric cryptography (or public key cryptography), every participating entity has 
its own key pair. So, there are two keys that work in a pair. One key of the pair is called the 
“public key” that is publicly available. And the other key of the pair is called the “private key,” 
which is kept secret by its owner. Public key cryptography involves an encryption operation that 
transforms blocks of plaintext into ciphertext blocks and a decryption operation that reverses this 
process [Menezes96, Stallings99]. The main difference from symmetric encryption is the way in 
which keys are used. The public key of the intended recipient of a message is used for encryption 
and the recipient's private key is used for decryption. A user’s public key is made available to 
anyone who wants to encrypt a message intended for that user; the recipient's private key is used 
to decrypt the received encrypted messages. Implementing any algorithm involving public key 
cryptography requires the computation of complex mathematical functions, e.g. involving multi-
precision integer or finite field arithmetic [Mitchell03]. As a result, public key encryption 
schemes tend to be more computationally intensive, and hence slower to compute, than secret key 
encryption algorithms [Mitchell03]. Tiny RFID tags do not have the computational capability to 
execute algorithms based on public key cryptography. Therefore, symmetric key cryptography is 
used for authentication and security purposes in RFID systems.   
5.2. Related Works on RFID System Security 
An authentication protocol is a defined exchange of messages between two or more 
parties, with the objective of providing one or both parties with an authentication service. That is, 
the objective is: 1) for one or both of the parties to verify the identity of who they are interacting 
with, 2) that the other party is actively involved in the protocol, and 3) that the messages send by 
the other part are not old messages and maintains integrity. Usually, RFID authentication 
protocols make use of cryptographic techniques to ensure confidentially and data integrity. In this 
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section, we present some classic and recently proposed approaches for ensuring the security of 
RFID systems. 
RFID security based research area can be divided into two categories. The first category 
is protocol based. This category mainly focuses on implementing protocols using secure, 
lightweight primitives on small RFID tags in order to ensure security and privacy. The second 
category is hardware based. This category focuses on improving RFID tag hardware so that it can 
provide additional security primitives. All of our proposed protocols in this dissertation fall in the 
first category. So we will not discuss the hardware based category. However, interested readers 
can refer to [Juels05b] and [Rieback07] for more details. In this section, we will mainly discuss 
the research background related to the protocols based category.  
Within the area of the protocol based category, many techniques have been proposed for 
ensuring RFID security, and the assortment of authentication protocols is quite extensive. Thus 
we shall avoid a broad review and focus on those works that are related to our contribution. 
Interested readers may refer to [Juels05b, Juels06 and Avoine12]. Avoine’s collection is one of 
the largest resources on RFID papers available on-line. The protocols scattered throughout the 
literature of RFID security can roughly be categorized into the following classification (see figure 
5.1): 
Early Protocols: There are roughly two simple protocols found in early RFID papers: 
Martin Feldhofer’s protocol [Feldhofer03] and Zero Authentication protocols [Engberg04]. 
Hash Lock Protocols: In later literature, there are many variations of the Hash Lock 
Protocol ranging from simple to complex. Hash Lock Protocols are a group of protocols based on 
the hash lock protocol of Weis in [Weis03]. The principle is that if you do not have the right key 
to fit on the hash lock, you do not get access to the tag and its ID. The Molnar and Wagner 
[Molnar04] protocol is one of the famous tree based hash lock protocol that is widely used in 
RFID systems. 
 Probabilistic Protocols: 
shift or reduce the workload from tag to reader. A way to do that is to use probabilistic protocols
Probabilistic protocols provide a framework to use weaker encryption
and Hopper01] and HB+ [Juels05a] protocols are example of such protocols.
Other RFID Protocols:
problems like: tag estimation and object localizing. According to our categorization, these 
protocols belong to “other” category.
Figure 
In the next subsection, we briefly describe some classic hash lock protocols and 
probabilistic protocols. Following this, we briefly describe some recent protocols for RFID 
security. 
5.2.1. Classic RFID Authentication Protocols
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replies with 	
,   

The cost and size limitations of a tag forces RFID protocols 
 primitives.
 
 Recently RFID tags have been used in many interesting 
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-Engels Protocol: Weis et al. [Weis03] proposed
 used a back-end database to perform authentication. In this protocol, 
 when it is queried by a reader. The reader forwards this 
, which finds out the real ID of the tag for the reader. An RFID 
 each time it is queried by a reader. So this protocol is not 
. This vulnerability hampers the privacy of the tag holder. So the 
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pseudorandom function, and 
 is a random number generated by the tag. The reader forwards this 
reply to the secure database, which then searches for the ID/tag secret key pair that matches the 
reply. Under this scheme, an RFID tag replies with a different value each time it is queried by a 
reader, as each reply of the tag involves a random number. Weis also introduced in [Weis03] their 
improved Randomized Hash Lock Protocol, which makes the output of the tag random. 
The Tsudik Protocol: Tsudik proposed a protocol, YA-TRAP, in [Tsudik06] that ensures 
high efficiency at the server side. It is a famous authentication protocol that places little burden 
on the back-end server. The principle advantage of this protocol is that the central database avoids 
any real time processing. Authors proposed that YA-TRAP is really advantageous in situations 
where tag information is processed in batches rather than in real time. The fundamental idea of 
this protocol is based on a monotonically increasing timestamp, which makes this protocol 
secured against tracking.  But the use of the timestamp makes this protocol unsecured against 
DOS attack. In this protocol, an RFID tag updates its timestamp based on a value provided by the 
reader. At the same time, each tag stores , where  is the maximum value that can be 
reached by the timestamp. When the timestamp reaches    a tag does not answer to the 
reader’s queries. Hence an adversary can send the tag a large enough timestamp so that it goes 
beyond . Thus it becomes quite easy for a malicious reader to create DOS attack. Although 
the solution to DOS was proposed in YA-TRAP+ [Avoine05], this protocol still lacks forward 
secrecy. 
The Ohkubo-Suzki-Kinoshita Protocol: Another lightweight protocol is OSK 
[Ohkubo03]. Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita proposed that two hash functions  and  are 
sufficient to provide indistinguishability and forward secrecy. Here,  is a one way hash function 
and  has a random oracle. According to this protocol, a tag is initialized with a shared secret  
and the back-end server maintains a list of tag ID/secret pairs (, ). The tag updates its secret 
key after each query according to the following formula  = . And in response to the 
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query from a reader, the tag replies  = . The server on the other hand uses  to identify 
the tag by performing a brute force search through the list of tags. OSK does not ensure 
scalability. In [Avoine05], Avoine and Oechslin modified OSK, which removed the scalability 
problem. They introduced a time-memory tradeoff, which reduced the computational complexity 
for inverting the hash function. Another problem of OSK is that a malicious reader may easily 
desynchronize a tag— eventually resulting in a DOS attack. 
The Henrici-M uller Protocol: In [Henrici04], Henrici and MÄuller rely on a one-way 
hash function to thwart tag tracking attacks. In this solution, a tag responds to a a reader's query 
with two hash values and updates its stored values after a successful authentication. This solution 
does not provide a full-degree of anti-tracking since a tag always replies with the same response 
before it is successfully authenticated. In addition, it does not provide forward security as a strong 
adversary could derive tag identifiers in previous sessions from the tag's current identifier and the 
server's random number. 
The Molnar-Wagner Protocol: Molnar and Wagner [Molnar04] pointed out that the 
randomized hash lock scheme does not defend against an eavesdropper. An adversary can 
eavesdrop on the communication between reader and tag to learn the tag replies. The adversary 
then uses this information to impersonate the RFID tag to fool a reader. In this protocol, both the 
reader and tag share a secret (!). Both the reader and tag generate random nonces 
, 
" and 
share them. By refreshing the random nonces during every instantiation of the protocol, replay 
attacks through eavesdropping are avoided. 
The Hopper-Blum Protocols: Hopper and Blum propose a secure human authentication 
protocol in [Hopper00 and Hopper01]. Here, 
#· ! and 
#  ! represent scalar product and 
exclusive-or (XOR) of k-bit binary vectors 
# and ! respectively. The HB protocol relies on the 
computational difficulty of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. It is meant only to be 
secure against passive attacks, and it is not secure against active attacks. A simple active attack, 
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where an adversary pretends to be the reader and transmits a fixed 
# to the tag several times can 
retrieve the value of !. While humans may get suspicious with repeated, failed login attempts if 
they are actively queried by a computer, a simple tag will blindly reply to active queries. In other 
words, HB would not protect against skimming attacks.  
The HB+ Protocol: An alternative method for RFID authentication is based on a 
“challenge and response” between a reader and a tag. Juels et. al. [Juels05a] observed that human 
authentication protocols can be applied to RFID, since RFID tags, like humans, have weak 
computational capabilities. They introduced the HB protocol, in which a reader issues a new 
challenge to a tag each time it queries an RFID tag. The tag computes the binary inner product 
based on the reader’s challenge, and returns the answer to the reader. The reader authenticates the 
tag by verifying the tag response. The HB+ protocol is an improvement over the HB protocol by 
using an additional binding factor from the tag to defend against an active adversary. Later work 
by [Piramuthu06], [Gilbert05], [Bringer06] improve on this idea. 
The Seo-Kim Protocol 1: Seo et al. [Seo06] proposed a hash function based 
authentication protocol that ensures high scalability. This protocol is also untraceable. Here back-
end server ℬ has the following four fields associated with each tag: EPC, ℎ,  and the 
access PIN. Each tag saves the last timestamp & sent by an authorized ℛ as &()*. Based on its 
own timestamp & and shared secret key , the reader compute ℎ, & and transmits it to the 
tag  +  together witℎ &. The tag recognizes an authorized reader if & received from the reader 
is greater than &()* and replies with ℎ. Reader ℛ forwards ℎ and & to ℬ and here the 
back-end server comes into play. It updates the  of the corresponding tag and asks the reader to 
pass on the message to the tag for synchronization. Upon reception of the message, tag + updates 
its  and &()*. The most significant contribution of this work is scalability and forward 
secrecy. Updating  with a one way hash function ensures forward secrecy. Scalability is 
ensured in a sense that back-end server needs time complexity ,- to find a tag in a multi tag 
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environment where - is the number of tags that have same key  within the operating range of a 
reader. The drawback of this protocol is that ownership transfer requires external intervention.  
The Seo-Lee-Kim Protocol 2: Seo et al. proposed another authentication protocol 
[Seo06b] that ensures high scalability and ownership transfer. It is a lightweight authentication 
protocol that employs a proxy in addition to the back-end server. The protocol is based on 
Universal Re-encryption which allows the back-end server to get the tag identifier only after a 
simple decryption. This decryption requires a constant time, which makes it one of the most 
scalable authentication protocols. But its application area is restricted because of the use of a 
proxy. This protocol is best suited for personal use. But it suffers from the problem of traceability 
and some other security issues such as DOS attack and swapping. 
The Tan-Sheng-Lee Protocol: In [Tan07], Chiu et al. proposed a serverless 
authentication protocol. In this protocol, the reader maintains an access list ., which is used for 
the purpose of tag authentication. And each tag has a secret  that is not shared with anyone. The 
reader and the tag both know 
, , where 
 is the reader identifier. Here in response to a query 
from a reader, the tag replies with some of the bits of ℎ
,  ∥  0  ∥  01 where 0 and 01 are 
two random numbers generated by the reader and the tag respectively and ℎ.  is a one way hash 
function. Since only a legitimate tag can generate ℎ
,  ∥  0  ∥  01, it works as the tag’s 
certificate to the reader. At the same time, the tag queries the reader with a question string. Only a 
legitimate reader replies with valid answer string, which introduces the reader as an authorized 
reader of the tag. The tag releases its data only after confirming that the reader is legitimate. But 
here again the reader has to do a lot of computation to find out the   of the required tag. But 
their protocol is not purely and strongly anonymous as they return tag  by performing an XOR 
operation with a hash value for authentication. Moreover, they didn’t propose any technique for 
ownership transfer.  
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The Chien-Chen Protocol: In [Chien07], Chien and Chen used a challenge-response 
protocol to prevent replay attacks. To prevent denial of service attacks, both new key and old key 
for authenticating a tag are stored in the back-end database. However, a strong adversary can still 
identify a tag's fixed EPC code and thus identify the tag's past and future interactions after 
compromising a tag. 
5.2.2. Recent Works on RFID Security 
In regard to recent RFID authentication protocols, Avoine et al. proposed a group based 
private authentication scheme in [Avoine07] (later improved by Hoque el.al [Hoque11]) that 
improves the tradeoff between scalability and privacy by dividing the tags into a number of 
groups. One major limitation of this protocol is that the level of privacy provided by the scheme 
decreases as more and more tags are compromised. Molnar et al. propose a new method 
[Molnar05] that supports delegation in the tag authentication. The tag owner can transfer the 
ownership to another party for authenticating valid tags. Lu et al. propose a RFID private 
authentication protocol (SPA) [Lu07], which enables dynamic key-updating for tree-based 
authentication approaches. A lightweight RFID private authentication protocol, RWP, has been 
proposed in [Yao09], based on the random walk concept. The analysis results show that RWP 
effectively enhances the security protection for RFID private authentication, and increases the 
authentication efficiency from 34567 to 31. However, this technique is suitable for tags 
with high computational power, as the technique requires tags to perform randomized hash 
functions. Besides these types of deterministic approaches, some RFID applications use 
probabilistic methods to determine some important features related to the system [Qian08].  
In [Hoque09a], Hoque et al. proposed a serverless authentication protocol for RFID 
systems. But their system is also more focused on defending various attacks without the help of a 
central database. Moreover, in their system, the reader has to do a lot of computation to find out 
the  of the required tag. In [Hoque09b], the authors proposed an RFID authentication protocol 
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that supports not only security and privacy, but also recovery in RFID systems. The protocol can 
return the desynchronized tags and readers to their normal state, and thus provides robustness. 
The focus of this system was to defend against various attacks. 
Sheng et al. [Sheng09] study a fundamental problem of continuous scanning in RFID 
systems and designs algorithms based on the information gathered in the previous scanning. Yang 
el al. [Yang10] proposes a probabilistic approach, SEBA, for fast and reliable batch 
authentications in RFID application. However, in this protocol, when queried by a reader, tags 
reply with some bits of their secret IDs. But the drawback of this protocol is that any adversary 
eavesdropping in the channel may learn the complete IDs of tags over time and launch several 
successful attacks. 
Most of the previous works (i.e. classic protocols) on RFID systems concentrate on 
collecting the IDs of a large number of tags as quickly as possible. Recently some researchers 
worked on the tag-estimation problem, which is to use statistical methods to estimate the number 
of tags in a large system [Kodialam06]. Tan, Sheng and Li [Tan08] designed the Trust Reader 
Protocol (TRP) to detect the missing tags with probability when the number of missing tags 
exceeds a certain threshold. TRP uses probabilistic methods to choose a frame size that satisfies 
the system requirements and identifies missing tags.  
Another recently studied area of RFID system is the reduction of radio contention during 
the execution of RFID authentication protocols. Collision is a critical problem in RFID systems 
when processing a batch of tags. In the literature, tag anti-collision algorithms can be categorized 
into Aloha based algorithms and tree based algorithms. Aloha based algorithms makes only one 
tag respond in a slot, in the response of tags, by dividing a time into slot units. On the other hand, 
tree based algorithms [Lee08] make trees while performing the tag identification procedure using 
a unique ID of each tag. Aloha based protocols are known for their low complexity and 
computation, thus making them attractive for use in RFID networks. Examples include Pure, 
Slotted and Framed Slotted Aloha (FSA) and their variants [Zhen05, and Lee05]. In Pure and 
47 
 
Slotted Aloha [Zhen05], a tag responds after a random delay, and continues doing so until it is 
identified. Lee et al. [Lee05] show that the FSA reader can obtain a maximum identification 
throughput when the size of the detecting frame equals the number of tags. They propose a 
dynamic FSA for RFID systems.  
In the recent past, significant research has been conducted in developing RFID systems to 
ease the everyday life of humans [Michahelles07, Munishwar09, Zecca09, and Hinske07]. Even 
recently some research has been performed to devise accurate ways of determining indoor 
location [Saxena07, Yunhao03]. But all of these works mainly focused on developing the system 
itself, rather than considering the security and privacy vulnerabilities of installing those RFID 
systems in practical environments. 
5.3. Related Works on Computational RFID (CRFID) Systems 
Recently WISP tags have been used in different application areas. For example, it has 
been used in recognizing daily activities [Buettner09]. In [Buettner09], the authors attached 
everyday objects (e.g., glass, plate, books) with WISP tags that have accelerometers. Later, daily 
activities are inferred from the traces of objects that are moved. In [Chaudhri08], WISPs are used 
for sensing and monitoring exercises involving free weights. The authors embedded WISPs with 
free weights and body parts. Then the accelerometer sensor readings from the tags are used to 
infer the exercise being done and the association between the user and the particular weight being 
used. [Yeager08] presents a wireless neural interface that uses WISPs. It provides the 
neuroscientists a wireless, battery-free method of monitoring neural signals. 
So far, the security aspects of WISP sensor networks have not been explored in literature 
extensively since the usage of these tags is still a new technology. Recently WISP has been used 
for RFID and low power wireless security research [Chae07 and Czeskis08]. We are also aware 
of one result that deals with the backup checkpoint status integrity of WISP [Salajegheh09]. Since 
WISPs operate intermittently, one problem occurs due to energy constraints in executing 
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cryptographic computations. Power derived by the sensor from a single cycle of harvested energy 
might be insufficient to perform a realistic cryptographic operation. CCCP (Cryptographic 
Computational Continuation Passing) [Salajegheh09] suggests that WISPs can perform 
demanding computations despite limited energy and power interruptions. The main idea is for a 
WISP to backup its RAM state just before it loses power (e.g., when the reader leaves). When the 
reader reappears, the WISP can retrieve its backed up state and resume unfinished operations, 
without having to re-start from scratch.  
By using the 3D accelerometer of WISP tags, Saxena et al. developed a motion detection 
system that also works as a means to ensure security [Saxena10]. According to the authors, 
accessing a personal RFID device fundamentally requires moving it in some manner. 
Determining whether or not the WISP tags are in motion helped the authors to provide enhanced 
security and privacy. The made the WISP tags to respond only when it is in motion, instead of 
doing so promiscuously. 
Hoque et al. [Hoque10b] proposed a sleep monitoring system based on the WISP tags. 
Their developed system does not require any additional action from the users outside their daily 
routines. By attaching WISP tags to the bed mattress, accelerometer data are collocated from 
WISPs and then reported back. They have shown that their system accurately infers fine-grained 
body positions from accelerometer data collected from the WISPs attached to the bed mattress. 
By adding a super-capacitor to the WISP, the authors of created a wirelessly re-
chargeable data logger that can read and log temperature data for 24 hours away from a reader 
and then report back the data and recharge when it is in range of a reader [Yeager08]. However 
this work again falls into the category of hardware based improvements of WISP tags.  
The founders of WISP tags maintain a repository [Intel] of new research techniques that 
have been conducted on WISP Network Security. It provides information on the entire WISP 
related literature that has been proposed so far. But, most of these works focus on the 
improvement of hardware or power aware parameters of WISP sensor network. 
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5.4. Summary 
In this section, we have reviewed a number of classical and recently proposed RFID 
authentication protocols. We have also discussed relevant related work on CRFID systems. 
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Chapter 6: Efficient Detection of Counterfeits in Large Scale RFID Systems 
The International Chamber of Commerce estimates that counterfeit goods make up seven 
percent of world trade, with the counterfeit market being worth 500 billion USD in 2004 
[Juels05a]. Counterfeiting has an impact on the rights holder, the country where counterfeiting 
takes place, and it causes social costs. Counterfeit goods, whether of clothes, medicines or CDs, 
cost hundreds of billions of US dollars globally every year. The effects of these crimes range 
from loss of company revenues to threats to public health and safety. Many companies already 
use anti-counterfeiting measures like holograms to reduce counterfeiting and product piracy. A 
drawback of existing anti-counterfeiting measures is the low achievable degree of automation 
when checking the originality of a product. Radio Frequency Identification, or RFID, helps to 
address this problem, and provides the possibility to implement secure protection mechanisms 
[Pollinger08]. 
A very good example of a large scale system that needs secure and efficient anti 
counterfeiting techniques on everyday basis is the pharmaceutical industry. It is one such market 
that is constantly fighting battles against counterfeiting (which make up to 7% of all 
pharmaceutical products in the international supply chain). Since pharmaceutical products are 
consumed by humans, any mistake during manufacturing may cause serious harm to people’s 
health and even lead to death. The importance of drug authenticity is obvious. In the United 
States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been considering the use of RFID tags to 
prevent counterfeit pharmaceutical products [Pollinger08]. Radio Frequency Identification, or 
RFID, helps to address this problem and provides the possibility to implement extensible, secure 
protection mechanisms. In fact, many RFID enabled anti-counterfeiting solutions have been 
already introduced in logistics, retailing, passports, etc. Because RFID has the capability of 
capturing and relaying data, it is what the pharmaceutical industry is looking towards to improve 
quality, reduce costs, and improve patient safety.  
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The RFID tags are typically low-cost and pervasive devices, being attached to products or 
objects to enable the identification of those objects. A tag has small microchip and an antenna on 
board. The reader can collect the IDs of tags via RF signals, without the need of line of sight. As 
an effective automatic processing measure, RFID offers several attractive features over barcodes, 
such as non-optical proximity, and rewritable ability. 
A common technique of RFID enabled anti-counterfeiting is that the manufacturer stores 
a serial number 9 (or termed as secret key) for each tag. The secret key is also stored in the 
central authentication server. During authentication, an RFID reader challenges a tag for its 
validity, and the tag replies with its encrypted or hashed serial key. This encrypted message is 
passed to the server for validity checking. If the serial number is valid, the product to which the 
tag is attached is declared as genuine. During this process, however, an adversary can eavesdrop 
in between the channel, and the learned information can be used to create a counterfeit tag. To 
address this issue, many efficient and private authentication protocols have been proposed in the 
literature. Weis et al. [Weis] propose an authentication scheme based on Hash Lock. The search 
complexity of Hash Lock is 37, where # is the total number of tags in the system. To improve 
the search efficiency, tree-based approaches [Dimitriou06, Lu07, Hoque11] convert the 
verification process to a Depth-First-Search in a key tree to reduce the search complexity to 
3log 7. However, the reader still needs much more time to authenticate products in a large 
supply chain. 
To solve the problem of RFID based counterfeit detection, we propose to authenticate 
tags in batches. However, if we apply a straightforward private authentication technique, the 
protocol execution time will still be very high. If we consider this problem from a different 
perspective, we see that it is not always necessary to ensure the genuineness of every single 
product in a batch. In fact, even in the genuine products, there can be some products that are 
shipped as defectives from the manufacture. So it is acceptable if we guarantee that the 
percentage of counterfeit products is sufficiently small. 
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6.1. Our Major Contributions 
At this point, we summarize our contributions − 
• We propose to verify the validity of a batch of tags using statistical inference based sampling 
in a protocol named GTest. However, it is not efficient since it requires high execution time 
and large volume of authentication data.  
• To solve the problems of efficient batch authentication, we propose FSA based authentication 
protocol (FTest) that uses a variation of Farmed Slotted Aloha [Zhen05] technique.  
• To compare the performance of GTest and FTest protocols with a per tag authentication 
protocol, we measure their execution time in a simulated RFID environment. 
6.2. Motivation 
When detecting product counterfeiting in large systems, existing approaches can be 
impractical since tags needs to be authenticated one at a time. It may seem at first that the 
problem of counterfeit tag detection can be solved by using any RFID tag identification or 
authentication protocol, simply by allowing the reader to interact with the tags of the batch. 
However, this deterministic process will be very time consuming since reader needs to 
authenticate each and every tag of the batch to determine its validity. The situation will be even 
worse if there are large numbers of tags in the system. Such low authentication efficiency is 
unacceptable in practice especially in large scale supply chain. Therefore, we need batch 
authentication not only to increase efficiency but also to prevent counterfeiting. To address this 
issue, we propose a batch authentication protocol that is scalable, efficient as well as able to 
prevent product counterfeiting within a user defined tolerance level. Due to this protocol, mass 
authentication along the supply chain can be possible, and the cost of maintaining integrity of 
supply chains can be significantly reduced. Eventually it may increase health security, company 
revenues, social awareness and global trading concerns. 
53 
 
6.3. Background 
In this section, we discuss how Framed Slotted Aloha (FSA) and Tree based 
authentication protocol works. 
6.3.1. Tree Based Authentication Protocol 
In tree based hash protocol [Nohl06, Lu09, Avoine05], the tags are organized in a secret 
key tree where each tag is assigned to a leaf of the tree. Secret keys are associated with each 
branch of the tree. Each tag (each leaf) receives all the secret keys along the path from the root to 
itself. If the tree has . levels, each tag stores . keys. The key tree as a balanced tree and therefore, 
if the branching factor is =, the 456> 7 will be equal to .. Each tag has only one key that is not 
shared with any other tag of the system. Figure 6.1 shows a balanced key tree with 7 = 8 and 
= = 2.  
According to this protocol, the reader queries a tag with a nonce 0A. Upon the reception 
of the nonce from the reader, the tag replies to the reader with 
ℎB, 0A, ℎ	(C , 0A, ℎ	(C,(D , 0A, … , ℎ	(C,(D,…,(F , 0A, 
where each 4 ∈ {1, … , =}, 1 ≤  ≤ . and ℎ.  is a hash function. After receiving the 
response, the reader first finds a match with the first hash value of the response by hashing with 
all the keys of level 1. Whenever the reader obtains a match, the reader starts to search for the 
second hash value of the response by hashing with all the keys at the next level of the sub-tree 
rooted at the node where the reader has found the match. The reader repeats this step until it 
reaches a leaf. Thus, the reader’s complexity is reduced to 3log> 7. In the worst case, the 
reader has to search with all the = keys at each level of the tree and the complexity becomes 
= log> 7.  
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The major drawback of this approach each tag must transfer 4 hash values to the reader at 
each authentication. As we discussed before, such a large volume of data is a major bottleneck 
preventing us from accelerating the batch authentication. 
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Figure 6.1 A secret key tree for the tree based hash protocol with +=8 and α=2 
6.3.2. Framed Slotted Aloha 
Aloha based protocols are important because they reduce the probability of occurrence of 
tag collision. In case of pure slotted Aloha, tags select their response time arbitrarily. In slotted 
Aloha [Zhen05], tags select the timeslot randomly and reply at the beginning of the timeslot to 
avoid overlapping of transmissions. Framed Slotted Aloha (FSA) algorithm can be used to 
identify a batch of tags. The protocol uses a fixed frame size and does not change the size during 
the process of tag identification. In FSA, the reader offers information to the tags about the frame 
size () and the random number (
) which is used for a tag to select a slot number in the frame. 
Each uses a hash function ℎ!, which is used to choose the slot number. After receiving , each 
tag selects ℎ⨁
 5 , as its slot number. The reader then sequentially scans every slot in 
the frame. In each slot, if a tag’s slot number equals zero, it will send its  to the server 
immediately. Otherwise, the tag reduces its slot number by one. Since a tag cannot sense the 
signals replied from other tags, there are three types of slots from the reader’s perspective − slots 
with no reply, single reply, or multiple replies. We define these slots as empty slot, single-reply 
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slot, or collision slot respectively. Slots can also be characterized as multi-bit response slots and 
single-bit response slots. Since the frame size of FSA is fixed, its implementation is simple but it 
exhibits low efficiency of tag identification. For example, if there are too many tags, no tag may 
be identified since the slots experience high collision. On the contrary, many slots wasted if the 
number of tags is small. Our FTest protocol is partially dependent on the concept of FSA. 
6.4. System Model and Problem Formulation 
6.4.1. Problem definition 
In our system, we assume that each object is attached with an RFID tag that has a unique 
id (e.g. secret key).  We define the set of tags as population. These tags are divided into batches or 
groups of equal size. Suppose, 7 is the total number of tags in the system and L is the number of 
groups. So, the group size is  0 = MN .  
The number of tags in a batch, 0, is known in advance. We define a batch of tags as valid 
if no counterfeit tag is detected, otherwise this batch is considered as invalid. In our system, each 
batch is associated with a unique key that we refer to as a group key. In addition to each tag’s 
own secret key , every tag shares this group key with other members of the given group. 
Figure 6.2 shows the group organization of the tags where 7 = 8 and L = 4. The ’s are the 
group keys, where 1 ≤  ≤ L. 
 
Figure 6.2 Group organization of the tags for the batch authentication protocol, with +=8 and τ =4 
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6.4.2. Architecture of the system 
There are mainly four components in the system: 
Issuer: The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment and also authorizes the 
reader access to the tags. We can think of the issuer as a certificate authority (PQ).  
RFID Tag: Each RFID tag is denoted as . The issuer assigns a unique key  and a 
group key  to the th tag  of the system. The use of group key will be explained later.  
Table 6.1 Database structure of the authentication server 
Group Key Tag Key Tag +ame 
 
  R R 
       ...        ...   
... ... ... 
S 
1 1 . .. . .. M M 
Reader: A reader (T) connects to the authentication server through a high speed network. 
Here, we assume the communication channel between the reader and the backend server is 
secured. The reader receives all the secret information by the issuer during the deployment.  
Server: The authentication server maintains all the group keys and 7 secret keys 
corresponding to 7 tags in the database. The server also knows which tag belongs to which group 
by maintaining a database like Table 6.1. The server has powerful computing capability. 
6.4.3. Preliminaries and Assumptions 
We assume that the reader and all the tags in the system has the knowledge of XOR 
operation and ℎ. , an irreversible one way hash function to protect the integrity of the message. 
The outputs of ℎ.  cannot be linked back to its input so that an adversary cannot link back the 
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tag s. There are many efficient hash functions in the literature. The hash ℎ.  does not need to 
be a cryptographic hash function. In order to keep the tag’s hardware simple a cyclic redundancy 
check (CRC) function which is already found in existing RFID tags can be used as ℎ. . 
Communication between the reader and the tags is time-slotted. The synchronization between the 
clocks of the tags and reader is done by “start” signal of the reader. The reader uses a ‘slot start’ 
command to start a slot. Our protocols are request-response based protocol, in which the reader 
issues a request in a time slot and then zero, one or more tags respond in the subsequent time 
slots. We assume that RFID reader is able to distinguish the three types of slots mentioned earlier. 
All the notations related to our system are shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Summary of notations 
Symbol Meaning  ∗ Set of RFID tags T RFID Reader 7 Number of tags in the population 0 Number of tags in a batch 
τ Number of batch in the system ℎ.  One way hash function ∆ Counterfeit threshold 0) Sampling size 
6.4.4. Protocol goals 
The goal of a server is to accurately and efficiently determine the validity of a batch of 
tags. It may seem at first that the problem of counterfeit tag detection can be solved by using any 
RFID tag identification or authentication protocol, simply by allowing the reader to interact with 
the tags of the batch. However, this deterministic process will be very time consuming since 
reader needs to authenticate each and every tag of the batch to determine its validity. The 
situation will be even worse if there are large numbers of tags in the system. To solve this issue, 
we design a probabilistic protocol to solve the batch authentication problem by using a variation 
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of FSA based tag detection algorithm. We call our protocol probabilistic since FSA itself is a 
probabilistic protocol. It will provide a provable probabilistic guarantee for valid batches of tags 
ensuring the percentage of potential counterfeit products is less than counterfeit threshold (∆). ∆ 
is a system parameter defined by the user in advance. We guarantee a batch is valid if there are no 
more than 0 ∗ ∆ counterfeit tags in the batch. Note that it does not mean that the batch will be 
declared as valid if the number of counterfeit tags is lower than 0 ∗ ∆. Even if there is only one 
counterfeit tag in the batch, it will still be declared as invalid. 
6.5. Group Test (GTest) Batch Authentication Protocol 
In this section, we present a batch authentication process called Group Test (GTest) that 
uses statistical inference to determine the validity of a batch of tags. The concept of GTest is to 
reduce the cost of detecting counterfeits in large populations which is believed to contain a small 
proportion of defectives by drawing sample from the large population randomly. If GTest 
protocol is applied to products of batches in a large supply chain, then there may be no interest in 
knowing which products are defective. The purpose may instead be to accept or reject the batch 
or to estimate the number of counterfeit products it contains. Therefore, it is useful to know the 
probability distribution of the number of counterfeit samples. 
6.5.1. GTest Protocol Design 
GTest protocol operates in two phases − 1) Group identification and 2) authentication. In 
the first phase, the reader queries the tags with a nonce 0A. The tags, then, replies the following 
encrypted message with probability 0.5 
ℎ ∥ 0A 
Here,  is the group key in which the tag belongs. Now the reader tries all the group 
keys to decrypt this message. If the reader finds the right group key that correctly decrypts the 
message, then the reader can learn the identification of all the tags corresponding to that group by 
online querying the database of the server. This process of tag identification is much efficient 
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than per tag based identification since the reader do not need to query each individual tag of the 
batch.   The reader will, then, start the authentication process by randomly selecting  tags as 
samples and collecting the authentication data from them. Next the reader forwards these data to 
the server. GTest declares this batch of tags as invalid if the server can detect one invalid or 
counterfeit tag. 
6.5.2. Protocol Analysis 
According to the statistical inference based on sampling, we can estimate the proportion 
of individual samples that are defective when they have been taken at random from a large 
population. If 0 individual samples are combined  at a time to give  pooled samples, then the 
number of counterfeit pooled samples follows approximately the binomial distribution ℬ, W*, 
where 
W*  =  1 − 1 − W*  = Y
5ZZ4[ ℎ  Y554 Y4  Y5\ 
Here, W is the probability that an individual sample chosen at random from the entire 
population is defective. Suppose, that our complete population of tags (i.e. 7 tags) contains 0] 
counterfeit tags. Therefore, 
W =  0]/7 
A pooled sample is assumed to be invalid if and only if it includes at least one individual 
counterfeit sample. Then the probability that exactly _ of the pooled samples may be invalid is 
given by 
_|0] =  ab c ∑ −1 	b beB  a MfSg Sfbf*c a MSfbf*ch    ...(3.1) 
where, max a0,  − MfSg* c ≤  _ ≤ min , 0] 
In equation 1, when _ is zero, we derive − 
_|0] =  	MfSg S  	M S h   ... ... ... ... ... (3.2) 
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Equation 3.2 refers to the hypergeometric probability since the absence of counterfeit 
among the 0 individual samples is equivalent to the absence of positive pooled samples. 
Now that we know that the number of counterfeit tags follows the hyper-geometric 
distribution, we define random variable X to refer to the number of counterfeit products in a 
batch. Suppose, in a batch with 0 tags we sample 0) at a time. Then the pdf of X will be: 
o|0∆ =  	S∆p  aSf∆Sqfp ca SSq c  
Here, rsot =  0) ∗  ∆. However, using GTest protocol, if we want to identify the validity 
of a batch, reader needs to read a high amount of data. For example, with 0 = 100000,  0) = 1000 
and ∆= 0% (meaning that every counterfeit tags need to be detected), reader needs to read 
1000 ∗ 20 ∗ 456RBBBBB =  3.1 M byte of data which will take high response time. Therefore, to 
decrease the protocol response time we propose a more efficient protocol in the next section. 
6.6. Framed Slotted ALOHA (FTest) based Batch Authentication Protocol 
In this section, we propose FTest protocol which is dependent on a variation of Frame 
Slotted ALOHA technique. We consider an RFID reader T, and a population of 7 RFID tags 
denoted as  ∗. Table 6.3 summarizes the notations for FTest protocol. 
Table 6.3 +otations for FTest protocol 
Symbol Meaning 
&| Slot position within frame 
T} Response Vector generated by the reader with the replies of tags 
T}) Response Vector generated by the server 

 Set of tags that are removed from the authentication initialization 
phase to reduce collision slot 
 
 6.6.1. FTest Protocol Design
FTest has three phases 
Counterfeit detection. The group identification phase is similar to the one mentioned in GTEst 
batch authentication protocol. The other two phases are discussed next. The entire process is 
illustrated in Figure 6.3.  
Authentication initialization:
identification mechanism mentioned in GTest protocol, the authentication phase is initialized. 
Reader simply starts the authentication by sending “
and by receiving a frame size 
from the server in the first step. The frame consists of 
request. Each tag uses the random number 
between s1, t where  
The tag transmits a short response at that slot (ex. 1 bit). Therefore, 
all slots in our approaches is very short. After the frame ends, the reader abstracts the responses in 
the frame as a Response Vector (
the frame. There are three typ
slot, single reply slot, and collided slot, respectively. 
 
− 1) Group identification, 2) Authentication initialization
Figure 6.3 Authentication process of FTest protocol 
 After identifying a group of tags using the group 
start authentication” command to the server 
 and random number 
. The reader broadcasts the 
 short-response time slots right after the 
r and its key () to hash to a Slot Position, 
&| = ℎ, 
 mod  
the time duration of 
T}). T} is a vector in which each element is related to a slot in 
es of elements in an T}− 0, 1, and 54450, representing empty 
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 and 
 received 
&|, 
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We modify the slot picking behavior so that instead of having a tag pick a slot and return 
its id, we let the tag reply with 1 bit of information signifying that the tag has chosen that slot. In 
other words, instead of the reader receiving 
{… | 1 | 0 |. . . | 54450 | 0 | 1 | … }, 
where, 0 indicates no tag has picked that slot to reply, and collision denotes multiple tags 
trying to reply in the same slot, the reader will receive: 
{… | 1 | 0 | … | 
05 Z | 0 | 1 | … } 
Algorithm 1: Algorithm executed by RFID tags 
Receive , 
 from T 
for each tag  (where i = 1 to #)  
      compute &| = ℎ , 
 mod  
end 
while R broadcasts Slot Position (&|) 
       if  (SP = = SPi) 
               return 1 in T}s&|t 
end 
Figure 6.4 Algorithm executed by tags in FTest protocol 
Algorithm 2: Algorithm executed by reader T 
Define T} of length  
Initialize all entries of T} to 0 
for Slot Position &| = 1 5  do 
      Broadcast &| and listen for reply 
     if (05 
Y4[) 
               continue 
     else if 
Y4[! =  54450  
               T}s&|t = 1 
      else  T}s&|t = 54450 
end 
return T} to the server 
Figure 6.5 Algorithm executed by reader in FTest protocol 
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Algorithm 3: Counterfeit Detection  
assign 54_50
_6 = number of counterfeit  tag  
detected during per tag authentication 
while (54_50
_6/0 < ∆|entire T} checked) 
        if (T}st ==  0 & T})st == 0)  continue 
         else if (T}st ==  1 & T})st == 0) 
                 assert counterfeit detected 
                 54_50
_6 ++ 
         else  if (T}st ==  54450 & T})st == 1) 
                 assert counterfeit detected 
         else   continue 
end 
Figure 3.6 Counterfeit detection process in FTest Protocol 
This is more efficient since the tag  is much longer than the bits transmitted. However, 
this approach is still inefficient because the information carried in the collision slot is totally 
unused. To utilize the collision slot, we turn it into a single reply slot by removing one of the two 
tags from this phase. 
Suppose two tags  and 1map to the same slot position. We remove the tag ( from 
this phase so that it does not transmit any short response. Hence, another tag 1 corresponding 
to this slot has a singleton slot which allows it to be authenticated. 
This situation can be made more efficient by turning each Y − 54450 (Y tags mapped 
into one slot) slot into a singleton slot by randomly removing Y −  1 tags. All the tags that are 
removed using this process are instructed to keep silent in this phase and they are authenticated in 
the next phase. We refer to this set of tags as 
. In counterfeit detection phase, the reader 
authenticates those tags after another to verify their validity. 
The authentication protocol is shown in Figure 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. Each tag in the set 
executes Algorithm 1 (see Figure 6.4) independently. The reader executes Algorithm 2 (see 
Figure 6.5) to generate the T} and return it to the server. 
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Counterfeit detection: In this phase, first the server starts the detection process by 
challenging the tags belonging to rem with a nonce 0A. The tags, replies the following encrypted 
message:  ℎ ∥ 0A. 
The server considers those tags as valid for which it can find legitimate ids able to 
generate the corresponding hash values. Tags that cannot authenticate it selves are considered as 
counterfeit tags. After this per tag authentication process is over, server starts to verify the 
validity of T}. Since the server knows all the keys of the tags corresponding to that batch, it can 
use those keys for reconstructing the T}. The server knows the locations of the empty, singleton 
and collision slots. If such reconstructed response vector exists, which we name as T}), the server 
deterministically accepts the batch of tags as valid. Otherwise, the batch is invalid. Because a 
counterfeit tag has no valid key, its corresponding reply is not expected. So if a slot is supposed to 
be empty but the server finds it singleton, then the server asserts the existence of counterfeit tag. 
If a slot is supposed to be singleton, but the server finds a collision, then at most one tag of that 
slot is valid and it is also an indication of the existence of counterfeit tag. Otherwise, the server 
goes to the next slot position. After the checking ends, if there is no counterfeit tag detected, the 
batch will be accepted as valid. 
Since our goal is to declare a batch invalid if the percentage of counterfeit tags exceeds 
counterfeit threshold ∆, we incorporate that parameter in our counterfeit detection process. This 
detection process will not continue if the number of total counterfeit tags in the batch to the 
number of total tags in the batch is greater than ∆. This will significantly reduce the number of 
rounds in the counterfeit detection protocol since the entire T} does not need to be checked. It 
will also reduce the response time of the entire protocol. For example, suppose n = 1000, number 
of counterfeit tag detected during per tag authentication is 35. Number of counterfeit tags 
detected during the first 70 rounds of counterfeit detection protocol is 15. Then, 
54_50
_6 /0 = BBBB = 0.05 
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If ∆ =  5%, then the counterfeit detection protocol will stop after 70th round. With 0 = 
100000,  0) = 1000 and ∆= 0%, FTest reads 0.03 M byte of data per batch. 
6.6.2. Protocol Analysis 
• In FTest protocol, we assume that all tags in a batch, both legitimate and counterfeit, will 
reply at least once in the frame. However, the counterfeit tags may reply more than once 
to introduce more collision and we name this type of attack as “collision attack”. 
Additionally, the counterfeit tags may not reply at all to hide their identity and we name 
this attack as “concealing attack”. It is very hard to defend against concealing attack and 
it is out of the scope of this work. We can identify the collision attack by comparing the 
T} (response vector returned by the reader) and T}) (response vector generated by the 
server for genuine tags only). There can be following types of distinguishable situations 
that indicate the existence of collision attack:  
• When T})st =  0 and T}st = 1, there should be no genuine tags replying in this slot. 
But the result shows one tag has chosen this slot. So, this tag must be a counterfeit. 
• When T})st =  0 andT}st = 54450, there should be no genuine tags replying in this 
slot. But the result shows more than one tags of this batch has chosen this slot. This also 
ensures that there are counterfeit tags in the system. 
When T})st =  1 andT}st = 54450, there should be only one genuine tag. But the 
result shows more than one tags has chosen this slot. It implies that at most one tag replied in this 
slot is genuine and the rest are counterfeit. 
6.7. Security Analysis of FTest Protocol 
6.7.1. Attack Model 
The goal of an adversary in our system is to install counterfeit tags in the system. 
Evidently, this fake tag can let a fake object to be identified as an authentic one. We assume Q is 
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an adversary who can eavesdrop in between the channel and can use the learned information to 
create counterfeit tags and install them in the system. Each counterfeit tag is denoted as  . The 
attacker may try to track genuine tags of the system. We also assume that genuine tags and reader 
cannot be compromised by the attacker. In our system, the following oracle-like construction 
exists:  
o , , : The adversary eavesdrops to listen to the communication between R 
and one of its tag . 
o , , , : The adversary impersonates a reader R by sending a message 
M to the tag . 
o , , , : The counterfeit tag   impersonates a genuine tag in a 
protocol session at time  and sends a message M to the reader R. 
o , : The adversary queries a tag  to learn information during a communication 
session at time . 
o  ¡, , : The adversary receives a message M from an entity U (e.g., either  or 
T) at time . 
6.7.2. Security Analysis 
In this section, we analyze our proposed authentication protocol against different types of 
attacks. For every attack, we first describe how the attack is performed by an adversary. Then 
how our protocol protects against the attack is explained. T and  are referred to as a legitimate 
reader and legitimate tag. Each attack and defend, as a whole, have three phases: 
Phase 1. Learning phase: This phase represents pre-attack preparations. Adversary, Q 
uses non-destructive oracles such as , , , , , 
, , , , and  ¡, ,  on a set of target tags and reader to learn 
information related to them. 
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Phase 2. Attacking phase: Q starts to attack by creating counterfeit tag () and installing 
them in the system.  
Phase 3. Defend Phase: Our protocol is designed in such a way so that it can defend 
against majority of the attacks performed by the fake tag . 
Since the defend phase is different for each attack, we discuss this phase for following 
attacks:  
• Collision Attack 
Learning and Attack Phase: Under this attack, Q queries a set of valid tags with 
different , 
 using ,  , ,  oracle to collect replies from the genuine tags. 
Using this learned information she creates fake tags and installs them in the system. From then 
on, the fake tags will try to attack the system with their responses. 
Defend Phase: In collision attack, a counterfeit tag emits replies in multiple slots for 
disturbing the distribution of slots in the T}. In fact, our approach is very immune to such attack, 
since generating more meaningless replies is equivalent to increasing the ratio of counterfeit tags, 
which helps to increase the probability of detecting counterfeit tags. 
• Privacy Violation Attack 
Learning Phase: Under this attack, Q repeatedly queries  with different , 
 using 
,  , ,  oracle to collect replies from the existing tags.  
Attacking phase: Q execute  ¡, ,  oracle to learn replies from the tags and 
create a response vector. The goal of the attacker is to learn the s of different tags. 
Defend Phase: Our protocol can preserve the privacy of individual RFID tag since none 
of the tags reply their . Therefore, the adversary cannot infer s from the replies of the tags.  
• Tracking Attack 
Learning Phase: Here, Q tries to track  over time. Q succeeds if it can distinguish ¢ 
from other tags over time. 
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Attacking phase: Under this attack, Q repeatedly queries  with different , 
 using 
oracle  ,  to learn about the slot picking behavior of the tags. Then the adversary 
executes oracle  ¡, ,  to receive replies from the tags. The goal of the attacker is to 
get a consistent reply that may become a signature of .  
Defend Phase: FTest protocol is resistant against tracking. Let an adversary Q 
eavesdrops on the transaction between a reader T and the genuine tags. So Q knows the queries 
and replies but Q cannot reverse compute the replies. The adversary can certainly be sure that a 
communication has taken place. However, it cannot Figure out which tag replied in which slot 
since it do not have s of the tags. Moreover, the slot picking behavior of the tags changes with 
the change of  and 
. Therefore, the outputs of all the tags seems to be pure random to the 
adversary Q. 
• Eavesdropping Attack 
Learning Phase: Q executes the oracle ,  ,  and later uses this 
information to launch different attacks (ex. replay attack). 
Attacking phase: Q learns every information exchanged between T and . The goal of 
Qis to use the data to impersonate a fake tag.  
Defend Phase: Our protocol is powerful against this attack. In our protocol Q will not be 
able to find out the expected reply of the tags. In each pass, all tags will pick a different slot based 
on the random number sent by the reader. Q can only observe the communication but it cannot 
link the outputs of the two parties. It cannot even launch replay attack by replaying previous 
messages since the slot picking nature of the tags changes with  and 
. 
6.7.3. Evaluation Results 
We evaluate the efficiency of GTest and FTest Protocol based on the metric − execution 
time. To compare the performance of both protocols we also simulate a Per Tag Authentication 
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(PTA) protocol to identify the validity of batches. PTA is a deterministic approach, which 
authenticates all tags to detect the validity of a batch. The accuracy of PTA is certainly 100% but 
its efficiency is very low. There are plenty of Per Tag Authentication protocols in literature 
[Dimitriou06, Lu07, Hoque11, Hoque09a, and Hoque09b]. We use AnonPri [Hoque11], a group 
based authentication protocol as PTA.  In our simulation, the authentication server is 
implemented on a high performance Dell PC. We use java for protocol simulation where we use 
SHA-1 as the hash function (returning 160 bits) in all three protocols. We also use MySQL to 
store secret keys for the simulated tags. In our simulated RFID environment, we have considered 
two systems with 7 = 2£ , L = 8, 16, 32, 64 and 7 = 2RB, L = 512, 256, 128, 64. We 
deliberately introduce 1% to 4% randomly generated counterfeits into the dataset. We have run 
the simulation for 100 times and reported the average.  
Execution time metric determines the time required for interaction between the reader 
and tags. This metric tells us the processing time of a protocol to determine the validity of tags 
when we need to identify all the counterfeit tags in each batch. Since every bit almost consumes 
the same transmission time which equals 25¥ [EPCGLOBAL] on average, we measure the 
execution time by multiplying the size of transmitted data (in bits) with 25¥. For all protocols, 
we consider the tags uses SHA-1 hash function. Therefore, in GTest protocol, the length of data 
replied by tags is 160-bits [Neill08]. The total size of data used for group identification equals 
160 ∗  0/2 (since tags will reply with probably 0.5). Now to verify a batch with 0 tags, suppose 
that 0) tags are sampled and the length of random numbers equals 160 bits. The size of 
authentication phase will equal 160 + 160 ∗ 0) Z, since reader will challenge with a random 
number (160 bits) and tags will reply with their hashed response (160 bits). So, the total data size 
of GTest protocol will be: 
_§¨©ª)* =  a160 ∗ 02 + 160 + 160 ∗ 0)c Z 
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For PTA protocol, the reader needs to check all the group keys and this has to be done for 
all the tags of the batch. Therefore, the data size will be 
_§«©# =  160 ∗ 0 + 160 + 160 ∗ 0 Z 
On the contrary, the data transferred in FTest one random number and  replies. Since 
each echo is in the same size (1bits), the total size: 
_§¬©ª)* =  	160 ∗ 0 2h + 160 + 1 ∗ 0 − 0Aª +  160 + 160 ∗ 0Aª Z 
 
(a) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2£ 
 
(b) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2RB 
Figure 6.7 Comparison of execution time of FTest, GTest and PTA protocol 
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Figure 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) shows the execution time of our two protocols. The figure shows 
that GTest performs better than PTA and FTest performs the best. We can see that FTest protocol 
significantly reduces the execution time. For system with N = 216, FTest reduces almost 800 sec 
than PTA for the largest batch. And for system with N = 220, FTest reduces almost 1700 sec than 
PTA for the largest batch. . And for system with N = 220, FTest reduces almost 1700 sec than PTA 
for the largest batch (see Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 Performance comparison table 
+ Ftest savings over PTA [6] 
216 ≈ 800sec 
220 ≈ 1700sec 
Figure 6.8(a) and 6.8(b) shows the execution time of our two protocols when ∆ ≈ 3%. By 
∆ ≈ 3%, we mean that the protocol will consider a batch invalid if it can identify at least 3% of 
the tags as counterfeit. At that point, the protocol will declare the entire batch as invalid and will 
stop executing further. The figure clearly shows that, with ∆ ≈ 3% , FTest is the most efficient 
protocol. We can see that out approaches, especially FTEst protocol significantly reduces the 
execution time. FTest with ∆ ≈ 3% saves almost 85 sec for largest batch size. 
 
(a) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2£ and ∆ = 3% 
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(b) 
(b) Execution time of FTest, GTest, and PTA when N =2RB and ∆ =  3% 
Figure 6.8 Comparison of execution time for FTest, GTest and PTA protocol with ∆ = ­% 
6.8. Goals Satisfied by FTest Protocol 
The motivating example of RFID application for this chapter is to identify counterfeit 
tags in large scale RFID systems efficiently. The goal of such a system is to identify counterfeit 
tags, ensure low system response time as well as provide basic security like confidentiality and 
authentication. FTest protocol is able to achieve all these goals with very low response time 
compared to the existing work. 
6.9. Summary 
Detecting counterfeit tags in large scale RFID systems is a very significant but underrated 
research issue. Most of the existing RFID authentication methods used for counterfeit detection 
require a pre-identification process, and suffer from high scanning cost and communication cost. 
We believe that an efficient, secure and fast counterfeit detection protocol may have good impact 
on the deployment of many large scale RFID systems. In this chapter, we present an efficient 
batch authentication protocol (FTest) to detect product counterfeiting in RFID enabled systems. 
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Our simulation results show that our FTest can perform significantly better than per tag 
authentication protocols. 
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Chapter 7: Privacy Preservation in RFID based Healthcare Systems 
RFID technology can provide a number of benefits to the healthcare industry. This 
technology can improve overall safety and operational efficiency because it operates without line-
of-sight while providing immense capabilities. In fact, RFID can contribute to create the hospital 
of the future by improving patient care and safety, optimizing the workflows, reducing the 
operating costs, and reducing costly thefts. There are a number of ongoing trials and studies at 
hospitals and healthcare centers around the world utilizing and integrating RFID into their 
hospital information systems. One study estimates that the market for RFID tags and systems in 
healthcare will rise rapidly from $90 million in 2006 to $2.1 billion in 2016 [Harrop08]. 
Primarily, this will be because of Item Level Tagging of drugs and Real Time Locating Systems 
for staff, patients and assets to improve efficiency, safety and availability and to reduce losses 
[Harrop08].  
By attaching RFID tags to different entities in healthcare industry (people and objects), 
RFID technology can provide tremendous automation in identification, tracking, monitoring and 
security control measures. These capabilities directly affect the major issues currently 
experienced by healthcare organizations while helping to drive down costs [BlueBean]. Some of 
the most promising RFID based systems that are already being successfully tested (or deployed) 
are: patient identification and monitoring, patient’s drug usage monitoring, surgical instrument 
tracking and locating, newborn identification, hospital personnel identification and tracking, 
blood bag tracking, detecting pharmaceutical counterfeit, avoiding theft of medical equipment, 
tagging of meal plateaux to ensure patients get the appropriate diet, ensuring proper identification 
of laboratory specimens, and restrict access to high threat areas of the hospital to authorized staff, 
etc. 
In a patient identification system of an RFID based hospital, every patient is identified 
using an RFID tag installed wristband [Wessel05]. A reader is used to identify the ID of the tag 
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which allows the system to identify the patient uniquely. It also allows doctors, nurses and other 
hospital personnel to access the medical information of the legitimate patient from the server, 
using the tag ID. The ID can also be used to access various healthcare services, for example, 
identifying and dispatching prescribed medicine for a particular patient.  
In spite of several ongoing researches on RFID based healthcare systems [Chen10, 
Turcu09], there are still some significant research challenges regarding privacy that need to be 
addresses. First, RFID tags can be read at a small distance, through materials, even without the 
knowledge of its owner. Second, if the communication between tags and readers is performed in 
wireless environment, any unauthorized reader may try to track the tag to access the user’s private 
information. Third, data collected from RFID tags can potentially be used by multiple users 
(doctors, nurses, pharmacists and etc) and multiple organizations to provide various healthcare 
services. Fourth, the ID of the RFID tags along with its Electronic Medical Record (EMR), 
collected over a period of time, may expose significant private information of user such as: trace 
of personal health information, clinical history and financial information. In conclusion, RFID 
technology has not really seen its true potential in healthcare since above mentioned four privacy 
concerns are not properly addressed by the existing techniques. 
7.1. Our Major Contributions 
In this chapter, we make an effort to address the above mentioned challenges with 
following contributions: 
• From the four privacy concerns mentioned in the introduction, we point out two major 
privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare systems: privacy concerns in RFID sensing and 
privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare service access.  
• We propose a framework (PriSens-HSAC), consisting of two major components, each 
component respectively addresses one of the above mentioned two privacy issues. 
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• The PriSens component proposes a group based anonymous authentication protocol to 
solve the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy problem of RFID sensing. Our idea is 
to preserve privacy in RFID sensing based on the premise that adversary cannot break 
unlinkability with probability better than random guessing.  
• The HSAC component proposes a privacy preserving healthcare service access mechanism 
to maintain user’s privacy while accessing various healthcare services.  
• We also present the evaluation of the framework by measuring the level of the achieved 
privacy. 
Though our major motivation in this chapter is to enhance the privacy of users in an 
RFID based healthcare system, our proposed PriSens-HSAC framework addresses all the security 
and privacy requirements mentioned in Chapter 3. This framework has scope not only in the 
healthcare industry, but also in other applications where the privacy of the tag bearers is an 
important issue. 
Organization of the chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 
presents the motivation of our work. In section 7.3, we present relevant related work. In section 
7.4, we discuss the privacy issues of RFID tag sensing in healthcare setting. In this section, we 
also discuss the privacy issues in RFID based healthcare service access. In section 7.5, we present 
the details of our framework. Then we present the group based anonymous authentication 
protocol (PriSens) in section 7.6. The architecture of HSAC is presented in the same section. In 
section 7.7, we present the evaluation of our framework.  
7.2. Motivation 
7.2.1. RFID in Healthcare 
With the deployment and use of RFID technology in the healthcare domain, there are 
increasing privacy concerns regarding the technical designs of RFID systems. The potential 
benefits of RFID technology have been accompanied by threats of privacy violations [Juban04]. 
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These threats pertain to the potential risks of unauthorized data access, misuse of patient data, and 
the capabilities of permanently saving and linking information about individuals through 
temporal and spatial extension of data collection activities. While RFID technology can improve 
the overall quality of healthcare delivery, the benefits must be balanced with the privacy and 
security concerns. The use of RFID introduces a new set of risks: Security risks are associated 
with the possible failure of the RFID system under various security attacks, i.e. tracking, 
eavesdropping, and denial of service, while the threat to privacy reside in the capabilities to 
permanently save and link information about individuals through temporal and spatial extension 
of data collection activities. Although concerns about information privacy are not unique to the 
healthcare domain, health related information can be perceived as more personal and more 
sensitive. Due to the highly personal and sensitive nature of healthcare data, both healthcare 
providers and patients can be expected to resist further digitalization though the usage of RFID 
technology until security and privacy protections is in place. 
There are different kinds of RFID applications that allows healthcare professionals to 
avoid errors or risks that could endanger the patient safety. Usually, RFID based sensing activities 
related to healthcare can be divided in two types:  
Direct sensing activity: These activities refer to various identification and monitoring 
systems. Some of the most promising RFID based direct sensing activity that are already being 
successfully tested (or deployed) in a number of hospitals are: hospital personnel [Wessel05], 
patient and newborn identification and monitoring [Wessel05], patient’s drug usage monitoring 
[Yao10], surgical instrument tracking and locating [Rivera08], and blood bag tracking  [Yao10]. 
Indirect inferred activity: These activities basically refer to those systems that use direct 
sensing activity data to infer important information. For example, detecting pharmaceutical 
counterfeit, avoiding theft of medical equipment, the tagging of meal plateaux to ensure that 
patients get proper diet according to their treatment, allergies and tastes and etc. 
 Figure 
Figure 7.1 illustrates a simple architecture of an RFID system in healthcare. It has two 
individual modules:  
1) RFID Sensing Module 
systems.  
2) Service Provider Module 
identification data to provide various healthcare services (ex. physician’s diagnosis, prescription, 
medicine usage chart, specialist’s opinion, insurance verification, appropriate medicine dispatch, 
and etc).  
Some simple example scenario of RFID tag usage in healthcare area can be as follows:
Medicines’ authenticity tracking:
guarantee their quality. RFID tag based identification and authentication methods can guarantee 
the origin of medicines, especially in pharmaceutical supply chains. Electronic Product Codes 
(EPC) (e.g. a serial number) in RFID tags are used to track each i
supply chain. Each EPC/RFID tag is attached to a drug unit. Thus, it is possible to track every 
individual drug unit and to verify its authenticity.
Patients’ drug dispatch:
using RFID installed wristband [
then pulled up from the central database and passed onto the physician’s PDA which is a part of 
7.1 An RFID based ubiquitous healthcare system
- consisting of all the RFID identification and monitoring 
- consisting of all the systems that uses legitimate RFID 
 Ensuring the origin of medicines is essential to 
ndividual medicine along the 
 
 Usually, in case RFID based hospitals, a patient is i
Wessel05]. The medical information of the legitimate patient is 
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dentified 
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the service provider module. The physician’s system may suggest medicine based on diagnosis 
and the pharmacy system may use the prescription to dispatch proper medicine for the patient.  
Financial Transactions: Depending on the health care system, patients must pay for the 
service that they receive. In addition, health care providers must be able to verify that a given 
patient is covered under a particular plan, what specific procedures, lab tests, and whether 
dependants are covered. In this case, RFID can be used to identify patients using wristbands 
[Wessel05] which can pull up all those information in seconds for hospital bill calculation.  
Patients’ disease monitoring: Wide varieties of methods have been used to identify 
patients when they are in hospitals. One of the most popular methods is based on using a 
wristband in which a bar code is printed. However, recently the barcode based bracelets has been 
replaces by RFID tag based bracelets [Wessel05]. In some chronic diseases, continuous 
monitoring of patients is very important. RFID technology could be used to send information 
from patients to a control system. The control system could activate an alarm based on the 
received data. 
7.2.2. Two Fold Privacy Preservation 
It is evident that in RFID based healthcare systems, the privacy concerns are twofold: 
privacy concerns in RFID sensing and privacy concerns in RFID based healthcare service 
access. Therefore, to address this problem we need to have twofold privacy management 
mechanism in place:  
1) A privacy preserving authentication protocol is required while sensing RFID tags. 
This protocol will preserve privacy when different identification and monitoring process are 
executed in “RFID sensing module” of Figure 7.1.  
2) A privacy preserving access control technique is required while receiving services 
from “service provider module” of Figure 7.1 to ensure that user preferred privacy level is 
achieved. 
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To address the two above mentioned privacy problems in RFID system, we propose a 
privacy preserving framework (PriSens-HSAC) in this chapter. With this privacy mechanism in 
place, the true potential of an RFID based healthcare system can finally be exploited. The 
widespread adoption of such privacy preserving RFID based healthcare system will open doors 
for various assisted care, remote health monitoring, and elderly care systems. Eventually, it may 
help to ensure quality healthcare facilities, longer life expectancy, reduced death rate, and 
preserve patient’s privacy. 
7.3. Background Study 
The HSAC component of the framework uses P-RBAC [Dafa-Alla05]. There are plenty 
of role based access control (RBAC) techniques in the literature. In [He05], the authors propose 
an enhanced role based access control mechanism for hospital information systems but they did 
not consider any privacy issues. Purpose based access control (PBAC) models also have been 
proposed to protect sensitive data [Byun05, Yang07], but the purpose is difficult to define. Jin et 
al propose a framework for e-Health systems [Jin09], which supports patient-centric selective 
sharing of virtual composite e-Health data using different levels of granularity. However, it 
focuses on the framework only and does not discuss a detailed approach for policy definition and 
management. Attribute based access control (ABAC) adopts XACML [Godik03] to define 
policies, and transform them into access control lists (ACLs). However, commercial DBMS 
kernel cannot support XACML and thus existing ABAC module in databases are implemented in 
an on the fly basis. This brings high performance degradation for the database.  
The major component of PriSesn-HSAC framework is PriSens which is an RFID 
authentication protocol. Several authentication protocols have been proposed to secure RFID 
systems against major attacks and details of such related works are presented in Chapter 5.  
Our proposed PriSens-HSAC framework provides higher level of privacy and security in 
terms of RFID sensing. The framework provides more privacy in RFID based healthcare system 
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by proposing a better privacy preserving authentication protocol and by using P-RBAC while 
accessing healthcare services. To the best of our knowledge, PriSens-HSAC is the first 
framework to provide increased privacy in RFID based healthcare systems through the usage of 
RFID authentication along with access control technique. 
7.4. Privacy Concerns in RFID Systems 
7.4.1. Privacy Issues in RFID Sensing 
Ensuring strong privacy in RFID sensing imposes a higher complexity on the reader. 
Conversely, improving efficiency may hamper some privacy. Here, our main focus is on the 
tradeoff between privacy and scalability of RFID systems. Public key cryptography would be a 
better candidate to solve the problem between privacy and scalability. In this approach, the tag 
would encrypt its message using the public key of the reader so that only the real reader would be 
able to decrypt the message and identify the tag. But public key encryption is too expensive for 
low cost tags. In this chapter, we consider the low cost tags which are capable of doing symmetric 
key encryption, in which keys are shared between the tag and the legitimate readers. First, we 
outline how the tree based hash protocol provides scalability but sacrifice some privacy. Then, we 
describe how the group based protocol provides improved scalability as well as a higher level of 
privacy. Finally, we point out the privacy problem of this group based protocol. Our main focus, 
here, is on this major problem of tradeoff between privacy and scalability of RFID systems. 
Molnar and Wagner [Molnar04] first proposed a tree based hash protocol for RFID 
systems to reduce the search complexity of the reader from 37 to 3log> 7, where = is the 
branching factor at each level of the tree. But this approach achieves better scalability at the cost 
of some privacy loss of the tags [Nohl06].  Figure 6.2(a) shows a balanced key tree with 7 =
8 and = = 2. Suppose the tag ® in Figure 6.2(a) becomes compromised. All the tags of the 
system are partitioned into three disjoint sets. The adversary can now uniquely distinguish the tag 
¯  and identify the tags  and R as a unique partition. All the remaining tags (, £, °, ±) form 
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a single partition because the tag ® shares no key with them. Therefore each tag of this partition 
(, £, °, ±) is anonymous among these four tags. The privacy provided by this scheme 
diminishes as more and more tags are compromised. 
Avoine et al. [Avoine07] proposed a group based authentication protocol to address the 
privacy problem of the tree based hash protocol. According to this protocol, tags are divided into 
² disjoint groups of equal size. Figure 6.2(b) shows the group organization of the tags where 
7 = 8 and ² = 4. This protocol reduces the complexity of both the reader and the tag. The tag 
always has to perform two encryptions. In the worst case, the reader has to perform ² + 1 
encryptions. In addition, each tag needs to store only two keys for the authentication. The group 
organization of this protocol improves the level of privacy. For instance, if the tag  ® is 
compromised, the adversary can uniquely identify only the tag ¯  (see Figure 6.2(b)). The 
adversary cannot uniquely distinguish the other tags , R, , £, °, ±. Each of these tags 
remains anonymous among these six tags. Like other protocols, this protocol also has some 
limitations. There is a tradeoff between the number of groups and the group size. To address this 
problem, we propose an efficient anonymous private authentication (PriSens) scheme that 
improves the privacy protection by keeping the reader’s complexity moderate. This protocol is 
specifically suitable for healthcare since its goal is to achieve automation and preserve privacy. 
 
(a) Tree based hash protocol with N=8 and α=2 
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(b) Group based protocol, with N=8 and γ=4 
Figure 7.2 Two privacy preserving RFID authentication protocols 
There are several authentication protocols that have been proposed [Hoque11, Hoque 
09a, Hoque09b, Avoine05, Avoine07, and Dimitriou06] for RFID systems to secure them against 
major attacks. However, all those protocols can preserve minimal user privacy at the cost of large 
reader complexity. The reader complexity increases with large number of tags is the system. 
Moreover, the level of privacy provided by the scheme decreases as more and more tags are 
compromised. Therefore, we identify that there is a tradeoff between privacy preservation and 
scalability in RFID authentication. To address this problem, we propose an anonymous private 
authentication (PriSens) protocol that improves the privacy protection in RFID sensing by 
keeping the reader’s complexity moderate. This protocol is specifically suitable for healthcare 
industry since RFID based healthcare systems since its main goal is to preserve privacy while 
achieving automation. In our approach, each tag is assigned a couple of identifiers. A single tag 
shares some of its identifiers with some members of its group. Thus this protocol prevents 
tracking by increasing the uncertainty of the adversary. 
7.4.2. Privacy Issues in RFID based Healthcare Service Access 
The ID of the RFID tag identified by PriSens, may need to be shared with physicians, 
pharmacy, insurance company and emergency care providers to access various healthcare 
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 services. This information, collected over a period of time, may expose significant private 
information such as trace of personal location, personal health information and 
this, we propose a privacy preserving access control 
patient’s private information.
7.5. Architecture of PriSens
To solve the two major privacy issues in RFID based healthcare systems, we
PriSens-HSAC, a framework consisting of two major components. One component is PriSens 
that proposes a group based anonymous authentication protocol to solve the tradeoff between the 
scalability and privacy of RFID sensing in healthcare. PriSens p
achieves better efficiency than existing RFID authentication protocols. The second component is 
HSAC that proposes a privacy preserving healthcare service access mechanism to maintain user’s 
privacy while accessing various healthca
access control mechanism to restrict unauthor
framework is shown in Figure 
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technique to restrict unauthorized access of 
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When any RFID based identification or monitoring operation takes place in a healthcare 
system, the reader as well as tags in concern executes PriSens protocol to preserve user privacy. It 
is important to notice that PriSens can preserve privacy and defend against attacks launched by 
the outsider adversary. For example, if any unauthorized reader tries to launch any attack in the 
RFID information system of the hospital or tries to violate user privacy (by tracking the user), 
PriSens can defend against the launched attacks and provide better privacy compared to the other 
existing protocols [Molnar04, Avoine07]. If any unauthorized user wants to access any healthcare 
service (ex. access patient’s medical history using the ID of the tag), HSAC will not allow the 
user to access that service using a privacy aware role based access control mechanism [Dafa-
Alla05]. Therefore, it is evident that PriSens component will run in tags and reader. But HSAC 
component can be executed in user’s mobile devices, central server or any other machines that 
uses ID if the RFID tag to access healthcare related services. 
7.6. Overview of PriSens-HSAC Framework 
In this section we describe the two components of Prisens-HSAC framework in detail. 
7.6.1. Details of PriSens (Group based Anonymous Authentication Protocol for RFID Sensing) 
In this section, we will describe the details of PriSens Protocol. 
1) Privacy Characterization in PriSens 
In literature several different notions of privacy have been proposed so far. Some authors 
mention information privacy as the privacy of RFID systems. This privacy notion is the act of 
preventing a tag from disclosing its product information [Ohkubo03, Weis03]. But protecting 
information privacy keeps tags traceable. Therefore, it is a weak notion of RFID privacy. Some 
define unlinkability as the strong notion of RFID privacy [Nohl06, Chatmon06]. Unlinkability 
means the inability to distinguish between the responses from the same tag and the responses 
from different tags of the system. Providing unlinkability ensures strong privacy when the 
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adversary cannot distinguish between two tags with a probability better than random guessing 
[Juels07]. In our protocol, we protect privacy of the tags by providing unlinkability between two 
tags of the system. 
The level of privacy obtained by any protocol can be measured using the anonymity set. 
Anonymity has been proposed in the context of mix-nets in [Diaz02]. Mix-nets are used to make 
the sender (and the recipient) of a message anonymous. The anonymity set is defined as the set of 
all potential senders (recipients) of the message. Anonymity is defined as being not identifiable 
among a group of entities, i.e., the members of the anonymity set. A higher degree of anonymity 
is achieved with an anonymity set of larger size. Perfect anonymity is achieved if anonymity set 
contains all the members capable of sending (receiving) messages in system. 
2) System Model of PriSens 
In our protocol, tags are divided into groups of equal size. Suppose, 7 is the total number 
of tags in the system and L is the number of groups. So, the group size is 0 = MN . Next, we define 
the components and parameters of our system.  
Issuer. The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag’s 
information into its memory. The issuer also authorizes the reader access to the tags. Even each 
group receives its unique group key and a pool of identifiers from the issuer. 
Group. Each group has a 0 number of tags. The issuer assigns a unique group key ¨³ to 
the th group  of the system. This key is shared between the members (tags) of this group. Each 
group also receives the following pool of identifiers from the issuer ´ = µ,, ,R, … , ,¶·, 
where, 1 ≤  ≤ L and ¸ is a system parameter. The pools of any two groups do not share any 
identifier, i.e., ´ ∩ ´1 = ∅, ∀ ≠ ½. Each tag of the group  is assigned a couple of identifiers 
from ´ by the issuer.  
Tag. All the tags of the system are divided into L groups. Each tag receives the shared 
group key of the group that the tag belongs to, a unique secret key that is known only to the 
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reader and the tag itself, and a set of identifiers from the pool of identifiers of the group. Suppose, 
the tag 1 belongs to the group . This tag possesses the group key ¨³, the unique secret key 
©¾, and a set of identifiers Ω1. Each key is of À bits, where À is the security parameter of 
symmetric key encryption. We define the Ω1 as follows 
Ω1 = µ,1C , ,1D , … , ,1Á·, where,  
each ,1Â  is chosen randomly following uniform distribution from the pool ´ and 
½ ∈ {1,2, … , ¸}, where 1 ≤ ! ≤  
,1Â ≠ ,1Ã , for all ! ≠ [ 
 is also a system parameter and ¸ > . 
The identifiers are assigned to the tags in such a way that at least one identifier of a tag is 
shared with at least two other members of the same group. So, we can say for the tag 1, 
∃Y, ÆÇ,1Â ∈ ÈÉ ∩ ÈÊË, 
where Y,Æ are any two members of  and Y ≠ Æ. 
Reader. The reader is connected to the backend server. We assume the communication 
channel between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, we denote the 
backend server as the reader. In our system, the tag is the prover and the reader is the verifier. The 
reader receives all the secret information by the issuer during the deployment. The issuer issues 
the reader a set of secret information for each group in the system Ì = µÍ¨³ , ÎÏÐ1 ≤  ≤ L·, 
where ¨³ is the secret group key and Î is the mapping of the identifiers of the pool ´ with the 
secret keys of tags. Formally,  
Î = µÍ, , ÑÏÐ1 ≤ ! ≤ ¸ and , ∈ ´·, 
 
where Ñ is the set of secret keys of tags associated with the ,. Ñ can be defined as 
an empty set if no tag is associated with the , or it can be a set of size at least one. Formally, 
88 
 
Ñ = ÒµÓC , ÓD , … ·,   where Ö∗ ∈ {, R, … , M}∅, otherwise Ø. 
System parameters. Since each tag receives  identifiers randomly chosen from the 
pool of ¸ identifiers, according to the  distribution strategy, we can say that each tag has at 
least one identifier common with at least two group members. The probability that each tag shares 
at least one identifier with at least two group members is 
|)ÙAª = 1 − Ú	¶f 	¶ ×
	¶fR 	¶ Ü = 1 −
	¸ − !®¸!R¸ − 3! 
where ¸ ≥ 0. For example, we consider an RFID system of 1000 tags divided in 10 
groups. 100 tags are in each group. For simplicity, we assume ¸ = 100 and  = 10. Then the 
probability that each tag shares at least one identifier with at least two group members is |)ÙAª = 
96.87%. 
Reader   Tag Þ 
Generate nonce, 0A   
       0A 1. Generate nonce 0* 
  2. Pick a ,1Â  from Ω1  
3. ← rà³ 	0A ∥ 0* ∥ ,1Â, \ ← rá¾ 0A ∥ 0*, and - ← , \  
  -  
1. T tries all the group keys 
until it decrypts  to retrieve 
the ,1Â  
2. T lookups the key set Ñ 
associated with the ,1Â  
3. T tries all the keys  ∈ Ñ  
until it decrypts \. 
4. If such a key exists, T 
accepts 1,otherwise rejects 1 
  
Figure 7.4 The PriSens protocol 
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3) Brief Overview of PriSens 
We describe our protocol briefly in this section. The reader starts to query the tag with a 
nonce 0A. Upon the reception of the query, the tag generates another nonce 0*. Suppose the 
reader interrogates the tag 1. In the second step, the tag picks an identifier, say ,1Â , from Ω1. 
Then the tag computes - as shown in Figure 7.4. Here, r.  denotes symmetric key encryption 
with key . The tag replies with the -. Now the reader searches all the group keys until it finds 
the correct one that properly decrypts the first part () of the response. If the reader retrieves the 
identifier ,1Â    that the tag used in its response, then the reader tries to decrypt the second part 
(\) of - with the potential set of secret keys (Ñ) associated with ,1Â . After finding the right 
secret key, the reader can uniquely identify the tag 1. Sharing some identifiers of a tag with other 
members of the group provide unlinkability even if any tag is compromised by the adversary. 
7.6.2. Details of HSAC (Privacy Preserving Healthcare Service Access Mechanism) 
Unauthorized disclosure of health related information can have serious consequences 
like: refusal of employment, seclusion from family or community groups and personal 
embarrassment. Once information has been disclosed, the damage cannot be undone so to earn 
user trust it is important that unauthorized disclosure is prevented. Also to prevent any kind of 
insider attack in the RFID based hospital information system, unauthorized access of sensitive 
data should be prevented. A major concern in RFID based healthcare system is how to protect 
user privacy when the RFID identification data, i.e. patient’s private information are increasingly 
passed around and accessed by a large number of people such as doctors, nurses, technicians, and 
researchers. This information, collected over a period of time, may expose significant private 
information such as: trace of personal location, medical history, treatment history, and even 
financial information. One measure is to use access control technique which requires that only 
authorized entities or users with a legitimate request satisfying related policies or laws can access 
sensitive information. 
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1) Access Policy Requirements for Healthcare Privacy 
In modern day healthcare systems, most of the organizations are internetworking their 
systems, increasing the potential for unauthorized access. Since there are countless individual 
scenarios, circumstances and relationships, the access control framework must be flexible and 
highly expressive. The framework needs to ensure that a user’s access policy can be recorded and 
enforced in a manner that reflects their understanding of who they want to have access and who 
they don’t want to have access. This will typically involve allowing or disallowing consent to 
groups or roles. In order to restrict access of certain information to only certain people, allowing 
or disallowing access to certain roles needs to be included too. To employ allowance and 
disallowance of consent or access rights explicit denial of access to particular role is necessary. 
2) Brief Overview of of HSAC 
Role based access control (RBAC) [Ferraiolo92] is a popular security model. Due to its 
flexibility, RBAC model has been widely applied to healthcare information systems [Becker04, 
Bhatti06]. In this research work, we propose HSAC, a privacy preserving healthcare service 
access mechanism. The architecture of HSAC is shown in Figure 7.5. HSAC propose to preserve 
user preferred privacy while accessing healthcare services using Privacy-aware Role Based 
Access Control (P-RBAC) [Dafa-Alla05]. The adoption of a model like P-RBAC in a RFID 
based healthcare seems justifiable since healthcare is a complex environment which deals with 
various user roles in multiple organizations. Classical RBAC, does not support role roaming 
among different organizations. Furthermore, in order to protect privacy in healthcare sector, not 
only the content of EMR but also some meta information about EMRs, e.g., the creators, owners 
are required for privacy protection. However, the main feature of P-RBAC lies in the complex 
structure of privacy permissions that reflects a structured ways of expressing privacy rules. 
Moreover, aside from the data and the action to be performed on the data, in P-RBAC, privacy 
permission explicitly states the intended purpose of the action along with the conditions under 
which the permission can be granted and the obligations that are to be finally performed. It helps 
 in verifying that the access control policies of the healthcare organization are compliant with 
privacy regulations. Moreover, in HSAC, we allow users to have preferred privacy configuration 
by including user defined privacy policies along with the organizational privacy policies. 
In HSAC, the administrator can define and manage traditional privacy policies related to 
the access of various data as well as user preferred privacy policies. For example, some doctor 
may not want anyone else to view her patient’s medical diagnosis withou
these policies are broken down into unit privacy policy and unit user role by the Privacy Policy 
Manager (PPM). The unit policy and unit role are stored in Privacy Policy DB (Database) and 
User Role DB (Database). The User Role DB mod
any information that can be viewed by the nurse must be accessible by the doctor too. But only a 
part of information visible to nurse may be accessible by the pharmacist, who only needs to know 
which drug to dispatch for which patient. Moreover, the pathologist only needs to know the 
test name, and the accounts section of the hospital needs to know the breakdown of costs for 
various services provided to the patient. It is hard to develop a generalized role
may differ for different institutions. However, such a role hierarchy can be defined by the 
administrator based on the preference and organization requirements.  Whenever, a user requests 
for some healthcare service using the ID of the 
policies defined by the PPM. The PPM then brings up the requested information by querying 
Figure 7.5 The architecture of HSAC 
t her permission. All 
ule also contains a role hierarchy. For example 
 
tag, the Access Control Manager (ACM) locates 
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stored unit policies and merging them for the particular user role. If ACM detects any violation of 
any unit privacy rule for a particular role, the service request is denied.  
7.7. Evaluation 
Though our framework consists of two major components, the main privacy preservation 
is done by the PriSens component while identifying a tag via radio frequency channel. HSAC is 
able to preserve privacy by restricting unauthorized access given that HSAC follows a proper 
implementation of P-RBAC technique and privacy policies are properly defined. Therefore, it is 
more significant to evaluate the privacy achieved by the PriSens component. In this section, first 
we evaluate PriSens protocol using formal security analysis. Then, we measure the level of 
privacy achieved by PriSens as a function of the total number of compromised tags. We also 
evaluate PriSens by assessing the memory and search complexity of the protocol and by 
comparing it other classic protocols. 
7.7.1. Security and Privacy Analysis of Prisens 
In this section, we formally prove that our protocol preserves data privacy and provides 
unlinkability. In addition, we analyze the preservation of privacy in some attack scenarios where 
some of the tags of the system are compromised by the adversary Q. 
Attack Model: One of the major goals of an adversary in any RFID system is to infringe 
the tags’ privacy by means of tracking. In this work, an adversary is denoted as Q. We assume Q 
as an active adversary who has full control over all the communications between the tag and the 
reader. She can not only eavesdrop, but also intercept, modify and even initiate authentication 
session. The adversary can, for example, impersonate a tag and communicate with the valid 
reader. Even the adversary can query a valid tag and learn the tag’s response. Our assumptions 
also include that the adversary can control a number of readers and tags. Each reader and tag 
controlled by the adversary are denoted as T and , respectively. T is unauthorized to have access 
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to any real tags since T has no secret information like the real reader T. Similarly,  is not valid 
as it does not have the secret and identifying information of a valid tag. However, the adversarial 
reader T can communicate with a valid tag. Even the fake tag  can communicate with a 
legitimate reader. In both cases, the ultimate goal of the adversary is to track any tag of the RFID 
system. We assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the adversarial tag have 
polynomially bounded resources. In addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks. 
However, the hardware based defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this work. 
We also assume that the reader cannot be compromised. 
1) Information Privacy: 
Theorem 1. PriSens preserves information privacy with respect to the adversary Q.  
Proof. Let us assume âÉ] provides the adversary Q with a tag . Q transmits this tag to 
the oracle âªS]AãÉ* with a nonce 0. Then âªS]AãÉ* provides Q with the response -.  
Now, Q selects a . To break data privacy, Q should tell if -is produced using the . 
This implies that Q has to identify the input of the encryption by just learning the cipher text. Q 
can succeed in two cases. First, if she can retrieve the inputs from the output of the random 
oracle. But this contradicts with our assumption that the inputs of a random oracle are 
computationally intractable from the output of the oracle. Second, if Q knows the secret keys of 
the tag . Without tampering the tag , if Q can determine the keys by learning the cipher texts, 
this again breaks the semantic security of the symmetric key cryptography. Therefore Q can break 
data privacy with probability no better than random guessing. Thus it proves data privacy 
property of Definition 1. ∎ 
2) Unlinkability: 
Theorem 2. PriSens provides unlinkability with respect to the adversary Q. 
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Proof. Let us assume âÉ] provides the adversary Q with two tags B,  from the same 
group. These two tags go into the learning phase. Q transmits B,  to âå(É which outputs the 
response -". 
Now, to break unlinkability, the adversary Q has to tell the value of Z. We assume that the 
adversary’s guess is right. In other words, the adversary can determine whether the response -" is 
produced by B or , given the learned responses from both the tags. The responses of a tag 
cannot be a signature of the tag because according to our protocol, a nonce on the tag side makes 
each response different from all the previous responses originated from the same tag. Therefore, 
we can say that the guess is right because the adversary knows the keys (the group key and the 
secret key) stored on these two tags.  Without tampering the tags B, , the adversary has to 
determine the keys stored on these tags by just observing the cipher texts. But this contradicts 
with the semantic security of symmetric key cryptography. Therefore, the adversary can break 
unlinkability with no better approach than random guessing. Thus it proves the unlinkability 
property of Definition 2.  ∎ 
3) Physical Attack: 
Under this attack, we consider that the adversary Q can compromise any tag with a 
probability of 
M. Whenever a tag 1 becomes compromised, the adversary learns all private 
information stored on the tag 1. Therefore, the adversary can now decrypt  of each response - 
originated from the other members of the group . Thus, Q can learn the identifier that a tag is 
using to produce its response by decrypting the . We discuss the aftereffect of this attack with an 
example and demonstrate how PriSens provides unlinkability even if the adversary realizes the 
identifiers used in the responses.  
We consider a group  of four tags , R, ®, and ¯ . Suppose the adversary 
compromised the tag ® as shown in Fig. 4. Now the adversary learns the group key ¨³, the tag 
secret key ©æ and a set of identifiers Ω® = {1,2,3,4}. From now on, the adversary can decrypt  
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part of all the responses originated from , R, and ¯  with the group key ¨³. But, the adversary 
still cannot decrypt \ part of these responses since she does not possess the secret keys of these 
tags. With this learned information (¨³ and Ω®), the adversary tries to track the other tags of this 
group. Since the adversary can decrypt  of each responses, she can learn the identifier 
underlying the cipher text . In other words, she can discover which identifier has been used to 
produce a response. The arrow in the Figure 7.6 represents that the responses of the 
authentication sessions (after ® is compromised) are transmitted from the tags (, R, ¯ ) to the 
reader.  The identifiers used in these responses are shown on above the arrow. Each identifier is 
shown in plaintext since the adversary can retrieve the identifier by decrypting  of - using ¨³.  
According to our protocol, even if the adversary comes to know about the identifier used 
in a response, she cannot conclude which of the potential tags is the sender of this response. In 
our example, the adversary discovers the identifier 2 is used two times, but she cannot be certain 
which of these tags (, R, ¯ ) is the originator(s) of these responses. Though ® shares the 
identifier 2 with only  and ¯ , however, the adversary has no knowledge about the parties with 
whom ® is sharing which of its identifiers. Even the adversary does not know how many of the 
identifiers of Ω® are being shared. So, under this scenario, the anonymity set of the potential 
senders of a given response seems to be 3 to the adversary. Therefore, when  the adversary  
compromises one tag from the  group  of 0 uncorrupted  tags, PriSens forms  an  anonymity  set 
of  size 1 and  another  anonymity  set of size (0 − 1)  from  the  group instead of 0 anonymity 
sets of size 1 like the group based authentication [Avoine07]. This is the noticeable partition that 
improves the level of privacy provided by PriSens. Because, the remaining 7 − 0 tags of the 
system forms the other anonymity set which is same under both the protocols. Thus PriSens 
prevents adversary benefit from tracking by compromising a tag.  
We now consider the case of compromising multiple tags of the same group. In the above 
scenario, even if Q compromises either  or ¯  after compromising ®, the adversary cannot be 
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certain whether R has identifier 2 in ΩR or not. Therefore, the size of anonymity set is still 2, i.e., 
0 − , where  is the number of compromised tags of the group. If Q compromises R instead of 
 or ¯ , the size of anonymity set is still 2 (i.e., 0 − ). Therefore, we conclude that the 
anonymity set, formed from a group that is under physical attack, is of size (0 − ), where 0 is 
the group size and  is the number of compromised tags of the given group. 
PriSens provides protocol-level privacy only. In real world, there are many possible side 
channels. If tags emit distinct “radio-fingerprint”, then no protocol-level privacy countermeasures 
can prevent privacy infringement [Avoine05]. 
 
Figure 7. 6 Aftereffect of a physical attack on PriSens, where ­ is compromised by the adversary 
7.7.2. Evaluation of PriSens by Measuring Privacy 
We consider two privacy metrics for the measurement of privacy. First, our privacy 
measurement technique is based on anonymity set like the privacy metric used by Avoine et al. 
[Avoine08]. Second, we identify the amount of information disclosed by a scheme as another 
metric presented in [Nohl06]. This metric is based on Shannon’s information theorem 
[Shannon48]. 
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7.7.3. Measurement of Privacy Based on Anonymity Set 
The level of privacy of an RFID system, achieved by a scheme, at a given time, is a 
function of the total number of compromised tags at that time. When some tags are compromised, 
the set of all tags are partitioned such that the adversary cannot distinguish the tags belong to the 
same partition, but she can distinguish the tags that belong to different partitions. So, these 
partitions become the anonymity sets of their members. The level of privacy based on anonymity 
set, ℘, can be measured as the average anonymity set size [Avoine08]. 
℘ = 17 è||| |||7 =
17R è|||R  
where ||| denotes the size of partition | and |«³||M| is the probability that a randomly 
chosen tag belongs to partition |.  
According to PriSens, a similar kind of partitions is formed when tags become 
compromised. If  is the number of compromised tags within group , then the set of the tags 
within this group is partitioned into  anonymity sets of size 1 and another anonymity set of size 
0 − . If ℂ = {|  is the total compromised tags within } is the set of compromised groups, 
|ℂ| is the total number of compromised groups, and P = ∑ ª]Ù ]³∈ℂ  is the total number of 
compromised tags, the level of privacy ℘ achieved by PriSens can be expressed as 
℘ = 17R ê	0L − |ℂ|R + è  + 0 − R
each ]³∈ℂ
ë 
where 7 = total number of tags in the system 
0 = total number of tags within a group 
L = total number of groups in the system. 
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7.7.4. Measurement of Privacy Based on Information Leakage 
We measure the information leakage in bits based on Shannon’s information theorem 
[Shannon48]. If we have a group of tags of size & and the adversary divides this group into two 
disjoint subgroups of size &/2, then 1 bit of information is disclosed out of logR & bits. Extending 
this concept from two subgroups of equal size to two subgroups of different sizes, where 
ì tags 
are in one subgroup and the remaining tags a1 − c & are in another subgroup, we can measure 
the average amount of information disclosed in bits as follows 
 = 1 logR +  − 1 logR a  − 1c. 
In general, if the adversary splits 7 tags of the system into  disjoint partitions, then  
 = è |||7 ∙ logR î 7|||ï

e  
where ||| denotes the size of partition |. According to our protocol, if ℂ =
{| is the total compromised tags within } is the set of compromised groups, |ℂ| is the total 
number of compromised groups, and P = ∑ ª]Ù ]³∈ℂ  is the total number of compromised tags, 
the amount of information leakage in bits  can be expressed as 
 = aSNf|ℂ|M logR a MSNf|ℂ|cc + ∑ a aM logR 7c +  Sf]³M logR a MSf]³ccðñòó ]³∈ℂ   
where, 7, 0 , and L bears the same meaning mentioned before. 
7.7.5. Experimental Results 
We have compared both the protocols, PriSens and the group based authentication, using 
a Matlab simulation. The experiment results establish that the level of privacy provided by 
PriSens is higher than that of the group based authentication. Our comparison is based on the two 
metrics presented above, the level of privacy (based on anonymity set) and information leakage. 
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We have come up with a conclusion same as [Nohl06] that the information leakage describes the 
privacy threats better than the anonymity set.  
In our simulation, we have considered two systems with 7 = 2£, L = 64 and 7 =
2RB, L = 64. Tags are selected to be compromised with a uniform random distribution. The 
number of compromised tags ranges from 0 to 160. We have run the simulation for 100 times and 
computed the average ℘ achieved by PriSens and the group based authentication as a function of 
the total number of compromised tags P (Figure 7.6(a)-(b)). 
 
(a) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 7 = 2£ and L = 64 
 
(b) Level of privacy based on anonymity set, with 7 = 2RB 
and L = 64 
 
(c) The amount of information leakage, with 7 = 2£ and L = 64 
 
(d) The amount of information leakage, with 7 = 2RB and L = 64 
Figure 7.7 Experimental results of PriSens against the group based authentication 
 
PriSens PriSens 
PriSens PriSens 
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The small increase in the level of privacy achieved by PriSens is visible when the total 
number of compromised tags becomes more than 30. During the simulation, we have also 
computed the average amount of information leakage , for both the protocols, as a function of 
the total number of compromised tags P (Figure 7.7(c)-(d)). The plots depict that a significant 
amount of improvement in privacy protection is achieved by PriSens. With the increase in the 
total number of compromised tags P, the average amount of information disclosed by the group 
based authentication is quite higher than the information disclosed by PriSens. 
In Figure 7.7(c) (7 = 2£, when P becomes 160, the group based authentication 
discloses about 15 bits out of 16 bits of information, while PriSens discloses about 6 bits of 
information. The group based authentication discloses 56.25% more information than PriSens in a 
similar setup. 
Figure 7.7(d) (7 = 2RB) shows that the group based authentication reveals almost 19 bits 
out of 20 bits of information and PriSens reveals around 6 bits of information. This time the 
group based authentication discloses 65% more information than PriSens. Based on the 
simulation results, we can conclude that the information disclosed by the group based 
authentication increases with the size of the system; however, PriSens shows consistency in the 
information leakage in both the cases. Information leakage is a better metric to demonstrate the 
privacy threats in RFID systems than anonymity set. Though the improvement in ℘ provided by 
PriSens against the group based authentication is not significant, however, we can say that 
PriSens provides better privacy protection than the group based authentication, based on the 
results of the amount of information disclosed by these two protocols. 
7.7.6. Memory and Search Complexity Analysis of PriSens 
Search Complexity: According to PriSens, the reader’s complexity is slightly increased 
than the group based scheme [Avoine07]. After receiving the response - = , \ from a tag 1, 
the reader searches for the correct group key to decrypt . In the worst case, the reader has to 
101 
 
perform this operation L times. If such a group key exists, the reader can retrieve the identifier 
,1Â  from . Now, the reader has to search for the tag’s secret key to identify 1 by decrypting \ 
properly. The reader searches a key space of size |Ñ|. Therefore, in the worst case, the reader’s 
total complexity is L + |Ñ|. In the best case, the size of Ñ is 3 and in the worst case, it can be 0, 
size of the group. But in the group based scheme, the reader’s complexity in worst case is L + 1. 
Nevertheless, PriSens is much better than the other schemes where the worst case reader’s 
complexity is 7, the number of total tags in the system. To provide improvement in privacy 
protection, we have to sacrifice this small increase in the complexity of the reader. Since readers 
are more powerful than tags, they can handle this increase in search complexity. 
Memory Complexity: According to PriSens, tags need to store  number of identifiers 
along with the group key and the unique secret key. Though tags have limited resources, 
however, the increase in memory requirement is acceptable than the increase in computation and 
communication complexity. A smart RFID tags have memory capacity of 32kBytes or more 
[Laurie07]. Even RFID tags with extended memory capacity are available at the market 
[Fujitsu08]. All these tags can store the information required for PriSens. 
7.7.7. Comparison of Security Requirements with existing Work 
Table 7.1 presents the summary of security and privacy goals satisfied by PriSens 
protocol. This table also summarizes the comparison of PriSens with other relevant existing work. 
Here, N is the number of tags in the system. 
Table 7.1 comparison of existing techniques 
 
Complexity 
Cloning 
Resistance 
Tracking 
Resistance 
Privacy 
Protection 
[Ohkubo03] O(N) Yes Yes Yes 
[Weis03] O(1) No No No 
[Molnar04] O(logN) Yes No Yes 
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[Avoine07] 1O(γ) Yes Yes Yes 
[Avoine05] O(N2/3) Yes No Yes 
[Dimitriou05] O(logN) Yes No Yes 
[Henrici08] O(1) No No Yes 
[Molnar05] O(logN) No No Yes 
[Tan07] O(N) Yes Yes Yes 
PriSens 2O(L + |Ñ|) Yes Yes Yes 
1. γ is the number of groups in the system. 
2. In the best case, the size of Ñ is 3 and in the worst case, it can be 0, size of the group. 
7.8. Goals Satisfied by PriSens Protocol 
The motivating example of RFID application for this chapter is to preserve privacy in 
RFID based healthcare or such systems where user’s privacy is the most important issue. The 
goal of such a system is to preserve privacy efficiently as well as provide basic security like 
confidentiality, unlinkability, and authentication. PriSens protocol is able to achieve all these 
goals since it discloses much less information than the existing works. 
7.9. Summary 
In this chapter, we propose a “two component” based framework PriSens-HSAC that 
provides increased privacy for RFID based healthcare systems. The PriSens component provides 
better privacy compared to the existing RFID authentication protocols while identifying an RFID 
tag in healthcare setting. The HSAC component restricts unauthorized access of patient’s private 
information by using P-RBAC mechanism. Our evaluation clearly illustrates that the adoption of 
this framework will allows RFID based healthcare systems to preserve user privacy.  
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Chapter 8: Ensuring Survivability in Computational RFID based Systems 
In the past decade there has been a substantial effort to realize the vision of original 
ubiquitous computing applications. Particularly wireless sensor networks (WSNs) based on mote 
sensing have been applied to many real-world problems. Despite many successes, WSNs have not 
led to sensing devices embedded in the fabric of everyday life, where everything is equipped with 
networked sensors. For this type of deployment, truly unobtrusive sensing devices are necessary. 
For the last few years, it is argued that Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has a 
number of key attributes that make it attractive for such applications. RFID is mainly used for 
automated identification of objects and people. However, this technology is limited to only 
identifying and inventorying items in a given space [Ma10]. Future RFID applications will 
require tags that can also perform minimal sensing, computation, and storage. One recent 
innovation of powerful RFID is Computational RFID (CRFID) [Buettner08b, Sample07] that 
presents exciting possibilities for future ubiquitous computing applications [Holleman08, 
Jiang05, and Segawa09]. In this chapter, we explore the survivability issue of CRFID systems. 
One example of CRFID tags is Wireless Identification and Sensing Platforms (WISP). WISP tags 
present the combination of capabilities of WSNs and RFID networks. 
Authentication is a key technique that can be used to defend against typical attacks on 
CRFID systems. However, as WISP tags have sensor data along with its ID, the chosen 
authentication technique needs to be different from the ones currently used in RFID systems.  
Usually CRFID systems are used in sophisticated applications like: enemy move 
detection in military battlefield, volcanic activity measure, etc [Buettner08a]. In these types of 
applications, the main goal of the system is to provide service constantly. However, in CRFID 
systems an adversary may de-synchronize tags and readers to create DoS attack and to threaten 
system’s survivability [Buettner08a]. Survivability refers to a system’s ability to withstand 
malicious attacks and support the system’s mission even when parts of the system have been 
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damaged. With effective fault tolerance and damage recovery mechanisms in place, a system may 
still be trustworthy in fulfilling its functions and supporting the system mission. In this chapter, 
we address the problem of ensuring survivability in CRFID based sophisticated applications 
without sacrificing system’s performance. 
8.1. Our Major Contributions 
The main contributions of this chapter are: 
• To address the survivability issue of CRFID systems, here we propose DoS attack 
resistant Robust Authentication Protocol (DRAP) for WISP networks.  
• This protocol detects DoS attack and recovers from the attack so that the tag and the 
reader can get back to their synchronous state. 
•  To prevent DoS at the link layer, we also propose to use the Enhanced Dynamic Framed 
Slotted ALOHA (EDFSA) [Lee05] technique at the link layer during communication. 
Here, our concept is to reduce the collision rate so that optimum system efficiency can be 
achieved. 
• We measure the performance of the DRAP protocol and present the evaluation results. 
Organization of the chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in section 
8.2 describes our major motivation to address survivability issue of CRFID based systems. We 
propose the DRAP protocol in Section 8.3. This section also includes the system architecture, 
DoS attack technique in CRFID systems, existing defend mechanisms, attack models, adversary 
goals and details of DRAP protocol. In section 8.3, we perform the security analysis of DRAP 
protocol. Section 8.4 describes our simulation technique and analysis of simulation results. 
8.2. Motivation 
For simple RFID systems, the data of interest is simply each tag’s identity. However, for 
WISP networks, it is difficult to develop efficient protocols for gathering sensor data that changes 
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over time. WISP tags with new sensor data must wait until they are interrogated by a reader. This 
increases the likelihood of many devices wanting to use the bandwidth limited channel at the 
same time. However, the standard RFID strategy of identifying and then communicating with 
each device is wasteful as only some devices would have relevant data. Moreover, most of the 
RFID authentication protocols are challenge response based and they need multiple rounds of 
message exchange in order to verify the legitimacy of both parties (verifier and prover, i.e. reader 
and tags). As WISP tags have sensor data associated them, communication can be reduced by not 
authenticating the tags that do not have new sensor data. One technique to reduce communication 
is to reduce the number of message exchanges by identifying and authenticating those tags only 
that have new sensor data. Because of all these differences, the trivial RFID protocols securing 
RFID network cannot be applied to WISP sensor network. 
As a motivating example, let us consider a CRFID system where WISP tags are deployed 
in a battlefield. Quick response time along with survivability is very important in such systems. A 
reader might have hundreds of WISPs in its field of view. Because all the WISPs share a single 
reader channel, the update rate per tag would be very low if every tag were simply queried for 
sensor data sequentially. However, at any given moment, only a few objects would typically be in 
motion and therefore producing non-trivial sensor values. For this type of situation, protocols 
have been designed which gives highest priority to sensors with new data [Saxena10]. But an 
adversary can send a bulk of dummy messages with dynamic new sensor values which would 
appear as a legitimate packet to the reader. This scenario may lead to Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack. DoS attack can also be launched in these types of systems by de-synchronizing the tags 
and readers. DoS attacks are not addressed by most of the authentication protocols because it is 
not possible to cope with all kinds of DoS attacks. DoS attacks may also occur because of some 
communication failure. For example, due to the radio jamming of the channel between the tag 
and the reader, a communication failure may happen and the tag and reader may become 
desynchronized which may eventually result in DoS attack.  However, defending against DoS due 
 to radio jamming is out of the scope of this research work. In the application layer, the underlying 
problem of DoS attack is tag collision. These collisions occur 
reflects their data at the same time. As a result the reader searches all the tags in interrogation 
(shown in Figure 8.1) zone. 
Figure 
Therefore, our focus is to investigate a feasible solution to detect the DoS attack and 
recover the system to maintain system survivability
We also minimize the tag reply collision at the link layer by using EDFSA based communication 
technique. 
8.3. DoS Attack Resistant Authentication Protocol (DRAP)
8.3.1. Our Approach to Ensure Security
In order to be secure against the major attacks of WISP networks, we design a mutual 
authentication protocol. However, in order to prevent the DoS attack in the link layer, we need to 
reduce the number of tag collisions at the link layer. Tag anti
categorized into ALOHA based algorithms and tree based algorithms. Tree based algorithms 
[Myung06] make trees while performing the tag identification procedure using a unique ID of 
each tag. On the other hand, ALOHA based protocols are known for their low complexity and 
computation, thus making them attractive to be used in WISP networks. Examples include Pure, 
Slotted and Framed Slotted ALOHA (FSA), and their variants [Zhen05]. In Pure and 
ALOHA, a tag responds after a random delay, and continues doing so until it is identified. Lee, et 
when more than one WISP tag 
 
8.1 Collision by the tags in interrogation zone 
 without sacrificing system’s 
 
 and Survivability 
-collision algorithms can be 
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survivability. 
Slotted 
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al. [Lee05] proposed enhanced dynamic framed slotted ALOHA for efficient RFID tag 
identification. The MAC protocol for WISP systems is based on Framed Slotted ALOHA. To 
increase the system efficiency and also to reduce collision rate, we propose a technique based on 
Efficient Dynamic Framed Slotted ALOHA (EDFSA) [Lee05] as the underlying layer’s 
communication technique. 
8.3.2. Goals of Different Actors 
Adversary goals. In WISP based systems, an adversary may perform several attacks like 
tracking, cloning, eavesdropping, replay attack and DoS attack. DoS attacks cover not only the 
adversary’s attempt to subvert, disrupt, or destroy a network, but also any event that diminishes a 
network’s capability to provide a service. This attack may also include de-synchronization of tags 
and readers of the system. In WISP networks, several types of DoS attacks in different layers 
might be performed. At the physical layer the DoS attacks could be jamming and tampering. At 
the link layer, the attack could involve collision. At the application layer this attack could be 
performed by malicious flooding and de-synchronization. 
Our Goals. Our goal is to design an authentication protocol to ensure systems’ 
survivability in the event of de-synchronization between tags and readers. Our authentication 
protocol prevents the DoS attack from application layer perspective and makes the system 
survivable. The EDFSA based communication technique allows us to minimize the effect of DoS 
attack by reducing the collision rate. 
8.3.3. System Architecture of WISP #etworks 
The architecture of a WISP tag based system is shown in Figure 8.4. There are three main 
components in WISP network. 
Issuer: The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment and authorizes the reader 
access to the tags. We can think of the issuer as a certificate authority (PQ).  
 WISP Tag: Each WISP tag in the system is denoted as 
key  to the th WISP tag ¢
9, an identifier , and new activity threshold 
new if the difference between the data at current timestamp and at previous time stamp is greater 
than ∆. 
Figure 
Reader: The reader is assumed to be connected to the backend server. We assume the 
communication channel between the reader and the backend server is secured. From now on, we 
denote the backend server as the reader. The reader receives all secret information by t
during the deployment. For each tag, the reader has a 4
the secret number of the last successful session 
sensor value ôÉAªõ. Initially, all 
tags that take the following form,
where there are # number of WISP tags in the systems. We assume that the reader and all 
the WISP tags in the system has the knowledge of 
protect the integrity of the message. In our protocol, we use SHA
bits. The outputs of ö.  cannot be linked back to its input, and as a result an adversary cannot 
¢. The issuer assigns a unique 
 of the system. Each tag contains a 3-tuple consisting of a secret 
∆. In our protocol, we consider a sensor data as 
8.2 System architecture of WISP based systems 
-tuple, composed of the secret number 
9÷øùú , the tag identifier  and the previous 
ôÉAªõ are assigned to zero. The reader contains a list of all valid 
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ö. , an irreversible one way hash function to 
-2 as ö. , and its outp
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link back the tag ID. All the entities of the system can generate pseudorandom number using a 
generator |.  based on its seed. Initially, the data of tag and reader are in sync, and 9÷øùú ,  
equals 9. We also assume that each tag (¢) can perform encryption of their sensor value with 
their key 9 by using an encryption function r³. . Similarly, the reader can perform decryption 
the same key (9) but by using a decryption function ³. . 
8.3.4. Threat Model 
We assume that an active adversary has full control over all the communications between 
the tag and the reader. Our assumptions also include that the adversary can control a number of 
tags but cannot corrupt a reader. The adversary can install a fake reader in the environment which 
we call an adversarial reader. We denote the adversary as Å. Each reader and tag controlled by the 
adversary are denoted as T and ¢ , respectively. T is unauthorized to have access to any real 
tags since T has no secret information like the real reader T. Similarly, ¢  is not valid as it does 
not have the secret and identifying information of a valid tag. However, the adversarial reader T 
can communicate with a valid tag. Even the fake tag ¢  can communicate with a legitimate 
reader. We assume that by programming a WISP tag appropriately, such that the sensor value > 
threshold (∆), an adversary can create a fake tag ¢  that can impersonate as legitimate tag in the 
system. Here, the adversary’s goal is to create as many collisions as possible so that the valid tags 
do not get a chance to reply. We also assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the 
adversarial tags have polynomially bounded resources. In our system, the following oracles 
represent the adversary’s actions to attack tags. 
, , : The adversary eavesdrops within a channel at session  between R 
and one of its communicating tags ¢. 
, , , : The adversary impersonates a reader R in a protocol session 
t and sends a message M to the tag ¢. 
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, , , : The adversary impersonates a tag ¢ in a protocol 
session t and sends a message M to the reader R. 
, : The adversary queries a tag , to learn information, during the 
communication protocol session t. 
 ¡, , : The adversary receives a message M from an entity U (e.g., either WT 
or R) during the execution of session t. 
8.3.5. Our Protocol (DRAP) 
The protocol operates as shown in Figure 8.2. At first, the reader sends a request 
accompanied by a random number 0A. If the tag has a new sensor value, it computes = with 
another random number 0, generated by itself, and 9. Next ¢ executes encryption function 
r³ on (ö ⨁ ôSª to generate -. Here, to enhance security, ¢ encrypts the XOR of 
ö and new sensor value (ôSª) rather than encrypting only the sensor value.  Finally, the 
tag replies with =for authenticating itself, 0to help the reader to produce the same 
pseudorandom number and - to retrieve the new sensor value. Now, the reader checks the 
validity of = by computing |9⨁0A ∥ 0 for each tag in the database. If the reader finds a 
match, it can be sure of the validity of the tag. 
Then the reader checks if the sensor value sent by the tag is old. ¢ does this by 
checking if the difference of new and old sensor value is greater than ∆. If it is old, it might be an 
indication of an adversary trying to launch DoS attack by using previous sensor values (Since a 
valid tag replies only when it has a new sensor value).  
If the sensor value is new, the reader updates 9÷øùú  and ôÉAªõ. And then =1 is generated 
by using the next seed that is the hashed secret number ℎ9. If the reader fails to find any match 
in the first search strategy, it changes the scheme of search by replacing the 9 with the 9÷øùú  of 
all the tags in the database. Upon realizing any match, the reader only generates =1. 
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Reader  
ü Í9÷øùú , 9, ôÉAªõ: Ï∙∙∙      þ ∙∙∙Í9M÷øùú , 9M , ôÉAªõM: MÏ 
 Tag   Í9 ,  , ∆Ï 
Generate nonce 0A 0 0A  
  
 
 
 
 0 =, - , 0 
if  ( ∆ ≤ |ôSª − ô(û| ) then 
1. Generate nonce 0 
2.  = =  |9⨁0A ∥ 0 
3.  - = rá³ ö ⨁ ôSª 
else 5 05 
Y4[ 
Use database to generate |9⨁0A ∥ 0 for 
all tags and check the validity of = 
if correct: W = ³-  ôSª =  W ⨁ ö 
if ôSª³  not equal ôÉAªõ³ then 9÷øùú ⟵ 9, X⟵ ℎ9, =1 ⟵ |X⨁0A ∥ 0 , 9 ⟵ öo ôÉAªõ³ ⟵ ôSª³  
else  
ignore the message, =1 ⟵ 
0 
if not correct: 
generate | a9÷øùú⨁0A ∥ 0c for all tags 
and check validity of = 
if correct: W = ³-  ôSª =  W ⨁ ö 
if ôSª³not equal ô(û³  then 
 =1 ⟵ | aℎ9÷øùú⨁0A ∥ 0c ôÉAªõ³ ⟵ ôSª³  
else ignore the message, =1 ⟵ 
0 
Otherwise: ignore the message, =1 ⟵ 
0  =1  
  
 ⟵ ℎ9 generate |
⨁0A ∥0 and check validity of =½ 
if correct: 9 ⟵ ℎ
 
Figure 8.2 DRAP protocol 
In fact, this step is to provide the robustness to the protocol by recovering any tag from 
out of order to be in synchronization with the reader. In both the cases, the reader replies with =1. 
If = is not valid, the reader simply ignores the message and replies with a random number rand. 
However, this rand keeps the protocol consistent by preventing an eavesdropper to acquire any 
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knowledge about this session. Finally, it is the tag’s turn to authenticate the reader by verifying 
=1. If =1 is valid, the tag updates its secret number. Otherwise the tag discards the message. 
8.3.6. Communication Protocol 
 
Figure 8.3 Collision ratio for tag identification with different frame size 
In DRAP, we propose to use Efficient Dynamic Slotted ALOHA (EDFSA) based 
communication technique to reduce collisions at the link layer. Generally, in the framed slotted 
ALOHA anti-collision method, the system efficiency decreases as the number of responding tags 
becomes larger. However, EDFSA facilitates us to have optimum system efficiency by 
maintaining dynamic frame size  ℱ  in each round. The derivation of ℱ for each round can be 
found in [Lee05]. In a WISP network, the number of tag collisions increases with the increase of 
tags in the system. The relationship between the collision ratio and the number of tags is shown in 
Figure 8.3, where the ℱ ∈  {32, 64, 128, 256, 312}. We can keep the system in maximum 
efficiency (35.5%) to decide the next round frame size. This also ensures a reduced collision rate, 
which allows the DRAP protocol to defend against the DoS attack. So, we lessen the 
susceptibility to DoS attack by reducing the number of collisions with the use of EDFSA. 
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8.4. Security Analysis of DRAP 
In this section, we analyze DRAP against different types of attacks. For every attack, we 
first describe how the attack is performed and then how DRAP defends against the attack. T and 
¢ are referred to as a legitimate reader and legitimate tag. DRAP is secure against most of the 
attacks; next we discuss the following two types of attacks and their defenses. Each attack and 
corresponding defense has three phases: 
Phase 1. Learning phase: Adversary, Å uses non-destructive oracles such as 
, , , , , , , , , 
, , , , and  ¡, ,  on a set of target tags and reader. The goal 
of the adversary is to learn important information related to the tags and reader. 
Phase 2. Attacking phase: Depending on the security level of the readers, Å may 
impersonate as a legitimate tag or reader. 
Phase 3. Defend Phase: DRAP protocol is designed in such a way so that it can defend 
against the majority of the attacks. 
• Eavesdropping: 
Learning phase: Å executes the oracle , ,  in the communication 
between T and ¢ and later uses this information to launch any of the attacks mentioned above. 
Attacking phase: Å can learn every piece of information exchanged between T and ¢ 
such as 0A, 0, = and -.  
Defend Phase: According to our protocol, Å cannot launch a privacy attack as the 
protocol does not reveal any sort of private information of the tag or the reader. Even Å fails to 
track ¢ because each time ¢ is queried, it replies with a new random value. Thus Å cannot 
figure out any signature to follow ¢. Even eavesdropping the communication cannot help Å to 
launch a cloning attack. Å cannot create a fake tag ¢  by executing the oracle 
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, , , . Even Å cannot act as a legitimate reader to the legitimate tags by 
executing the oracle , , , . 
• Denial of Service (DoS)  
Learning phase: In this case, Å does not want to derive any information or try to 
impersonate. The main target of Å is to ensure that a reader cannot access its authorized tags. By 
executing the oracle , , , Å tries to learn information and crate fake tags to 
install them in the network. 
Attacking phase: To launch a DoS attack, Å places many programmed nodes with 
random sensor data within the network. The task of these malicious nodes is to reply whenever 
the reader executes an authentication query on the legitimate tags so that the there is a maximum 
number of collisions in the channel. As a result, the reader/back-end server is not able to 
authenticate tags easily and with efficient response time. 
Defend Phase: As part of our authentication protocol, we propose an EDFSA based 
communication technique that minimizes the collision rate within a channel. This technique also 
reduces the collision rate as well as maintains reasonable system efficiency. Moreover, our DRAP 
protocol is designed in such a way so that it can detect DoS attack and recover from de-
synchronization between tags and reader. 
In the final dissertation, we plan to include the formal proof mechanism of DRAP against 
all major attacks, like: tracking, cloning, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack. 
8.5. Performance Evaluation 
In our simulation, the authentication server is implemented on a high performance Dell 
PC. We use Java for the protocol simulation where we use SHA-2 as the hash function (returning 
256 bits). The simulated environment consists of 1000 nodes in the network and one legitimate 
reader. Among the1000 WISP nodes we made 1% ~ 3% nodes to be malicious. The system 
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efficiency and collision rate is determined in terms of the legitimate nodes. We ran the simulation 
300 times and reported the average. 
 
Figure 8.4 Average collision ratio with three different frame sizes 
 
Figure 8.5 Total number of rounds required to authenticate one tag 
Our comparison is based on two performance metrics. The first metric is collision rate, 
which is defined as the ratio of the number of slots with a collision to the frame size.  And the 
second metric is the rounds/iterations required by the reader to authenticate one tag. Now, 
considering the current state of the network (i.e. number of malicious nodes and number of 
legitimate nodes are fixed), we executed the DRAP protocol to perform authentication of all valid 
tags. As the underlying communication mechanism between the tag and the reader, we used our 
ℱ = 64 
ℱ = 128 
ℱ = 128 
ℱ = 64 
ℱ = 256 
ℱ = 256 
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proposed technique based on EDFSA. Finally, we took the average of 300 collision rates. We also 
took the average of 300 runs performed to collect rounds required to authenticate one tag. 
We performed the above mentioned simulation for three different frame sizes (ℱ =
64, 128, 256). Figure 8.4 shows the collision rate for different numbers of tags in the networks. 
We can clearly see from the Figure 8.4, that when the number of tags increases the collision rate 
increases. However, with a larger frame size (ex. 256), the collision rate reduces with the increase 
of total tags in the system. Figure 8.5 shows the number of iterations required to identify one tag 
with respect to the number of tags in the system. From this figure, we can see that, with smaller 
frame size, and with increased number of tags, the collision rate increases. Therefore, more 
iteration is required to authenticate a single tag. However, when the frame size is increased, even 
with increased tags in the system, the iterations required to authenticate one tag is ∼ 5. Therefore, 
the system response time is low, since the reader requires less time to authenticate. 
8.6. Summary 
To address the survivability issue of WISP networks, in this chapter, we propose DRAP 
(DoS attack Resistant Authentication Protocol). DRAP allows both tag and reader to 
communicate successfully with each other even if the adversary launches De-synchronization or 
DoS attack.  
8.7. Goals Satisfied by DRAP Protocol 
The motivating example of CRFID application for this chapter is sophisticated RFID 
applications especially designed for enemy move detection in military battlefield. In such 
applications the main goal of the system is to receive service from the system consistently. 
Therefore, the system needs to provide service even if the system is under attack. Because of this, 
ensuring survivability as well as reducing response time are two major goals in these type 
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applications. DRAP protocol is able to achieve these goals since it is robust and it allows an RFID 
system to re-synchronize the state of tags and reader if there is de-synchronization of DoS attack. 
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Chapter 9: Ensuring Reliability in Computational RFID based Critical Systems 
Recently, WISP tags, one example of CRFID tags, have been used in indoor activity 
recognition, vital signs identification, sleep quality, and other health status monitoring systems 
[Buettner08a]. In [Chaudhri08], WISPs are used for sensing and monitoring exercises involving 
free weights.  Hoque et al. [Hoque10b] proposed a sleep monitoring system based on the WISP 
tags. Recently WISP has been used for low power wireless security research [Chae07, Czeskis08, 
and Salajegheh09]. By using the 3D accelerometer of WISP, Saxena et al. developed a motion 
detection system that also works as a means to ensure security [Saxena10]. These systems are 
considered as critical RFID applications where the decision accuracy or reliability of the system 
is very important. These types of systems can be very popular in the healthcare and wellness 
application domain if the protocols designed for such systems can provide necessary security 
features and can assure reliability of system’s decision. With the appropriate protocols in place, 
these technologies can be applied to home healthcare [Haigh06], elderly care [Haigh06], smart 
hospitals [Bardram07], medication adherence [Lundell07], smart kindergartens, smart homes 
[Srivastava01], etc. 
Within the above mentioned CRFID based critical applications, one area of research is 
the problem of monitoring a large set of WISP tags and then identifying the missing ones. The 
missing WISP tag data may introduce errors in the resolved decision of the system which reduces 
the reliability of the system’s decision. Therefore, in order to maintain system reliability a 
monitoring protocol needs to be executed frequently to find the missing tags of the environment 
and so it should be made efficient in terms of execution time.  
Aside from home healthcare systems, detecting missing tags is an important problem in 
other settings too, such as warehouses, hospitals, pharmacy, and prisons. In a warehouse, it is 
sometimes necessary to know if a product is missing due to theft, administrative error or vendor 
fraud. Similar situations may exist in a large hospital where tens of thousands of pieces of 
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equipment and other objects need to be tracked. Highly related to this is a recent paper by Tan, 
Sheng and Li [Tan08], who designed novel protocols to detect missing tags within a certain 
probability. However, the protocols cannot detect missing tags with certainty (i.e. 100%) and 
more importantly, they cannot tell which tags are missing. Identification of missing tags has also 
been investigated by Li et al. in [Li10]. They proposed a series of missing tag detection protocols 
but they are not suitable for WISP tags since they do not have any mechanisms for handling 
sensor data of the WISP tags. To address the problems mentioned above, we propose a missing 
tag detection protocol that follows the following two guidelines to achieve efficiency and ensure 
low response time -  
1) Reduce collision rate and  
2) Let the tags report their presence by transmitting sensor data so that another round of 
data collection is not needed.  
The aim of this protocol is to ensure that the resolved decision of the system based on the 
tag data of the environment is reliable 
9.1. Our Major Contributions 
• We consider the problem of how to accurately and efficiently monitor a set of WISP tags for 
identifying the missing tags. 
• We propose two tag monitoring protocols, MTD (Missing Tag Detection) that does not 
require the reader to collect IDs from each WISP tag, but is still able to accurately detect 
missing ones. 
• Our first monitoring protocol, Simple MTD, eliminates the transmission contention among 
tags but it is not defensive against two attacks.  
• Our second protocol, Reliable MTD, increases reliability and is secure against major attacks. 
To ensure low response time, this protocol reduces information volume that needs to be 
transmitted from the tag.  
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• Reliable MTD is efficient as it allows the WISP tags to send their sensor data in the same 
round of messaging in which the tag identification data is received. 
Organization of the chapter: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 
describes our major motivation to address the problem of missing WISP tag detection. In this 
section we also characterize reliability from our protocol’s perspective. In section 9.3, we present 
the system model of a WISP based home healthcare system. Section 9.4 describes the MTD 
protocols. This section is followed by section 9.5, presenting the security analysis of reliable 
MTD protocol. Section 9.6 describes the performance comparison of the two protocols.  
9.2. Motivation 
As a motivating example of CRFID based critical system, let’s consider a scenario where 
CRFID tags are used to determine the physiological status in a home healthcare system. This 
system depends on collecting raw sensor data from the environment and inferring important 
health status. In these types of systems, even subtle changes in the behavior of the patient can 
give important signs of the onset and progression of certain diseases. Typically, this type of 
system is composed of three subsystems (Figure 9.1) - the body area network (BAN), the home 
network, and the central processing node, which also acts as a gateway to the Internet. Usually 
the implementation of BAN depends on deploying different sensors for collecting different 
environmental and human behavioral parameters (for example: room temperature, humidity, heart 
rate, pulse, etc.). Moreover, the physical condition of the patient has to be sensed in an 
unobtrusive manner by using as few sensors as possible. Recently WISP tags have been used in 
the implementation of BAN in such systems. Since WISP tags alone have the capability to sense 
various parameters, they allow the inference of important health status and activities by intelligent 
analysis. Since these systems depend on every tag data for collective information analysis, the 
absence of any tag data may eventually introduce error in the resolved health status.  
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For example, Table 9.1 shows a computational RFID tag based health status monitoring 
environment consisting of three WISP tags that are used to monitor the health status of a person 
who recently had a heart attack. At time , the pulse rate and body temperature measuring tags 
show high readings. Since the heart rate measuring tag shows normal reading, the system can 
make an accurate decision that the person has a fever. But, at time R, the heart rate monitoring 
tag is missing and due to high pulse rate and high temperature, the system makes an incorrect 
decision. The system decides that the person has a fever. But in reality the person has high blood 
pressure which is very dangerous for a patient who recently had a heart attack.  
Therefore, in such systems, before making a decision based on the collective information 
analysis, it is very important to detect the tags that are missing in the system. Otherwise, the 
absence of any tag data may result in reduced reliability of the system’s decision. In this chapter, 
by “missing tag”, we refer to an event when the sensor data is not reported back to the reader. 
This event may occur due to the physical absence of the tag, some programming error in the tag, 
some hardware error inside the tag or maybe the tag needs to be replaced in order to function 
properly. In all these cases, the missing tag event needs to be fixed either by replacing a new tag 
or by re-programming the tag accurately. But in order to fix the “missing tag event”, the system 
needs to detect it first.  
Table 9.1 Example of system error due to missing WISP Tags 
Time  (Heart  
rate) 
 
(pulse) 
­  (Body 
Temp) 
Real Health 
status 
Inferred Health 
status 
System 
Accuracy 
 Normal High High Fever Fever Correct 
R Missing High High High Blood 
pressure 
Fever Incorrect 
 Figure 9.1 Architecture of WISP based home healthcare system
To address the above mentioned problem, we propose a protocol in this chapter to 
identify the missing tags and collect sensor information from the existing tags only. 
missing raw data from the tags may incorporate errors in the system’s decision making process, it 
is important to ensure that all tags are present in the 
system’s decision 
Reliability Characterizatio
been proposed so far. In general, the definition of reliability is
perform its intended function for a given interval of time under specified operating condi
our system, we consider our protocol to be successful if it can identify the tags that are missing in 
the system. For example, let’s assume that 
time . We say that our protocol is reliabl
1. We define reliability as follows: 
Definition 1. Reliability, R(ts), is the probability of a system performing successfully  
during the time period [0, ts].
environment to maintain the reliability of the 
n. In literature several different notions of reliability have 
− the probability that a system will 

 tags’ data is missing out of 7 tags in the system at 
e if the probability of detecting 
 missing tags is close to 
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Identifying missing tags is a very important problem that has practical significance and 
existing tag collection protocols can be adapted to solve this problem. In a typical tag collection 
protocol, the reader collects the IDs from every RFID tag in the set, and returns all the IDs back 
to the server. The server uses the collected data to determine whether there are any missing tags. 
Since a collision yields no useful information to a reader, this protocol uses a slotted ALOHA-
like scheme to minimize collisions. Tree based protocols [Myung06] can also be used for this 
purpose. However, slotted ALOHA [Lee05, Zhen05] based algorithms reduce the probability of 
collisions as tags are scheduled to transmit at separate times. So, here we propose slotted ALOHA 
based protocol to solve the problem. 
9.3. System Model 
9.3.1. Problem definition 
In our system, we assume that the server has a group of objects, and a WISP tag with a 
unique ID is attached to each object. We refer to this group of objects as a set of tags. We 
consider this set of tags to be “intact’’ if all the tags in the set are physically present together at 
the same time. The problem is to design time efficient reliable protocols for the reader to 
exchange information with the tags in order to identify the missing ones. 
9.3.2. Protocol goal 
The goal of the protocol is to accurately determine whether a set of WISP tags is intact 
and collect the sensor data from the existing tags only.  
 
 
 
 
 9.3.3. Architecture of the system
The architecture of a WISP based system is shown in Figure 9.2. There are four main 
components in the system: 
Issuer: The issuer initializes each tag during the deployment by writing the tag’s 
information into its memory. 
issuer as a certificate authority (
WISP Tag: Each WISP tag in the system is denoted as 
identification  to the th WISP tag 
Reader: The reader is connected to the backend server. In our system, the WISP tag is the 
prover and the reader is the verifier. The reader receives all the secret information by the issuer 
during the deployment.  
Server: The server contains the database of all tags. We assume that the communication 
channel between the reader and the backend server is secure.
Figure 9.2 System architecture of WISP based network
We assume that the reader and all the tags in the system has
operation and ℎ. , an irreversible one way hash function, to protect the integrity of the message. 
The outputs of ℎ.  cannot be linked back to its input so that an adversary cannot link back the 
tag s. There are many efficient has
hash function that outputs 160 bits. Communication between the reader and the tags is time
 
The issuer also authorizes the reader to the tags. We can think of the 
PQ).  
¢. The issuer assigns a unique 
¢ of the system. 
 
 the knowledge of XOR 
h functions in the literature. In this work, we use SHA
125 
 
 
-1 
-
126 
 
slotted. Reader uses a “synch” command to synchronize the clocks of the tags and reader. The 
reader uses a ‘slot start’ command to start a slot. 
9.3.4. Preliminaries and Assumptions 
A home healthcare infrastructure may have multiple synchronized readers covering the 
entire home but we logically treat them as one. We assume that the reader has access to a 
database that stores the s of all tags. This assumption is necessary for any missing-tag detection 
protocol. If we do not have the s of the tags, even after the reader collects the s directly from 
all the tags, we still do not know if any of the tags are missing. If the database is lost due to a 
database failure, we can recover the information by reading the s from the tags one at a time. In 
this case, we will not be able to detect the tags that have already been lost because we have no 
way to know of their existence in the first place. However, after collecting the s of the existing 
tags, we may use our proposed protocol to monitor the intactness of this set of tags. 
Communication between the reader and the tags is time-slotted. Our protocols are 
request-response based protocol, in which the reader issues a request in a time slot and then zero. 
One or more tags respond in the subsequent time slots. We assume that an RFID reader is able to 
distinguish the slots with no reply, single reply, or multiple replies. We define these slots as 
empty slot (E), single-reply slot (S), or collision slot (C) respectively.  In each types of slot, there 
can be three possible responses − 1) A bit string of 0 - meaning that no tags have replied, 2) A bit 
string of sensor values- meaning that one tag has replied sensor data in that slot,  and 3) Collision 
- meaning multiple tags have replied in that slot.  
If a slot is supposed to be single and it has a bit string of sensor values, it means that the 
tag is present and the event corresponding to that slot is correct (OK). If a slot is supposed to be 
empty but it has a bit string of sensor values, it might be an indication of an attack (A). On the 
other hand, if a slot is supposed to be single-reply slot but it has a bit string of 0, it is indication 
that the tag is missing (M). Based on the three types of slots and three different outcomes in each 
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slot, there can be nine situations in our system (see Figure 9.3). The focus of this work is limited 
to the six situations corresponding to the lower triangular (along with the diagonal) part of the 
table shown in Figure 9.3. Therefore, we assume that the attacker is benign who will not 
introduce any error in the system by replying in any slot or by launching replay attack. However, 
the attacker is able to eavesdrop and track. The capabilities of the attacker and the security 
analysis of MTD are discussed in a later section. Slots can also be characterized as multi-bit 
response slots and single-bit response slots. The length of a multi-bit response slot is denoted as 
(, which allows the transmission of a long response carrying multi-bits (ex. 4 bit) information. 
The length of a single-bit response slot is denoted as ), which allows the transmission of a short 
response carrying only single bit information. 
slot type 
outcome E S C 
E OK A A 
S M OK A 
C M M OK 
Figure 9.3 Table of possible situations in the system 
9.4. Monitor and Collect (MTD) Protocols 
In this section we describe our protocols. We consider an RFID reader, T and a set of 7 
WISP tags, ¢ ∗. We denote the frame size as f and the random number generated by reader/tag 
as r. The server contains a table of tag entries. Each entry of the table contains the corresponding 
tag id. Table 9.2 summarizes the notations. 
All of our protocols have two phases− Learning Phase and Execution Phase. The 
learning phase is similar for the two protocols and it is executed only once; at the beginning of a 
protocol when the tag monitoring system is launched for the first time. After that point, only the 
execution phase will be executed by the MTD protocol to detect missing tags and to collect 
existing sensor information. The execution phase is different for each protocol and this phase has 
two steps− Monitor Step and Collect Step. The goal of the monitor step is to detect missing tags 
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and the goal of the collect step is to collect sensor data from the tags. We will discuss these two 
steps for each of the protocols later.  
Table 9.2 +otations for MTD protocol 
Symbol Meaning 
 ¢ ∗ Set of RFID tags T RFID Reader 
 Random number  Frame size ℎ.  One way hash function &| Slot position within frame T Bit Record generated by the reader with the 
replies of tags T)ªAõªA Bit Record generated by the server ahead of 
time _ Encrypted sensor data 
_ Raw sensor data 
Learning Phase: Since the reader is connected to the database using a secure connection, 
it can collect s of all the tags directly from the database. The reader can then use these s to 
authenticate one tag at a time. Reader can use any standard authentication protocol [Hoque09a]. If 
the reader can successfully authenticate all the tags, the set of tags is intact. Otherwise, tags that 
cannot be authenticated are considered as not existing. Using this process, the reader can learn 
about the tags that currently exist within the system. From then on, the reader can perform the 
Execution phase of the MTD protocol to detect missing tags within this set of tags. Instead of 
authentication, the reader can also broadcast the s of the tags one at a time and wait for a fixed 
time period for receiving the response from the tag. However, this process of tag presence 
learning is not secure since an adversary may learn tag s by eavesdropping. If the time required 
for reader’s authentication query and a tag’s response is denoted as ( (as query and response are 
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supposed to be multi-bit), then the estimated time for learning phase is  7 ∗ 2 ∗ (, for a system 
with 7 tags. 
9.4.1. Simple MTD Protocol 
Monitor Step: In monitor step of simple MTD protocol, the reader will issue a request 
such that only an authenticated tag can understand, and the tag will reply only if the query is 
intended for itself. All other tags will keep silent. Since we assume that each tag has a unique , 
only one tag will reply resulting in no collisions. At the end of the list, the reader will inform the 
server if there are any missing tags. The Simple MTD protocol works as follows:  
T                      þ       
Æ = ℎ⨁
  
T →  W ∗     þ       
Æ ∥ 
  
¢ ∗                þ    _
Æ = ℎ⨁
 
                                         _
Æ ==  
Æ 
                                                 
Y4[   
                                        
0 40 
      T                      þ      
\ 
Y4[ 
                                         6 50 
   6 06     
The verification of each tag’s existence takes (( + ) time and the total execution time 
is 7 ∗ ( +  ). Where, ( = reader’s query time (multi-bit data) and ) = tag’s response (single-
bit reply, can be 0 or 1).  
Collect Step: In this step, the reader signals each of the tags to reply with their sensor 
values one at a time. To maintain security, the sensor data has to be encrypted using some 
standard encryption technique. If the time required to transmit encrypted sensor data is û*, the 
collection step will take 7Éû* +  ). Where, 
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Total time for the entire simple MTD protocol is: 
 =  7( +  ) + 7É )+û* 
9.4.2. Reliable MTD Protocol 
The simple MTD protocol is not completely secure and time efficient. In this protocol, an 
adversary can observe all the transactions. Since the adversary does not know the content of the 
query, observing the existence of an answer may not be very useful, but it will allow the 
adversary to track the tag. This protocol is also vulnerable to an eavesdropping attack. To 
overcome the shortcomings of simple MTD, we propose Reliable and Secure MTD protocol in 
which the reader is assumed to be honest. 
 Given a set of 7 WISP tags, Reliable MTD returns a Bit Record (BR) to the server to 
check if the set of tags is intact and lets the server collect the sensor values. We will discuss the 
data structure of a Bit Record soon. 
In this protocol, we assume that WISP tags resolve collisions using a slotted ALOHA 
[Lee05, Zhen05] like scheme. The reader first broadcasts a frame size and a random number, 
, 
, to all the tags. Here, 
 is a random number and  is the frame size. The frame consists of  
short-response time slots right after the request. Each tag uses the random number r and its id to 
hash to a Slot Position, &|, between s1, t where  &| = ℎ⨁
 mod . Each tag creates an 
encrypted version of the sensor data, _ , using the following method: 
_ = ℎ⨁
_ 
Finally the tag sends the encrypted data, _, to the slot position SP. Tags that 
successfully transmit their data are instructed to keep silent in the following rounds.  Tags that 
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pick the same slot for replying will face a collision and they will be given chance to retransmit in 
subsequent rounds. For each round, the reader forms a Bit Record (BR) by maintaining an array 
of slot positions. Whenever the reader receives any sensor data, it is stored in that slot position. 
Upon receiving 0 or collision, respective values are stored in corresponding slot positions.  
We modify the slot picking behavior used in typical tag collection protocol so that instead 
of having a tag pick a slot and return its id, we let the tags reply with the encrypted sensor data 
value _, signifying that the tag has chosen the slot. In other words, instead of the reader 
receiving 
{· · ·  | 1 | 0 | 6 | 54450 |  54450  |  · · ·}, 
where, 0 indicates no tag has picked that slot to reply, and collision denotes multiple tags 
trying to reply in the same slot, the reader will receive − 
{· · ·  | _ | 0 | _ | 54450 |  54450 |  · · ·}. 
After receiving the replies, the reader can insert a random number, r, in the collision slot. 
The final BR created by the reader from existing tag’s reply has the following structure: 
T =  {· · ·  | _ | 0 | _ | 
 | 
 |  · · ·}. 
This is more secure since the tag is not returning its id, and the sensor data is sent in 
encrypted form which seems purely random to the adversary. Our protocol exploits the fact that 
tags pick reply slots in a deterministic fashion. Thus, given a particular random number 
 and 
frame size , a tag will always pick the same slot to reply. Because the server knows the s of all 
tags, it knows in which slot each tag is supposed to respond with their sensor data. The server 
knows that it is supposed to get random numbers in the collision slots and it will discard those 
random numbers. The server knows the locations of the empty, singleton and collision slots. In 
fact the server can create its own bit record (T)ªAõªA ahead of time, with 0 for the empty slots, 
1 for the singleton slots, and random bits for the collision slot. The server can use this bit record 
T)ªAõªA to compare with the BR transmitted by the reader to identify the missing tags.  
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Algorithm 1: Interaction between server and reader( T) 
1. Server sends , 
 to the reader T 
2. R executes Algorithm 4 
3. All nearby tags executes Algorithm 3 
4. Pre-compute T)ªAõªA for all tags ¢ ∗ 
5. Receive T from T 
6. for  =  1 þ   do 
7.        if T)ªAõªA == 1   
8.               if (T  ) 
9.                       ℎ 6  Y
0 
10.               else  ℎ 6  05 Y
0 
11. end 
Figure 9.4 Algorithm for interaction between server and reader 
Algorithm 2:Interaction between WISP tags and reader T 
1. Reader broadcasts , 
 to all tags ¢ ∗ 
2. Each tag ¢ executes Alg. 3 
3. Reader executes Alg. 4 
4. Reader returns T to the server 
Figure 9.5 Algorithm for interaction between tags and reader 
Algorithm 3: Algorithm executed by WISP tags 
1. Receive , 
 from T 
2. for Each tag ¢ (where i = 1 to #)  
3.       compute &| = ℎ⨁
 mod  
4.       compute _ = ℎ⨁
_ 
5. end 
6. while R broadcasts Slot Position (&|) do 
7.        if  (SP = = SPi) then 
8.                return _ to R 
9. end 
Figure 9.6 Algorithm executed by WISP tags in MTD protocol 
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Algorithm 4: Algorithm executed by reader T 
1. Define T of length  
2. Initialize all entries of T to 0 
3. for Slot Position &| = 1 5  do 
4.       Broadcast &| and listen for reply 
5.       if 
Y4[_
06 ! =  54450  
6.                Ts&|t = 
Y4[ 
7.       else  
8.                Ts&|t = 
 
9. end 
10. return T to the server 
Figure 9.7 Algorithm executed by the reader in MTD protocol 
If a slot is supposed to be singleton but the server finds it to be empty, then the tag that is 
mapped to that slot must be missing. This process can verify the existence of all tags that are 
mapped to the singleton slots. But it cannot verify existence of the tags that are mapped to the 
collision slots. 
In order to verify the existence of the tags that faced collisions during the first round, the 
reader executes the simple MTD protocol to learn of their presence. In the first round of reliable 
MTD, the reader detects missing tags and collects sensor values in the same time slot. But in 
following rounds, each existing tag’s detection and sensor data collection takes at most ( + ( 
time. For tags that are mapped to a collision slot as well as missing, the reader only needs ( time 
to detect its absence since there is no response time for them. Therefore, the execution time of 
complete reliable MTD is.  
 =   ∗ ( + ( ∗  7] +  2 ∗ ( ∗ 7] 
where 7] is the number of tags mapped to the collision slots and present. 7] is the 
number of tags mapped to collision slots but missing. Alg. 1 (see Figure 9.4) shows the overall 
interaction between the reader and the server. Each tag in the set executes Alg. 3 (see Figure 9.6) 
independently. 
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The reader executes Alg. 4 (see Figure 9.7) to generate the T and return it to the server. 
Notice MTD algorithm only requires a single round for missing tag detection and data collection. 
Furthermore, in Alg. 4, the tag does not need to return the tag id to the reader. Rather the tag 
sends the encrypted sensor value (that seems random to the attacker) to inform the reader of its 
presence. This reduces the communication cost since a second round of messages is not required 
to send the sensor data to the reader. 
9.4.3. Protocol description 
Monitor Step: In this step, the reader first broadcasts a frame size and a random number, 
, 
, to all the tags. Each WISP tag ¢ uses its own tag  and r to generate &| =
ℎ⨁
 mod  . At the same time, each tag calculates its own sensor data, _ =
ℎ⨁
_. When the slot position broadcasted by the reader matches with &|, tag ¢ 
replies _ in that slot position to the reader. Upon receiving replies from different tags, the 
reader forms the Bit Record (BR) of length f (frame size) to transmit to the server. Initially the 
reader assigns 0 to all the slot positions. However, the reader stores 
Y4[_
06 in those slot 
positions where it receives a reply. The reader stores a random number in the slot position where 
it receives a collision. This technique of bit assignment allows our search protocol to be secure 
against some major attacks which we will discuss in next section. The T is then transmitted to 
the server. The server calculates Bit Record, T)ªAõªA, for all the tags ahead of time. We assume 
that the frame size (f) is large enough to accommodate enough tags in the first round without 
collision.  
Next, the server compares between received T and T)ªAõªA. If any slot position of 
T)ªAõªA contain 1 and that slot position of T does not contain any data, the server become 
aware of that the tag data is missing. For the tags that faced collision in the first round, the reader 
broadcasts those s one after another. If the reader does not receive sensor data for any particular 
tag, it is detected as missing. 
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Collect Step: The collect step is executed by the server after the monitor phase is over. In 
this phase, the server computes the raw sensor data from the 
Y4[_
06 corresponding to each 
tag. The 
Y4[_
06 is an encrypted form of the raw sensor data. However, only the server can 
determine the correct sensor value since s for different tags are only known by the server. The 
server can compute the hash of the , i.e. ℎ. The server can XOR the hash, ℎ, with 
_ to determine 
_ using following steps: 
for Each tag ¢ (where i = 1 to N)  
      compute 
_ = ℎ⨁ _ 
end 
9.5. Protocol Analysis 
In this section, we analyze our second protocol, Reliable MTD protocol, against different 
types of attacks. 
9.5.1. Attack Model 
The goal of an adversary in a WISP based home healthcare system is to counterfeit a real 
tag with its real data such that it can only be distinguished from the real one with small 
probability. Evidently, this fake tag can let a fake object be identified as an authentic one. In this 
system, an adversary is denoted as Q. We assume Q is an active adversary who can listen to all 
the communications between the tag and the reader. The adversary can, for example, impersonate 
a tag and communicate with the valid reader. The adversary can even query a valid tag and learn 
the tag’s response. Each reader and tag controlled by the adversary are denoted as T and ¢ , 
respectively. T is unauthorized to have access to any real tags since T has no secret information 
(i.e. ) like the real reader T. However, the adversarial reader T can communicate with a valid 
tag. Even the fake tag ¢  can communicate with a legitimate reader. In both cases, the ultimate 
goal of the adversary is to perform various attacks in the system.  
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We assume that the adversary, the adversarial reader, and the adversarial tag have 
polynomially bounded resources. In addition, the adversary can launch physical attacks. 
However, the hardware based defenses against physical attacks are beyond the scope of this work. 
Our assumptions also include that the reader cannot be compromised. In our system, we consider 
following oracle construction:  
, , : The adversary eavesdrops within a channel to listen to the 
communication at time  between reader R and one of its communicating tag ¢. 
, , , : The adversary impersonates a reader R in a protocol session 
at time  and sends a message M to the tag ¢. 
, , , : The adversary impersonates a tag ¢ in a protocol 
session at time  and sends a message M to the reader R. 
, : The adversary queries a tag , to learn information during protocol 
session at time . 
 ¡, , : The adversary receives a message M from an entity U (e.g., either WT 
or R) during the execution of protocol session at time . 
9.5.2. Security Analysis 
For every attack, we first describe how the attack is performed by an adversary. Then 
how our protocol protects against the attack is explained. T and ¢ are referred to as a 
legitimate reader and legitimate tag. Each attack and defense, as a whole, has three phases: 
Phase 1. Learning phase: This phase represents pre-attack preparations. Adversary, Q 
uses non-destructive oracles such as , , , , , , , 
, , , , , , and  ¡, ,  on a set of target tags and 
reader. The goal of the adversary is to learn information related to tags and reader. 
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Phase 2. Attacking phase: Q starts to attack. Q may impersonate as a legitimate tag or 
reader. 
Phase 3. Defend Phase: Reliable MTD protocol is designed in such a way so that it can 
defend against the majority of the attacks performed by the adversary Q. Due to space limitation, 
here we only discuss three attacks. 
• Privacy Preservation 
Learning Phase: Here, Q repeatedly queries ¢ with different , 
 using 
,  , ,  to collect replies from the tags.  
Attacking phase: Q executes  ¡, ,  oracle to learn replies from the tags and 
create a bit record. The goal of the attacker is to learn the s of different tags and also the raw 
sensor values so that it can infer human activity or environmental situation. This is known as 
privacy violation. 
Defend Phase: Our protocol can preserve the privacy of individual WISP tags since none 
of the tags reply their . Therefore, the adversary cannot infer the s from the replies of the 
tags. Q cannot even find out the original sensor data. Each tag replies with an encrypted sensor 
data, ℎ⨁
_ which can be decrypted only by the server. Since the server only knows the 
 of different tags, only it can compute the hash value. So, none but the server can decrypt the 
encrypted sensor data to collect the raw data. 
• Tracking  
Learning Phase: Here, Q tries to track ¢ over time. Q succeeds if it can distinguish 
¢ from other tags. 
Attacking phase: Under this attack, Q repeatedly queries ¢ with different , 
 using 
oracle  ,  to learn about the slot picking behavior of the tags. Then the adversary 
executes oracle  ¡, ,  to receive replies from the tags. The goal of the attacker is to 
get a consistent reply that may become a signature of ¢.  
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Defend Phase: MTD is resistant against tracking. Let an adversary Q eavesdrop on the 
transaction between a reader T and the existing tags. So Q knows the queries and replies but Q 
cannot reverse compute the replies. The adversary can certainly be sure that monitoring has taken 
place. However, it will not be able to figure out which tag replied in which slot since it does not 
have the s of the tags. Moreover, the slot picking behavior of the tags changes with the change 
of  and 
. As a result, the outputs of all the tags seems to be purely random to the adversary Q. 
• Eavesdropping  
Learning Phase: Q executes the oracle ,  ,  and later uses this 
information to launch different attacks (ex. replay attack) 
Attacking phase: Q can learn every piece of information exchanged between T and ¢. 
The goal of Q is to use the data to impersonate a fake reader or a fake tag.  
Defend Phase: Our protocol is powerful against this attack. In our protocol Q will not be 
able to find out the expected reply of the tags. Q will not be able to find out any relation between 
the slot positions and tag replies. In each monitoring pass, all tags will pick a different slot based 
on the random number sent by the reader. Q can only observe the data sent by the reader and the 
tags. But Q will not be able to link the outputs of two parties and it will not be able to decrypt 
sensor data. It cannot even replay the messages since it cannot compute the correct slot position 
(given  and 
) without the knowledge of . Therefore, Q cannot impersonate  T or ¢and it 
cannot launch replay attack by using previous values. 
9.6. Evaluation Results 
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our two protocols by simulation. We use two 
metrics to compare the performance of the protocols − 1) protocol execution time and 2) time to 
determine the first missing tag.  The protocol execution time metric tells us how long it takes for 
a protocol to identify exactly how many tags are missing and which tags are missing. The second 
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metric tells us how long it takes a protocol to identify the missing-tag event, i.e. at least one tag is 
missing. 
(a) Number of missing tags follows an 
exponential distribution with mean 
20000 
(b) Number of missing tags follows an 
exponential distribution with mean 
35000 
(c) Number of missing tags follows an 
exponential distribution with mean 45000 
Figure 9.8 Comparison of Simple and Reliable MTD protocol based on protocol execution time 
 
(a) Number of missing tags follows an 
exponential distribution with mean 
20000 
(b) Number of missing tags follows an 
exponential distribution with mean 
35000 
(c) Number of missing tags follows an 
exponential distribution with mean 45000 
Figure 9.9 Comparison of Simple and Reliable MTD protocol based on the time to detect the first 
missing tag 
According to the technical specification of Philips I-Code system [Buettner08], a reader 
needs 0.4 to detect an empty slot, 0.8 to detect a collision or a singleton slot, and 2.4 to 
transmit a 96-bit piece of data. In our simple MTD protocol, we need to consider only the time to 
transmit short responses () = 0.4 ), long responses (( = 0.8 ) and time to transmit sensor 
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data (û* = 2.4 ). However, in the Reliable MTD protocol, we only need to identify single 
reply slots and collision slots. The efficiency of reliable MTD is also dependent on frame size . 
A smaller  has fewer slots, which results in faster performance. We assume the duration of each 
slot is equally long. 
In our simulated WISP environment, we considered 7 =  50,000 to 100,000 WISP tags 
and one legitimate reader. Figure 5.8 shows the execution time of our two protocols. We assume 
that the number of missing tags in the system follows an exponential distribution with mean = 
10000 in Figure 9.8(a), mean = 35000 in Figure 9.8(b) and mean = 45000 in Figure 9.8(c).  We 
ran each simulation 100 times with different random seeds and took the average of these values to 
produce a point on the graph. The first set of simulation results (Figure 9.8 (a) (b) (c)) shows that 
the reliable MTD protocol performs increasingly better than the simple MTD protocol, especially 
when there is a large number of missing tags in the system. For example, when N = 100000, the 
time of the reliable MTD is 65.3% of the time taken by simple MTD. 
The second set of simulations studies the relation between the number of missing tags 
and the time to detect the first missing tag. From the experimental results shown in figure (Figure 
9.9 (a) (b) (c)) it is evident that it takes less time to find out whether some tags are missing than to 
actually identify all of them. This is also an important feature for systems that require a quick 
check on the tags on whether the set of tags is intact. All the results of Figure 9.9 also illustrate 
that the simple MTD takes more time to detect missing tag than the Reliable MTD protocol. 
9.7. Discussion 
The overall goal of this research work was to investigate the solution of missing WISP 
tag detection that can be very significant in any WISP based monitoring systems. Since the 
decision making of such a system depends on each individual WISP tag, the absence of any tag 
data may raise questions about reliability of the system’s decision. If the missing tag event goes 
undetected and any wrong decision is taken by the system, it can be even more critical from the 
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point of view of the system’s user. Therefore, from the point of view of system’s functionality 
accuracy, missing WISP tag detection is an important problem.  
In this chapter, we propose a simple and reliable missing tag detection protocol that can 
be useful in the above mentioned application areas where reliability and security is the primary 
focus. However, our protocol has a minor limitation. In secure and reliable MTD, there can be 
situations where existing tags in the systems are compromised by an adversary and are instructed 
to keep silent during the execution of the protocol. We call this type of attack a “concealing 
attack”. It is very hard to defend against a concealing attack and it is out of the scope of this work. 
However, investigation of defense mechanism for concealing attack can be a good future work. 
9.8. Goals Satisfied by MTD Protocol 
The motivating example of CRFID application for this chapter is critical CRFID 
applications where the reliability of the system’s decision is really very important. In such 
applications the main goal of the system is ensure that the decision taken by the system is reliable 
or accurate enough since the overall collective decision of the system may have an impact on 
human lives. Therefore, ensuring decision making reliability (by indentifying missing data in the 
system) as well as reducing response time are two major goals in these types of applications. 
MTD protocol is able to achieve these goals since it allows identifying the missing tags as well as 
ensures system security and decision reliability. 
9.9. Summary 
In this chapter, we considered the problem of identifying the missing tags in CRFID 
based critical systems. To address this problem, we propose a secure protocol to monitor for 
missing tags, identified the missing ones without sacrificing the performance of the system.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, we summarize the contributions of the dissertation and present some 
future research directions. 
10.1. Research Achievements 
RFID technology is increasingly being deployed in diverse applications ranging from 
inventory management to counterfeiting prevention. With the emergence and deployment of 
computational RFID tags, the application of this technology will become even more extensive. 
Nonetheless, RFID tags have yet to replace the ubiquitous barcode found on almost every grocery 
product. This slow adoption is partly due to the security and privacy concerns over the pervasive 
deployment of RFID tags. With commodities as varied as bank notes, airport luggage, and 
clothing items, the security and privacy aspects of each system need to be individually addressed.  
Usually general RFID authentication protocols are used for ensuring security and preserving 
privacy in all applications. However, each RFID application has its own specific requirements. 
For example, RFID systems for healthcare, supply chain and military battlefield have different 
security, privacy and performance requirements. Therefore, our focus in this dissertation is to 
ensure that RFID system specific goals are met without sacrificing performance.  
To address the above mentioned goals, the methodologies that we have presented in this 
dissertation represent a complete solution to the security and privacy issues of couple of major 
real life RFID applications. We can use encryption and digital signatures in our scheme despite 
the use of passive read/write tags, which are resource constrained. This scheme can be deployed 
without any changes to the existing EPC Class 1 architecture. Further, it can be integrated with 
the EPC Network.  
The main achievements of the research presented in this dissertation can be summarized 
as follows: 
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• Detecting Counterfeits in Large Scale RFID Systems Using Batch Authentication 
Protocol: In Chapter 6, we propose to detect counterfeit tags in large scale system using efficient 
batch authentication. In large scale RFID applications (such as supply chain, retail industry, and 
pharmaceutical industry) tag authentication is used to detect counterfeit products. However, RFID 
authentication protocols are mainly per-tag based where a reader needs to authenticate tags 
sequentially. This increases the overall protocol execution time. To address this, we propose 
Frames Slotted ALOHA (FSA) based protocol, FTest, to meet the requirements of prompt and 
reliable batch authentication in large-scale RFID applications. FTest can determine the validity of 
a batch of tags with minimal execution time which is a major goal of large-scale RFID systems. 
FTest can reduce protocol execution time by ensuring that the percentage of potential counterfeit 
products is less than a user-defined threshold. Our experimental result demonstrates that FTest 
performs significantly better than the existing counterfeit detection approaches, e.g. 
authentication techniques. 
• Preserving Privacy in RFID based Healthcare Systems: In Chapter 7 we address the 
tradeoff between privacy and reliability in RFID based healthcare systems. RFID has received 
considerable attention within the healthcare community since early 2000. However, the prospect 
of wide spread use of RFID in the healthcare area has also triggered discussions regarding 
privacy. There are basically two types of privacy preservation issues in RFID based healthcare: 1) 
A privacy preserving authentication protocol is required while sensing RFID tag for different 
identification and monitoring purposes; 2) A privacy preserving access control framework is 
required to maintain user preferred privacy while accessing various healthcare services based on 
RFID identification data. To address the above mentioned research issues, we propose two 
component based framework (PriSens-HSAC). The PriSens component proposes a group based 
anonymous authentication protocol to solve the tradeoff between the scalability and privacy 
problems of RFID sensing in healthcare. The HSAC component proposes a privacy preserving 
healthcare service access mechanism to maintain the users’ privacy while accessing various 
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healthcare services. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first framework to provide increased 
privacy in RFID based healthcare using authentication along with access control technique.  
• Ensuring Survivability of RFID Systems using a Robust Authentication Protocol: In 
Chapter 8 we introduce computational RFID tags and their possible application areas. WISP tags 
are an example of Computational RFID (CRFID) which is used in many sophisticated 
applications like: enemy move detection in military battlefields, and activity inference in elderly 
care systems. In these types of systems, an adversary may create more collisions to initiate a de-
synchronization attack. This, in turn, may result in Denial of Service (DoS) attack, increase the 
system response time, and jeopardize the survivability of the system. In an effort to address the 
survivability issues in CRFID based sophisticated applications, we propose DRAP protocol. This 
protocol can return desynchronized tags and readers to their synchronous state. Therefore, it 
provides robustness and ensures survivability. Our simulation results show that DRAP reduces 
the collision rate significantly to increase the system performance. 
• Detecting Missing WISP Tags for Improved Decision Reliability of CRFID based 
Systems: In Chapter 9, we present missing tags detection protocols for CRFID based critical 
systems. Recently, WISP tags, one type of CRFID tags, have been used to monitor indoor 
activity, vital signs, sleep quality, and health status remotely. However, these critical CRFID 
based systems are very sensitive in terms of decision reliability. Any missing tag data in these 
systems may introduce error in the final decision of the system and this may reduce system’s 
decision reliability. To address this problem and to maintain system’s decision reliability, we 
propose two tag monitoring protocols for CRFID based critical systems based on probabilistic 
methods. We also report the performance comparison of our protocols. The goal of these 
protocols is to improve the security and decision reliability of CRFID based critical systems. 
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10.2. Future Research Directions 
There are many possible research topics for further study within the area of RFID 
security and privacy. We mention some possible research directions related to the work described 
in this dissertation: 
• In FTest Protocol, we assumed that all tags (both legitimate and counterfeit) will be 
honest, i.e., all tags will reply when queried by a reader. In our attack model, we did not consider 
counterfeit tags that may not reply to hide their identity during the query phase. However, in an 
active adversarial environment the counterfeit tags may not reply at all to hide their identity and 
we name this attack as “concealing attack”. It is very hard to defend against concealing attack and 
it is out of the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, one future research direction would be to 
investigate defense mechanisms against concealing attack in FTest Protocol. 
• One other future research direction in case of FTest protocol is to investigate the protocol 
performance for different batch sizes and for varying ∆ values. In this regards, one could also 
investigate the design of a lightweight batch authentication protocol based on key transportation 
and authentication using threshold secret sharing scheme which provides strong security on low-
cost RFID tags.  
• In PriSens-HSAC framework, one research investigation could be to investigate the 
performance and accuracy of the entire framework by utilizing it in various real scenarios for 
different user roles like: Physician, Emergency care provider, and Pharmacist. To better 
investigate the privacy preservation issue one could also test the accuracy of the framework by 
simulating the system scenario under various attacks. 
• One other research direction in case of PriSens-HSAC framework can be to investigate 
the privacy levels achieved for different types of service requests and different attacks. 
• Another future research direction in the context of privacy preservation in RFID systems 
could be to study the privacy threats in RFID data publishing phase and show that traditional 
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anonymization techniques are not applicable for RFID data due to its challenging properties: 
high-dimensional, sparse, and sequential. Future research can also be focused to adopt a newer 
privacy model like LKC-privacy that can overcome these challenges in the data publishing phase. 
• In DRAP Protocol, we use EDFSA based communication technique while the tag and 
reader communicates with each other to reduce the collision rate so that optimum system 
efficiency can be achieved. However, one future research could be to investigate how the protocol 
performs when the underlying communication technique is varied. The underlying 
communication technique can be varied by varying the frame sizes for the following protocols: 
pure slotted ALOHA, framed slotted ALOHA, dynamic framed slotted ALOHA.  
• One major future research work could be to develop an emulator for secure RFID 
protocol testing so that the real performance of all the protocols proposed in this dissertation can 
be tested. The aim of this future work could be to better understand the nature of various attacks 
launched in different RFID system and how our protocols can address them. This work can be 
further extended by investigating the performance of our protocol under collaborative attack. 
• This dissertation only considers RFID protocols using symmetric cryptography, primarily 
those using hash functions. There are a number of other general RFID protocols that needs further 
study, including RFID protocols using asymmetric cryptography. There could also be many 
attacks on RFID systems that we have not identified. Thus, further study of such protocols and 
possible attacks would be really significant. 
• In this dissertation, we have also assumed that the channel between the back-end server 
and the reader is secure. Therefore, we have not dealt with security threats arising on that 
channel. However, in some applications, this communication channel may be unsecure, for 
example, the channel me be an unsecure wireless channel. Thus, development of secure 
authentication protocols over this channel should be studied further. 
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Chapter 12: Appendix 
Glossary of Terms 
Term Definition 
Anonymity Anonymity is the state of not being identifiable within a set 
Authentication 
Authentication means the act of confirming someone (or something) 
as authentic. 
Backend server/ 
central server/ 
backend database 
A backend server is a trusted server that contains all the information 
of all tags in RFID system and it can access these information from 
its database by using the tag’s response as a key 
Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is the act of secretly listening to the private 
conversation between two parties 
Gen 2 
The second generation air interface for communication between an 
RFID reader and tag, administered by EPC global Inc. It deals with 
the modulation scheme, packet structure, command language and 
methods for dealing with collision. 
Lightweight 
Cryptography 
Cryptographic operations that require low computational and 
processing power to be performed 
Nonce A random number that never repeats its value 
Pervasive computing 
Pervasive computing provides an environment where information 
and services can be accessed remotely from the environment 
specially through wireless technologies 
Privacy 
The notion of controlling where, when, to whom and what amount 
of information is provided to the external entities 
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Public key 
cryptography 
A class of algorithms for cryptography that use a pair cryptographic 
key: public key (known to public) and private key (known only to 
the owner). 
RFID systems 
RFID is an abbreviation of Radio Frequency IDentification. It is a 
data collection technology that uses electronic tags for storing data. 
RFID tags 
A microchip attached to an antenna that is packaged in a way that it 
can be applied to an object. The tag picks up signals from and sends 
signals to a reader. The tag contains a unique serial number. 
Reader 
A device used to communicate with RFID tags. The reader has one 
or more antennas, which emit radio waves and receive signals back 
from the tag. 
Security 
Process of creating a computing platform that ensures only allowed 
actions are performed. 
Symmetric key 
cryptography 
A class of algorithms for cryptography that use shared secret 
cryptographic keys 
WISP 
WISP stands for Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform. 
WISPs have the capabilities of RFID tags, but also support sensing 
and computing. 
 
